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ABSTRACT 
 
Interim Measures are viewed as an essential means to protect parties‘ rights in international 
commercial arbitration disputes. Most Arbitration Laws and Rules have recognised the 
arbitral tribunal‘s power to grant such measures. The success of this system relies on the 
court‘s assistance of the tribunal during the process. This relationship between the tribunal 
and the court is something vague under Egyptian Law, since there are no clear rules 
addressing the matter. Hence, this research examines the theories that explain the tribunal‘s 
authority and the relationship with the authority of the court.  
 
This study uses a comparative analytical approach in terms of analyzing relevant legal texts 
to determine the optimal legal approach to the issue. The purpose of the study is to address 
deficiencies in the Egyptian law – the Code of Civil Procedure and Egyptian Arbitration Law 
– and compare it with English, Scottish Arbitration Acts and international arbitration systems, 
laws, and practices. 
 
The findings of this research offer several recommendations that could help achieve a 
successful and smooth arbitration process. This study identifies and explains types of interim 
measures and explores the international practice of every type. It gives some important 
recommendations for future development and improvement of the Egyptian law. It also 
makes general recommendations that would help improve the efficiency of the English and 
Scottish laws. 
 
Further research directions are also suggested in light of the findings and potential limitations 
of this study. 
 
II 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Wael Shalaan, hereby declare that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been 
submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other 
university or institute of learning.  
 
III 
 
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT 
 
Copyright of the text of this thesis rests with the author. Copies (by any process) either in 
full, or extracts, may be made only in accordance with instructions given by the author and 
lodged in the University of Stirling. Details may be obtained from the Librarian. This page 
must form part of any such copies made. Further copies (by any process) of copies made in 
accordance with such instructions may not be made without the permission (in writing) of the 
author.  
 
The ownership of any intellectual property rights which may be described in this thesis is 
vested in the University of Stirling, subject to any prior agreement to the contrary, and may 
not be made available for use by third parties without the written permission of the 
University, which will prescribe the terms and conditions of any such agreement.  
 
IV 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
My first thanks go to the greatest Almighty Allah, the Glorious, for his mercy and help. 
Without His blessings, none of this work would have been possible.  
 
I extend my sincere thanks to all who have helped and encouraged me during the years of my 
research, especially my parents for their believing in me, my wife for her great support and 
help, and my family and my friends for their encouragement to finish this research. 
 
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Fraser Davidson, my principal 
supervisor, for his patience, flexibility, genuine caring, and for his great efforts to explain 
things clearly and simply. I am forever grateful. Special thanks go to the University of Stirling 
staff for their great help with facilitating everything that I needed in this work.  
 
My gratitude is also extended to the Grand Imam and President of Al-Azhar, Prof. Ahmed El-
Tayyib, for encouraging me to get this scholarship. I will forever be thankful to the former 
deans of the School of Shari‘a and Law, Prof. Hamed Abou Talib and Prof. Abdel Samie 
Abul Khair, for their unlimited support and encouragement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
I1. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 11 
II1. Aims of Research ..................................................................................................... 11 
III1. Research Outline and Limitation ............................................................................. 12 
Chapter 1 ................................................................................................................................ 14 
1.1 What Are Provisional Measures? ............................................................................ 14 
1.1.1 Definition ............................................................................................................. 14 
1.1.2 UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 definition ............................................................ 17 
1.1.3 Interim or Provisional .......................................................................................... 24 
1.1.4 Order or Award .................................................................................................... 25 
1.1.5 Characteristics of Interim Measures .................................................................... 29 
1.1.6 Types of Interim Measures .................................................................................. 31 
Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................................ 34 
2.1 Measures for Taking/Preserving Evidence .............................................................. 34 
2.1.1 Preserving Evidence under Egyptian Laws ......................................................... 34 
2.1.1.1 Arbitral Tribunals and Preserving Evidence ................................................ 35 
2.1.1.1.1 Preserving Witness Testimony .............................................................. 38 
2.1.1.1.2 Preserving Documents ........................................................................... 44 
2.1.1.2 The Egyptian Courts‘ Powers regarding the Preservation of Evidence....... 47 
2.1.1.2.1 Petition orders ........................................................................................ 51 
2.1.1.2.2 Third party possession of documents ..................................................... 54 
2.1.1.3 Preserving evidence by appointment of experts .......................................... 56 
2.1.1.4 Expert appointments in Egyptian Law ........................................................ 59 
2.1.1.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 63 
2.1.2 Preserving evidence in the Scottish Arbitration Act ............................................ 65 
2.1.2.1 Outline of the Scotland (Arbitration) Act 2010 ........................................... 65 
2.1.2.2 Preserving Evidence under the Scottish Arbitration Act ............................. 66 
2.1.2.2.1 The power of the tribunal to preserve evidence by directions and orders
 70 
2.1.2.2.2 Tribunal's power to preserve evidence by provisional awards .............. 74 
2.1.2.2.2.1 The concept of a provisional award under Rule 39(2)(d) ............... 75 
2.1.2.2.2.2 The concept of a provisional award under Rule 53 as procedural 
relief 78 
VI 
 
2.1.2.3 Court power to preserve evidence under the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010
 81 
2.1.2.3.1 Court intervention to preserve evidence under Rule 45......................... 83 
2.1.2.3.1.1 Application Procedures ................................................................... 84 
2.1.2.3.2 Court intervention to preserve evidence under Rule 46......................... 85 
2.1.2.3.2.1 Conditions for court intervention under Rule 46 ............................ 86 
2.1.2.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................. 87 
2.1.3 Preserving Evidence in the English Arbitration Act 1996 (EAA) ....................... 90 
2.1.3.1 Outline of the English Arbitration Act ........................................................ 90 
2.1.3.2 The Arbitral Tribunal's Power to Preserve Dispute Evidence ..................... 93 
2.1.3.2.1 Arbitral Tribunal Directions (Interim Protection Order) to 
Preserve Dispute Evidence ...................................................................................... 97 
2.1.3.2.1.1 Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller Relief under Section 38 ..... 100 
2.1.3.2.1.1.1 Mareva Injunction .................................................................. 101 
2.1.3.2.1.1.2 Anton Piller Relief  ................................................................ 105 
2.1.3.2.1.2 Preservation of Evidence by the Tribunal‘s Peremptory Orders .. 109 
2.1.3.2.1.3 Preservation of Evidence by an Provisional Award or Order  ...... 111 
2.1.3.2.1.4 Preservation of Evidence under Section 48 .................................. 113 
2.1.3.2.2 Court Power to Preserve Evidence in the English Arbitration Act 1996
 114 
2.1.3.2.2.1 Conditions for Court Intervention in Arbitration Proceedings ..... 116 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1 Court Intervention in Non-urgent Cases ................................ 116 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1.1 Conditions for Court Intervention in Non-urgent Cases . 120 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1.1.1 Absence of Agreement to Prevent Court Intervention
 120 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1.1.2 Arbitral Tribunal's Permission or Request ............... 121 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1.1.3 Written Agreement of Parties Allowing 
Court Intervention 122 
2.1.3.2.2.1.2 Court Intervention in Urgent Cases ....................................... 122 
2.1.3.2.2.1.3 Revision of Court Orders by Arbitral Tribunal...................... 124 
2.1.3.2.3 Appointment of Experts, Legal Adviser or Assessors in 
English Arbitration Act 1996 ................................................................................. 127 
2.1.3.2.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 128 
Chapter 3 .............................................................................................................................. 131 
3.1. Measures to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable harm. ..................... 131 
3.1.1. Measures to regulate the status quo and prevent irreparable harm in 
Egyptian Arbitration Law .............................................................................................. 134 
3.1.1.1. The arbitral tribunal preserving the status quo. ......................................... 134 
VII 
 
3.1.1.2. The court and preserving the status quo .................................................... 136 
3.1.1.2.1. Lawsuit ................................................................................................ 137 
3.1.1.2.2. Petitions............................................................................................... 138 
3.1.2. Measures to regulate the status quo and prevent irreparable harm in the 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 .................................................................................... 140 
3.1.2.1. Preservation of the status quo by the arbitral tribunal ............................... 140 
3.1.2.2. Preservation of the status quo by the court ................................................ 146 
3.1.2.2.1. Sale of property order ......................................................................... 146 
3.1.2.2.2. Warrants for arrestment or inhibition orders ...................................... 147 
3.1.2.2.3. Interdict ............................................................................................... 148 
3.1.2.2.4. Interim or permanent orders................................................................ 149 
3.1.3. Preserving the status quo in the English Arbitration Act 1996 ..................... 149 
3.1.3.1. Preservation of the status quo by the arbitral tribunal. .............................. 150 
3.1.3.2. Preservation of the status quo by the Court. .............................................. 151 
3.1.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 153 
Chapter 4 .............................................................................................................................. 155 
4.1 Security for Costs Measure .................................................................................... 155 
4.1.1 Preamble ............................................................................................................ 155 
4.1.2 Security for Costs: Definition ............................................................................ 157 
4.1.3 Different Aspects for Security for Costs ........................................................... 160 
4.1.3.1 Objections and Answers on Security for Costs ......................................... 161 
4.1.3.1.1 Violation of Confidentiality ................................................................. 162 
4.1.3.1.1.1 Answer .......................................................................................... 162 
4.1.3.1.2 Security for Costs and Access to Justice (Justice Denied) .................. 164 
4.1.3.1.2.1 The Answer ................................................................................... 165 
4.1.3.1.3 The Absence of Clear Rules or Criteria Addressing This Measure ..... 168 
4.1.3.1.3.1 The Answer ................................................................................... 169 
4.1.3.1.4 Security for Costs Increases Arbitration Cost and Causes 
Financial Damage 171 
4.1.3.1.4.1 The Answer ................................................................................... 171 
4.1.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 173 
4.1.5 Egyptian Arbitration Law and Security for Costs ............................................. 175 
4.1.5.1 Egyptian Court and Security for Costs ...................................................... 176 
4.1.5.2 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 178 
4.1.5.2.1 Regarding Egyptian Arbitration Law................................................... 178 
4.1.5.2.2 Regarding Egyptian Civil Procedure Law ........................................... 179 
4.1.6 Security for Costs under Scottish and English Arbitration Laws ...................... 180 
VIII 
 
4.1.7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 183 
Chapter 5 .............................................................................................................................. 184 
5.1 Preamble ................................................................................................................ 184 
5.2 Some aspects of Provisional Payment Measures ................................................... 187 
5.3 Provisional Payment Measures under the Egyptian Arbitration Law of 1994 ...... 191 
5.3.1 Arbitral Tribunal Provisional Payment Order ................................................... 191 
5.3.2 The Provisional Payment Measure (Provisional Expenses) before the 
Egyptian Court ............................................................................................................... 192 
5.4 Provisional Payment Orders under the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 .............. 194 
5.4.1 Orders Issued by the Arbitral Tribunal .............................................................. 194 
5.4.2 Provisional Payments ordered by the Scottish Courts ....................................... 196 
5.5 Provisional Payment Orders under the English Arbitration Act 1996 .................. 198 
5.5.1 Provisional Payment Ordered by the Arbitral Tribunal ..................................... 198 
5.5.2 Provisional Payment Ordered by the English Court .......................................... 200 
5.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 201 
5.6.1 Egyptian Law ..................................................................................................... 202 
5.6.2 The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 ................................................................. 202 
5.6.3 The English Arbitration Act .............................................................................. 203 
Chapter 6 .............................................................................................................................. 204 
6.1 Anti-Suit Injunctions ............................................................................................. 204 
6.1.1 Preamble ............................................................................................................... 204 
6.1.2 Anti-Suit Injunction Historical Background ...................................................... 206 
6.1.3 Definition of Anti-Suit Injunction ..................................................................... 209 
6.1.4 Anti-Suit Injunction on Balance ........................................................................ 210 
6.1.4.1 Allianz SpA v West Tankers Case .............................................................. 211 
6.1.4.2 Arbitration matters fall outside the scope of Brussels Regulation No 
44/2001. 214 
6.1.4.2.1 ECJ‘s Answer....................................................................................... 215 
6.1.4.3 The anti-suit injunction and the personam effect ...................................... 216 
6.1.4.3.1 ECJ‘s Answer....................................................................................... 216 
6.1.4.4 Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Principle of Comity .................................... 218 
6.1.4.4.1 Answer ................................................................................................. 218 
6.1.4.5 An Anti-Suit Injunction is Consistent with Modern and International Law
 220 
6.1.4.5.1 The Answer .......................................................................................... 221 
6.1.4.6 Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Right to a Fair Trial (Denial of Justice) ..... 221 
6.1.4.6.1 The Answer .......................................................................................... 222 
IX 
 
6.1.4.7 Anti-suit Injunctions and the Principle of Mutual Trust ............................ 224 
6.1.4.8 Anti-Suit Injunction and New York Convention ....................................... 225 
6.1.4.8.1 The Answer .......................................................................................... 226 
6.1.4.9 Other Aspects of Anti-Suit Injunctions ..................................................... 228 
6.1.4.9.1 Economic Interests ............................................................................... 228 
6.1.4.9.2 Anti-anti-suit injunction (Clash of Jurisdictions) ................................ 229 
6.1.5 Anti-Suit Injunctions under Egyptian Law. ....................................................... 232 
6.1.5.1 Anti-Suit Injunction under Egyptian Arbitration Law ............................... 232 
6.1.5.2 Anti-Suit Injunctions under Egyptian Civil Procedure Law ...................... 234 
6.1.5.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 235 
6.1.6 Anti-Suit Injunctions under Scottish Law ......................................................... 236 
6.1.6.1 The situation after West Tankers ............................................................... 237 
6.1.6.2 The power of arbitral tribunals to issue anti-suit interdicts under Scottish 
Law 238 
6.1.6.2.1 Where there is no agreement to make such remedy available ............. 238 
6.1.6.2.2 The parties agree on this remedy ......................................................... 239 
6.1.6.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 239 
6.1.7 Anti-suit Injunctions under English Law ........................................................... 240 
6.1.7.1 Arbitral Tribunal‘s Power to Grant an Anti-Suit Injunction ..................... 241 
6.1.7.1.1 Tribunal‘s Power under Section 48...................................................... 241 
6.1.7.1.2 The Tribunal‘s Power under Section 38 .............................................. 242 
6.1.7.1.3 The Tribunal‘s Power under Section 39 .............................................. 244 
6.1.8 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 244 
Chapter 7 .............................................................................................................................. 247 
7.1 The Conditions for Granting Provisional Measures .............................................. 247 
7.1.1 Case Conditions ................................................................................................. 250 
7.1.1.1 Urgency ...................................................................................................... 250 
7.1.1.2 Irreparable Harm ........................................................................................ 252 
7.1.1.3 The Non-effect of the requested measures on the substantive matters ...... 254 
7.1.2 Conditions of the Arbitral Tribunal ................................................................... 255 
7.1.2.1 The Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to take Interim Measures .......... 255 
7.1.2.2 Reasonable Chance of Success on the Merits ............................................ 256 
7.1.3 Conditions of the Applicant ............................................................................... 257 
7.1.3.1 Providing Security ..................................................................................... 257 
7.1.3.2 Party request .............................................................................................. 259 
7.1.3.3 Good faith (bona fide) ............................................................................... 259 
7.1.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 261 
X 
 
7.1.5 The Conditions for granting Interim Measures under Egyptian Arbitration Law
 261 
7.1.5.1 The Arbitral Tribunal‘s Conditions ........................................................... 261 
7.1.5.1.1 The Arbitral Tribunal‘s Jurisdiction .................................................... 262 
7.1.5.1.2 Necessity for the Interim Measures ..................................................... 262 
7.1.5.1.3 Party request......................................................................................... 263 
7.1.5.1.4 The linking between the required Measures and the Subject of the 
Dispute 263 
7.1.5.1.5 Providing Security ............................................................................... 264 
7.1.5.2 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 264 
7.1.5.3 The Conditions under Egyptian Civil Procedure Law ............................... 265 
7.1.5.3.1 Urgency ................................................................................................ 265 
7.1.5.3.2 Non-prejudice of substantive matters .................................................. 266 
7.1.5.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 267 
7.1.6 The Conditions for granting Interim Measures under Scottish and 
English Arbitration Acts ................................................................................................ 267 
7.1.6.1 Arbitral tribunal conditions for granting the interim measures ................. 267 
7.1.6.1.1 Agreement of the parties ...................................................................... 268 
7.1.6.1.2 Provisional Basis .................................................................................. 268 
7.1.6.2 Court conditions for granting interim measures ........................................ 269 
7.1.6.2.1 Agreement of the parties  ..................................................................... 269 
7.1.6.2.2 Commencement of the arbitration process and arbitral tribunal consent
 270 
7.1.6.2.3 Urgency ................................................................................................ 270 
7.1.6.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 271 
Chapter 8 .............................................................................................................................. 272 
8.1 Summary of the research ....................................................................................... 272 
8.2 Implications for Practice ........................................................................................ 273 
8.2.1 Recommendations for Egyptian Lawmakers ..................................................... 274 
8.2.2 Recommendation for Scottish Lawmaker ......................................................... 277 
8.2.3 Recommendation for English Lawmaker .......................................................... 277 
8.3 Contributions to knowledge ................................................................................... 278 
8.3.1 For Egyptian and Middle East Arbitration Laws ............................................... 278 
8.3.2 For Arbitration in Scotland ................................................................................ 279 
8.3.3 For Arbitration in England ................................................................................. 279 
8.4 Limitations of the research .................................................................................... 279 
8.5 Further research ..................................................................................................... 280 
8.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 280 
XI 
 
I BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................ 281 
  
XII 
 
Table of Abbreviations 
     
A I A J    Asian International Arbitration Journal 
Afr J Int'l & Comp L.   African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
Am J Comp L    American Journal of Comparative Law 
Am Rev Int'l Arb.   American Review of International Arbitration 
Am U Int'l L Rev.   American University International Law Review 
Arb Intl.    Arbitration International 
ASA Bull.    ASA Bulletin 
Aust Bar Rev.    Australian Bar Review 
Brook J Int'l L    Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
C J Q     Civil Justice Quarterly 
Cardozo J Conflict Resol.  Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 
CIA     Chartered Institute of Arbitrators  
CIArb     Journal of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
Colum J Transnat'l L.   Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
Croat Arbit Yearb   Croatian Arbitration Yearbook  
Disp Resol J.    Dispute Resolution Journal 
EAL     Egyptian Arbitration Law  
ECPL     Egyptian Civil Procedures  
EEL     Egyptian Evidence Law 
EU      European Union  
FAA      French Arbitration Association  
FOSFA     Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations  
GAFTA     Grain and Feed Trade Association 
I C L Q.    International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
IBA      International Bar Association  
ICC      International Chamber of Commerce  
ICCA      International Council for Commercial Arbitration  
ICDR      International Center for Dispute Resolution  
ICSID  International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes 
Int A L R    International Arbitration Law Review 
XIII 
 
Int Bus Lawy.    International Business Lawyer  
Int'l Trade & Bus L Ann.  International Trade and Business Law Annual 
J B L     Journal of Business Law 
J Int'l Arb.    Journal of International Arbitration 
J Priv Int L    Journal of Private International Law  
L M C L Q    Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
N Y L J.    New York Law Journal  
NAI      Netherlands Arbitration Institute  
PCA      Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague)  
Rev.arb    Revue de l'Arbitrage    
SCC      Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Institute  
SIAC      Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
Tex Int'l L J.    Texas International Law Journal 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission for International Trade 
Law  
UNECAFE United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East  
UNECE    United Nations Economic Commission for Europe  
UNIDROIT    International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
Unif L Rev    Uniform Law Review 
WIPO     World Intellectual Property Organisation 
General Abbreviations 
AA      Arbitration Act  
AC      Law Reports, House of Lords (Appeal Cases)  
ADR      Alternative Dispute Resolution  
ADRLJ     Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal  
All ER     All England Law Reports  
ALR      Australian Law Reports  
AO      Arbitration Ordinance  
AR      Arbitration Rules  
Arb Int     Arbitration International  
Arb J      Arbitration Journal  
BYBIL     British Yearbook of International Law  
XIV 
 
CA      Court of Appeal of England and Wales  
CCP      Code of Civil Procedure  
ChD      Chancery Division  
CLR      Common Wealth Law Reports  
Comm     Commercial  
Con LR     Construction Law Reports  
CPR      Civil Procedure Rules  
DAC      Departmental Advisory Committee  
Dis Res J     Dispute Resolution Journal  
ECHR     European Convention on Human Rights  
ECJ      Court of Justice of the European Communities  
English AA 1996    English Arbitration Act 1996  
ER      English Reports  
EU      European Union  
European Convention European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 1961  
European Ct HR    European Court of Human Rights  
EWCA Civ  Neutral Citation for England and Wales Court of 
Appeal civil division decisions 
Geneva Convention  the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 1927  
Geneva Protocol    the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses 1923  
Harv Int'l LJ     Harvard International Law Journal  
HKHC     Hong Kong High Court   
HKLJ      Hong Kong Law Journal  
HL      House of Lords  
IBA Rules  IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International 
Commercial Arbitration 1999  
ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull  International Chamber of Commerce International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin  
ICJ      International Court of Justice  
ICLQ      International and Comparative Law Quarterly  
ICSID  Centre  International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes  
XV 
 
ICSID Convention  Washington Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
other States 1965  
ICSID Rev‐FILJ    ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal  
ILA Rep     International Law Association Report  
Int'l Bus Law     International Business Lawyer  
Int'l Fin L Rev    International Financial Law Review  
Int'l Law     International Lawyer  
J Int'l Arb     Journal of International Arbitration  
J Law Soc Scotland    Journal of Law Society of Scotland  
J Mar L & Com    Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce  
JBL      Journal of Business Law  
KB      King's Bench  
Law & Policy in Int'l Bus   Law & Policy in International Business  
Lloyd's Rep     Lloyd's Law Reports  
LMCLQ     Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
New York Convention  New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958  
NSWLR     New South Wales Law Reports  
NY L Sch J Int' 1 & Comp L  New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law  
NYLJ      New York Law Journal  
NYULQ Rev     New York University Law Quarterly Review  
OJ      Official Journal of the European Communities  
QBD      Queen's Bench Division  
Rev Arb     Revue de l'arbitrage  
SPIL      Swiss Private International Law  
Texas Int'l LJ     Texas International Law Journal  
Tulane L Rev     Tulane Law Review  
UN      United Nations  
UNCITRAL Notes    UNCITRAL Notes Organizing Arbitral Proceedings  
US      United States of America  
YCA      Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 
 
XVI 
 
Table of Cases 
 
Australia  
 
 
Jackson v Hamer [1993] 113 FLR 216 (Family Court of Australia)  
 
Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell [1995] 1 Qd R 406 October 29(Supreme 
Court of Queensland)  
 
 
Court of Justice of the European Communities 
 
 
Allianz SpA v West Tankers C-185/07 [2009] All ER (D) 82 (Feb) 
 
Deweer v Belgium 1980 2 E H R R 439 (European Court of Human Rights) 
 
Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] C-116/02 09.12. (European Court of Justice)  
 
Mietz v Intership Yachting Sneek BV [1999] C99/96 E C R I-2277 27 April (European Court 
of Justice)  
 
Turner v Grovit [2004] C-159/02 27April 2004 (European Court of Justice)  
 
Van Uden Maritime BV (t/a Van Uden Africa Line) v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-
Line [1998] C 391/95 17 November (European Court of Justice)  
 
 
Egypt 
 
 
Amal Tourism Complex v. Minister of Tourism [2007] 4721 December 27 
 
Appeal No. 1678, Judicial Year 52 BC on 27 Mars 1989 (Court of Sessions) 
  
Soares Da Costa Construction Company v Arab Company for Investment [1996] 1975 year 
66 BC December 12 (Cairo Court of Cassation) 
  
Appeal No.49 of judicial year 117 BC (Cairo Court of Appeal circle 7(D) Commercial 
Arbitration) 
 
Appeal No. 1, Judicial Year 22 BC on 20 January 1955 (Court of Sessions) 
 
Appeal No. 797 of judicial year 12 BC on 16 October 1961 (Court of Sessions)  
 
Appeal No.772, Judicial Year 43 BC on 22 June 1977 (Court of Sessions)  
 
Appeal No 195 of judicial year 50 on 22 November 1983 (Court of Sessions) 
XVII 
 
Appeal No. 1682 of judicial year 49 BC on 3 December 1986 (Court of Sessions) 
 
Appeal No. 3705 of judicial year 59 BC on 10 April 1994 (Court of Sessions) 
 
Appeal No. 3935 of judicial year 60 BC on 4 January 1996 (Court of Sessions)  
  
Appeal No. 86 of judicial year 70 BC on 26 November 2002 (Court of Sessions) 
 
Appeal No 55/122, Seventh Commercial Division 7 April 2009 (Cairo Court of Appeal) 
 
 
United Kingdom  
 
 
A Ltd v B Bank [1997] F S R 165 31 July 1996 (Court of Appeal) 
  
A v B [2011] All ER (D) 184 (Jan) (QBD, Commercial Court) 
  
AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLC v Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC 
[2011] EWCA Civ 647 
 
Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 87 (Court of 
Appeal  
 
Airbus Industries GIE v Patel [1998] 2 All ER 257 (House of Lords)  
 
Allen v Thomson [2010] SLT (Sh Ct) 60 (Sheriff Court)  
 
Apollo Engineering Limited v James Scott Limited [2009] CSIH 39; 2009 S.C. 525 
 
Azov Shipping Co v Baltic Shipping Co (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) QBD (Commercial 
Court)  
 
Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techniki SA [1984] QB 291 (Queens Bench) (Robert Goff LJ)  
 
Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 3 All ER 353 
 
BMBF (No 12) Ltd v Harland and Wolff Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries Ltd [2001] All 
ER (D) 8 June (Court of Appeal) (Potter, Clarke LJJ, and Sir Martin Nourse)  
 
Bushby v Munday [1814-23] All ER Rep 304) 1821 05, 08 MARCH 1821 (Sir John Leach V-
C)  
 
Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Limited [2005] EWCA Civ 618 (Court of Appeal) (Clarke LJ)  
 
Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] A C 334 (House of 
Lords)  
 
Church Commissioners for England v Abbey National Plc [1994] SC 651 (Court of Session 
(Inner House))  
XVIII 
 
Cohen v. Rothfield [1919] 1 K B 410 (Court of Appeal) (Scrutton L.J. and Eve J.)  
 
Conoco (UK) Ltd v Commercial Law Practice [1997] SLR 372 
 
Coppee-Lavalin SA/NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd [1994] 2 All ER 449 
 
Credit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] Q B 818 11 June 1997 (Court of Appeal)  
 
Cretanor Maritime Co Ltd v Irish Marine Management Ltd, The Cretan Harmony [1978] 1 
W.L.R. 966 
 
Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Company [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 819 - (Court of Appeal)  
 
Dolling-Baker v Merret [1991] 2 All ER 890  
 
Ellerman Lines, Ltd v Read [1928] All ER Rep 415 (Court of Appeal) (Scrutton LJ) 
  
ETI Euro Telecom International NV v Republic of Bolivia and another [2008] EWCA Civ 
880 
 
Fili Shipping Co Ltd v Premium Nafta Products Ltd [2007] Bus L R 1719 (House of Lords) 
  
Fiona Trust and Holding Corpn v Privalov [2007] 2007 Bus L R 1719 (House of Lords)  
 
Fourie v Le Roux and others [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 571 (House of Lords) (Lord Bingham)  
 
George Cohen, Sons & Company v. Jamieson & Paterson [1963] SC 289. 
 
Glafki Shipping Co SA v Pinios Shipping Co No.1 (The Maira) [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 25  
 
Harrison v Teton Valley Trading Co Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1028 (Court of Appeal)  
 
Hiscox Underwriting Ltd and another v Dickson Manchester & Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 479 
(Comm) (Queen's Bench) (Cooke J) 
  
Hoekstra v HM Advocate (NO 1) [2000] S.C.J.C 387 
 
How Engineering Services Limited v Lindner Ceilings Floors Partitions Plc [1999] 2 All 
E.R. (Comm) 374 
 
Hussmann (Europe) Ltd v Al Ameen Development & Trade Co & Ors [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
83. 
 
Inverurie  Magistrates v Sorrie [1956] SC 175 (Sheriff of Aberdeen, Kincardine and Banff)  
 
Jet West Ltd v Haddican [1992] 2 All ER 545 (Court of Appeal) (Lord Donaldson) 
  
K/S A/S Bani v Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corp [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 445 
(Bingham LJ)  
 
XIX 
 
Kastner v Jason and others Sherman and another v Kastner [2004] EWHC 592 (Ch) 
 
LauritzenCool AB v Lady Navigation Inc [2004] EWHC 2607 (Comm) (Cooke J) 
  
Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Co SAL [2008] EWCA Civ 303 
 
Mavani v Ralli Bros Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 555 QBD (Kerr J)  
 
Meadows Indemnity Co Ltd v Insurance Corpn of Ireland Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 298 
  
Midgulf International Ltd v Groupe Chimiche Tunisien [2009] EWHC 963 (Comm). 
 
Mobile Telesystems Finance SA v Nomihold Securities Inc [2011] EWCA Civ 1040 
 
Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1973] 2 All ER 943 (House of Lords) 
  
O T Africa Line Ltd v Hijazy [2000] All ER (D) 1571 (Commercial Court)  
 
OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corporation [2005] EWCA Civ 710 (Court of 
Appeal) (Longmore LJ)  
 
Pacific Maritime (Asia) Ltd v Holystone Overseas Ltd [2007] EWHC 2319 (Comm)  
 
Patel v Patel [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) (Court of Appeal) (Lord Woolf) 
  
Permasteelisa Japan UK v Bouygesstroi [2007] All ER (D) 97 (Nov) (Queen's Bench) 
(Ramsey J)  
 
Petroleum Investment Co Ltd v Kantupan Holdings Co Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 416 
(Commercial Court) (Toulson J)  
 
Phaethon International Co Sa v Ispat Industries Limited [2010] EWHC 3446 (Comm) 29 
November Q.B.D (Commercial Court)) 
 
Phillip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd v Bamberger [1997] IL Pr 104 (Court of Appeal)  
 
Pieters v Thompson [1815] 35 ER 548 (Court of Chancery)  
 
Porzelack KG v Porzelack (UK) Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 1074 (Chancery Division) (Nicolas 
Browne)  
 
Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 2) [199]3 BCLC 532 (Donald Nicholls)  
 
Renel v Gulf Petroleum [1996] 2 All ER 319 QBD (Commercial Court)  
 
Republic of Indonesia v. Himpurna California Energy Ltd [2000] Albert Jan van den Berg 
(ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (XXV)  
 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Ali [2012] STC 42 (Warren J)  
 
XX 
 
Schuh Limited v SHHH Limited [2011] CSOH 123 (Outer House, Court of Session)  
 
Scottish Power Generation Ltd v British Energy Generation (UK) Ltd [2002] SC 517  
 
Seabridge Shipping A.B. v AC Orssleff's Eftf's A/S [1999] WL 807168 (High Court of Justice 
QBD) (Mr. Justice Thomas)  
 
Shashoua and others v Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm) (QBD, Commercial Court) 
(Cooke J)  
 
SL Sethia Liners v Naviagro Maritime Corp (The Kostas Melas) [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 18 
QBD (Commercial Court)) (J. Goff)  
 
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] A C 871 (Privy Council)  
 
Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Co Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 14  
 
Starlight Shipping Co and another v Ta Ping Insurance Co Ltd and another [2007] EWHC 
1893 (Comm) QBD (Commercial Court) (Cooke J)  
 
Style Menswear Ltd, Petitioners [2008] CSOH 149 (Court of Session (Outer House))  
 
Swift-Fortune Ltd v Magnifica Marine SA [2007] EWHC 1630 (Comm) QB Division 
(Commercial Court) (Steel J David)  
 
Technocrats International Inc v Fredic Limited [2004] EWHC 2674 (QB). 
 
The Kostas Melas [1981] 1 Lloyd‘s Rep.18  
 
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom [1995] ECHR 18139/91  
 
Travelers Insurance Company Ltd v Countrywide Surveyors Ltd [2010] EWHC 2455 (TCC) 
(Queen's Bench Division, Technology and Construction Court) (Coulson J)  
 
United Co Rusal plc v HSBC Bank plc [2011] EWHC 404 (QB) 
 
Vale Do Rio Doce Navegacao SA v Shanghai Bao Steel Ocean Shipping Co Ltd (t/a Baosteel 
Ocean Shipping [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) (Commercial Court) (Thomas J)  
 
WAC Ltd and others v. Whillock [1990] IRLR 23 (Court of Session) 
 
West Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA [2007] UKHL 4 (House of Lords)  
 
 
France  
 
 
In Zone Brands International Inc v In Beverage International [2010] I L Pr 30 October 14, 
2009 (French Supreme Court)   
 
XXI 
 
Société Buzzichelli v. S.a.r.l. S.E.R.M.I, M. Michel Hennion, Cour de Cassation (2 Chambre 
civile), 18 June 1986 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
Republic of Indonesia v. Himpurna California Energy Ltd in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration,(Kluwer Law International Volume XXV 2000) pp. 443 – 
534 
 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
 
 
 
ARB/77/1 AGIP S.p.A. v. People's Republic of the Congo (ICSID) 1979 November 30  
  
ARB/97/7 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain (Procedural Order No. 2) (ICSID) 
1999 October 28 
 
ARB/98/2 Víctor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile 
(ICSID) 2001April 11 
 
ARB/02/18 Order No.3 Tokios Tokelės v kraine (ICSID) Case, January 18, 2005. 
  
ARB/03/19 Suez, S G, V Universal, AWG Group v Argentine Republic (ICSID) 2010 July 30 
 
ARB/08/5 Burlington Resources Inc. and others V Republic of Ecuador (ICSID) 2009  
 
ARB/08/6 Perenco Ecuador Limited v. Ecuador and Petroecuador (ICSID) 2008 June 04  
 
ARB/06/11 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v. The Republic of Ecuador (ICSID) 2007 August 17 
 
ARB/09/12 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador (ICSID) 2010 August 2 
 
 
 
International Chamber of Commerce  
 
 
ICC Award No. 2114 Meiki Co. Ltd., Licensor (Japan) v Bucher-Guyer S.A., Licensee 
(Switzerland) 
 
ICC Case 12761 Mexican companies v. Mexican citizen (2004) 
 
ICC case 13046 Dutch and Swiss Companies v. Danish Company and Citizen, May 2004  
 
ICC Case 13054 Dutch & Lebanese Companies v Lebanese Citizen 20 Sep, 2004 
XXII 
 
  
ICC Case No. 382 Behring International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, Interim Award No. ITM 
46-38-23 (22 February 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 44. 
 
ICC Case No. 7047/JJA of 28 February 1994 
 
ICC Case No. 7289. Rev. arb. 2002, 1001 
 
ICC Case No.114 United Technologies Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, Decision Dec 53-114-3 (10 
December 1986), reprinted in 13 Iran-US CTR 254. 
 
ICC Case No; 12990 Panamanian Company v African State on May 2004 
 
ICC Interlocutory Award 10596 of 2005 Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration Vol. XXX 66 
(ICC) 
 
ICC Partial Award 3896 French Construction Co v. Iranian Government Organization 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration Volume X 1985 1982 23 Dec 47 (ICC) 
  
ICC Partial Award 9984 of 1999 
 
 
Singapore  
 
 
WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 3 SLR 603; SGHC 
104 (Singapore High Court) (Lee Seiu Kin JC)  
 
 
UAE 
 
 
Appeal No. 91 of 1991 Hearing of 23/10/1993, Dubai Court of Cassation 
 
 
United States 
 
  
Cooper v. Ateliers De La Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y. 2d 208 (1982). 
Hilton v Guyot [1895] 159 U S 113 (U.S. Supreme Court) 
  
Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara No. in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration,(Kluwer Law 
International Volume XXVII 2002) pp. 814 - 838McCreary Tire & Rubber Co v. Seat SpA, 
501 F.2d 1032;  
 
Publicis Communications and Publicis SA v True North Communications Inc [2000]206 F.3d 
725 7th Cir.  
Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel [1982] 532 F.Supp.901 September 3 
(United States Court of Appeals) 
1 
 
Introduction   
 
Arbitration has flourished in the last few decades because it offers advantages over litigation. 
It is generally (although not invariably) quicker and cheaper.
1
 It is private and usually 
confidential,
2
 very important features for most parties,
3
 who do not want their business 
secrets exposed in court.
4
 Under the principle of party autonomy, parties may choose the seat 
of arbitration, the applicable laws and the arbitrators (thus allowing them to select individuals 
with the most relevant expertise). Such freedom gives parties greater control over the 
determination of their dispute, reducing the risk of an unwelcome decision. Finally, the 
flexibility of arbitration makes it easier to overcome the obstacles, which may attend 
international transactions
5
 such as differing cultural approaches, political turmoil
6
 and the 
unfamiliar formalities of national courts.  
 
                                                 
1
 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2009) 84.  
2
 Ileana M. Smeureanu (ed), Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration, International Arbitration 
Law Library, Volume 22 (Kluwer Law International 2011).  
3
 Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 184; Departmental Advisory Committee on 
Arbitration Law, Report on the English Arbitration Bill 1996 (DAC Report) para 12. 
4
 Noah Rubins, „In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash Security for Costs in International Commercial 
Arbitration‟ (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 307, para.354. The DAC Report para 12 stated that there is ‗no doubt 
whatever that users of commercial arbitration in England place much importance on privacy and confidentiality 
as essential features of English arbitration.‘  
5
 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) para 1.95. 
6
 Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 2003) 1. 
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Therefore, individuals, corporations, and jurists in many countries believe that the arbitration 
system is the natural means of settling conflicts resulting from international transactions.
7
 
Therefore, arbitration system is considered as a panacea for many ills in courts proceedings, 
such as the delays, uncertainties, the high costs, and publicity.
8
  
   
The arbitration system has created tools to protect parties' rights from any potential damage 
pending an award, and to ensure expeditious decision-making by arbitral tribunals. The most 
significant of these ways are interim and conservatory measures, which provide parties with 
temporary protection until the final decision is rendered.
9
 At present, the majority of 
legislative regimes governing arbitration recognize the arbitral tribunal‘s right to take interim 
measures in arbitration disputes.
10
 
 
These measures have been accorded different names in different systems, e.g. provisional and 
protective measures, interim measures of protection, conservatory measures, preliminary 
                                                 
7 
Georgios Petrochilos, Procedural Law in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2004) para 1-01, 
Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009) para 1-01.  
8
 Noah Rubins, „In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash Security for Costs in International Commercial 
Arbitration‟ (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 307,  para.354. 
9 
See William Wang, „International Arbitration, the Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief‟ (2003) 28 3 
Brooklyn J.Int'l L. 1061, who stated ‗Interim Measures are an absolute necessity to protect what is a stake in the 
arbitration. Regardless of whether evidence, real property, personal property, or financial assets needs to be 
preserved, there must be an effective procedure for maintaining the status quo. Without the protection of such 
provisional remedies the outcome of the arbitration could become meaningless to the winning party.‘ 
10
 See for example; American Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 and American Federal Arbitration Act of 1970; 
Belgian Judicial Code of 1985 Articles 1679 (2) and 1696 (1), Dutch Civil Procedural Law issued July 1st, 1986 
Article 1022, British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration in Canada of 1988 Article 17(1), Swiss 
Private International Law of 1987 Article 183. 
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measures, provisional remedies, interlocutory orders.
11
 Yet, whatever the names given to 
these measures, they are to be found in most legal systems,
12
 and remain one of the most 
important devices in ensuring the effectiveness of international arbitration.
13
 Nevertheless, 
these measures are not self-enforceable, which means that unless there is a voluntary 
compliance from the parties, the arbitral tribunal cannot take any procedure against a 
recalcitrant party.
14
    
 
Unlike a court, an arbitral tribunal lacks the coercive power directly to enforce its decisions 
or compel parties and a fortiori third parties to comply with its orders,
15
 which makes court 
intervention necessary
16
 to help enforce them.
17
 Therefore, many parties prefer to resort 
                                                 
11
 For example under the Belgian Act Article 1696 speaks of ‗provisional and protective measures‘ while the 
Dutch Civil Procedure Law Article 1022, the British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Act 
Article 17(1) and the German Arbitration Law 1998 Article 1041 refer to ‗interim measures of protection‘. The 
Yemen Arbitration Act No. 22-1992 Article 30 speaks of a ‗provisional or conservatory measure‘. 
12
 Collins, Lawrence, Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation (3
rd
 edn, Maritnus Nijhoff 
Puplishers 1992) 23. 
13 
Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 2003) 586, Axel Bösch (ED.), Provisional Remedies in International Commercial 
Arbitration (Berlin; Walter de Gruyter, 1994) 4, Collins, Lawrence, Provisional and Protective Measures in 
International Litigation (3
rd
 edn, Maritnus Nijhoff Puplishers 1992) 23. 
14
 Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 2003)356. 
15 Donald Francis Donovan, ‗The Allocation of Authority between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals to Order 
Interim Measures: a Survey of jurisdictions, the Work of UNCITRAL and Model Proposal‟  in Albert Jan van 
den Berg(ed), New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond ICCA, Congress Series 2004 
Bejing 12 (Kluwer Law International 2005) 204-205, Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2005) 8, Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., 
Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009) para 7-01.    
16 Lira Goswami, ‗Interim Relief: The Role of the Courts in International Arbitration and National Courts: The 
Never Ending Story‘ ICCA Congress Series no. 10 (Kluwer Law International 2000) 111.  
17
 See for example Egyptian Arbitration Act 27 of 1994 Article 37 ‗The president of the court referred to in 
Article 9 of this Law is competent, upon the request of the arbitral panel, to do the following: ‗Condemn any 
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directly to the court to request the interim measures to save time.
18
 Court intervention in 
arbitration proceedings is in many cases vital to rescuing the arbitration process itself.
19
 Lord 
Mustill in Coppée Levalin NV v Ken-Ren Fertilisers and Chemicals stated that: 
It is only a court possessing coercive powers which can rescue the arbitration if it is in danger of 
foundering, and the only court which possesses these powers is the municipal court of an individual 
state. Whatever extreme positions may have been taken in the past there is, I believe, a broad consensus 
acknowledging that the local court can have a proper and beneficial part to play in the grant of 
supportive measures.
20
 
One jurist said that ‗National courts could exist without arbitration, but arbitration could not 
exist without the courts.‘21  
Hence, the success of the arbitration process relies in many cases on the balanced relationship 
between the court and the tribunal, in which the court should take into consideration that its 
role is merely to help the arbitral tribunal to conduct the arbitration process and to make the 
final award. Lord Mustill in Coppée Levalin NV v Ken-Ren Fertilisers and Chemicals stated 
that ‗[The Court] should aim to be at the same time supportive but sparing in the use of its 
powers.‘22 
                                                                                                                                                        
witness who refrains from attending or declines to reply, by inflicting the sanction prescribed in Articles 78 and 
80 of the Law of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters‘. 
18
 Alan Redfern, J.Martin H. Hunter, et., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Thomson 
Sweet& Maxwell 2004) para 7-18. 
19
 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009) para 7.01. 
20
 Coppée Levalin NV v Ken-Ren Fertilisers and Chemicals [1994] 2 All E.R. 449 at 460  
21
 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009) para 7.03. 
22
 Coppée Levalin NV v Ken-Ren Fertilisers and Chemicals [1994] 2 All E.R. 449 at 460 
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The forgoing statement indicates the general approach towards interim measures in many 
arbitration laws and rules. What about Egypt? Is current Egyptian Law suitable for governing 
international arbitral procedures in general and interim measures in particular? The Egyptian 
Civil Procedures Law 13 of 1968 is the applicable procedural law relating to the conduct of 
international arbitration in Egypt, which means that interim measures will be governed by 
this law. Therefore, any shortcomings of this law will directly affect the tribunal‘s power to 
grant such measures, which in turn may limit the types of interim measures that might be 
available in the arbitration dispute, thus affecting negatively the tribunal‘s power to conduct 
the arbitration process and threatening the parties' rights.
23
  
In this context, we should consider the decision of the Cairo Court of Appeal No.12 of 1995. 
On 25 December 1995 in its capacity as a court of urgent matters the court issued an interim 
judgement to stop the payment of letters of guarantee until the dispute was settled by an 
arbitral tribunal. The Soares Da Costa Construction Company had applied to the President of 
the Cairo Court of Appeal as a judge of urgent matters to order an original conservatory 
measure to stop the liquidation of letters of guarantee issued at the request of the Bank of 
Egypt and the Egyptian-British Bank for the Arab Company for Investment. The company 
further requested that until the dispute was resolved by an arbitral tribunal in accordance with 
Law No. 27 of 1994, and as a preservative measure, the value of these letters should be 
deposited in the treasury of the court pending arbitration of the case. In its statement, Soares 
Da Costa said that the Arab Company for Investment had contracted to carry out construction 
of the Hotel Hilton Hurghada and Soares Da Costa provided letters of guarantee against the 
final deposit plus a guarantee of payments made. The company (Soares Da Costa) had hardly 
                                                 
23
 Egyptian Civil Procedure Law Article 1, Egyptian Civil Law Article 22 both state that ‗[t]he law applicable to 
jurisdiction and all procedural matters is the law of the state where the litigation was commenced the or 
proceedings were held‘.  
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started construction work when it was ordered by the Ministry of Investment to stop work 
because the Arab Company for Investment had violated provisions of the associated licence. 
Da Costa complied, stopped work, and sent the Ministry of Investment a notification to that 
effect. On the other side, the Arab Company for Investment tried to obtain the value of the 
letters of guarantee by fraud.   
 
Because of the allegation of fraud and suspending of the contractual relationship, the 
president of the Cairo Court of Appeal – in his capacity as judge of urgent matters – issued an 
interim judgement preventing the payment of the value of the letters of guarantee and putting 
the value of two letters that had been withdrawn in the Egyptian-British Bank until the 
settlement of the dispute by an arbitral tribunal. The Arab Company for Investment appealed 
against this judgment to the Cairo Court of Appeal, which rejected the appeal. The Arab 
Company then filed a petition against this decision to the Court of Cassation (No 1975 for the 
judicial year 66). The Court of Cassation annulled the decision of the Cairo Court of Appeal 
on the ground that the latter issued its judgment on the basis of conditions other than those 
provided for in the Civil Procedures Law.  
 
The Cairo Court of Appeal had grounded its decision on which stipulates ‗In cases provided 
by the law, the claimant can submit a petition to the Judge of Urgent Matters or to the 
president of the court considering the substantive claim.‘24 The Court of Cassation annulled 
the Court of Appeal‘s judgment because stopping the payment of letters of guarantee, as an 
interim measure, is not one of the cases specified by Article 194.  
                                                 
24
 Author's translation. The cases that have been mentioned in Article 194 are miscellaneous in many different 
laws, such as: Article 376 in Egyptian Code of Civil Procedure which stipulates ‗However, if the things seized 
are perishable or goods subject to price fluctuations, the judge may order the implementation of the sale on an 
hourly basis pursuant to a petition from a guard or a party concerned‘.  
7 
 
Article 194 stipulates that;  
In those where  the law allows the claimant to request a provisional order, the claimant may submit his 
application in petition form to the judge of urgent matters, or to the head of the court which considered 
the substantive claim. The petition shall take the form of two identical copies, and must identify the 
application merits, the evidence, and the claimant‘s address within the court‘s territorial jurisdiction.25 
 
The Court of Cassation explained that the Court of Appeal could not apply the provisions of 
Article 14 of the Egypt Arbitration Act – "Upon request of either party to the arbitration, the 
court referred to in Article 9 may order the taking of an interim or conservatory measure, 
whether before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings or during said proceedings" 
26
 
– as the court's authority in this respect is conditional on the existence of a legal provision 
which allows the party to obtain particular sort of interim order needed in the arbitration. It 
felt that the conditions stipulated in Article 194 of the Code of Civil Procedures are 
exceptional; that they do not apply to general cases and their interpretation should not be 
generalized. Accordingly, and since there was no provision in the law specifically allowing 
the court to stop the liquidation of the letters of guarantee, the Court of Cassation was 
compelled to annul the order of the Cairo Court of Appeal.  
 
Since the stopping of the liquidation of letters of guarantee is an important interim measure,
27
 
which maintains the status quo
28
 and aims at ensuring the enforcement of the arbitral award 
after its issue, the Egyptian Court of Cassation seems to have handled the case very 
inflexibly, establishing a very dangerous new legal principle. It seems to be saying that the 
                                                 
25
 Author's translation. 
26
 Egyptian Arbitration Law Article (14)  
27 
Samir EL-Sharkawi, ‗The Arab Perspective‘ in: ICC (ed.), Conservatory and Provisional Measures in 
International Arbitration ICC Publication No. 519 (ICC Publishing 1993) 104, argues that Article 24(1) 
empowered arbitral tribunal the power to grant this measure.  
28
 See later Chapter 3.  
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fact that a particular measure (in this case, stopping the liquidation of letters of guarantee) is 
not stipulated by Article 194 of the Civil Procedure Law means that no competent court can 
issue such a measure, and that if it does its award becomes flawed and subject to annulment 
on the grounds of violating Article 194. This could have very serious consequences for 
international commercial arbitration, namely:  
1. Many interim measures are issued by arbitral tribunals outside Egypt require to be 
enforced inside Egypt. However, the Rule laid down by the Court of Cassation 
compels arbitral tribunals and opponents to study Egyptian law before requesting a 
measure even if it is not the law applicable to the dispute. Besides being too 
demanding, this Rule is incompatible with the arbitration system and the aim of 
prompt arbitration of cases relating to international trade.      
2. The Rule contrasts with the authority of the arbitral tribunal to issue the measures 
which it may deem appropriate in the matter of the dispute, and offers only a limited 
number of measures that may not be relevant to the merits of the case.
29
 This may tie 
the hands of the arbitral tribunal in the performance of the role entrusted to it by the 
parties, i.e., implementing the rules of justice and of law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement, including preserving the parties' assets pending a final decision in the 
case.  
3. The decision of the Court of Cassation allows the competent court referred to in 
Article 9 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law
30
 to refuse requests to enforce provisional 
                                                 
29
 This seems to totally contradict Article 24(1) of the Egyptian Arbitration. Law which states, ‗The parties to 
the arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral panel the power to order, upon request of either party, those 
interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute…‘ 
30
 The Egyptian Arbitration Law Article 9 stipulates, ‗Competence to review the arbitral matters referred to by 
this Law to the Egyptian judiciary lies with the court having original jurisdiction over the dispute. However, in 
9 
 
measures issued by the arbitral tribunal on the grounds that these measures are not 
stipulated in Article 194 of the Code of Civil Procedures. 
4. The rejection of applications to enforce provisional measures issued by the arbitral 
tribunal may render its final award practically ineffective, as the main goal of some of 
these measures is to ensure enforcement of that award by conserving disputed 
assets.
31
 
This threat to the arbitration system is doubly unfortunate since litigation in Egypt is 
bedevilled by slow procedures, a problem which has a negative effect both domestically and 
internationally. 
This case stimulated my interest in interim measures in Egypt. Revisiting the few studies on 
interim measures in the Egyptian law,
32
 I have found that they do not define those measures, 
classify their types or explain which legal rules apply to them. Yet a number of Egyptian 
scholars have identified the need to lay down new rules for organizing interim and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the case of international commercial arbitration, whether conducted in Egypt or abroad, competence lies with 
the Cairo Court of Appeal unless the parties agree on the competence of another appellate court in Egypt.‘  
31
 For example, an interim order to store goods in a warehouse, or appoint a guard to maintain the goods. 
32
 Mohammad Abul-Einein,  Constitutional and Legal Foundations of Arbitration and the Role of the Judiciary 
(Publication of Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial  Arbitration), Abul-Ela An-Nimr, Legal 
System of Interim and Provisional Measures in Arbitration (Cairo: Dar-un-Nahda Al-Arabia 2005), Hafiza 
Haddad, The Extent of Jurisdiction of the National Judiciary to Issue Interim and Provisional Measures in 
International Disputes Agreed upon in Arbitration (Alexandria: Dar-ul-Fikr Al-Jame'i, 1996), Ahmed Abdul 
Kareem Salama, Theory of Urgent Matters and Its Impact on Judicial Jurisdiction, Conflict of Laws and 
Enforcement of Foreign Awards (Cairo: Dar-un-Nahda Al-Arabia 2008) Ahmed Abdul Kareem Salama, 
Jurisprudence of the International Civil Procedures (Cairo: Dar-un-Nahda Al-Arabia), and Ahmed Sawy, 
Arbitration According to Law 27 of 1994 and International Arbitration Systems (Cairo: Dar-un-Nahda Al-
Arabia 2002).  
11 
 
conservatory measures in order to avoid the inconsistency between international arbitration 
and the Egyptian Civil Procedures Law.
33
  
 
At the same time, exploring this subject in English works,34 I have found it quite 
controversial. While some countries prohibit the arbitral tribunal from issuing provisional 
measures,
35 
others empower the tribunal to do so, but subject to restrictions and conditions.
36
  
Despite the wealth of books on interim measures in English, most do not deal with the types 
of measure in detail, the rules which govern them, the nature of security for costs and anti-
suit injunctions, the conditions for granting such measures, who can grant such measures, and 
procedural requirements. For these reasons and in light of the differences between national 
laws in the field of provisional measures, it is essential to study these measures in some detail 
in order to arrive at recommendations that may help reform the system of provisional 
measures in Egypt and ensure its effectiveness and consistency with the system of 
international commercial arbitration. 
                                                 
33
 Ahmed Sedki Mahmoud, The Provisional measures and Orders necessity for in Arbitral Litigation (Cairo: 
Dar El-Nahda El-Arabia, 2005) 50-52. 
34
 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009), Alan Redfern, et al., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4
th
 
edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2004), Axel Bösch (ed)., Provisional Remedies in International Commercial 
Arbitration (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), Bond, Stephen R., Conservatory and Provisional Measures in 
International Arbitration (ICC Publishing Inc, 1993), Carolyn B Lamm, Hansel T. Pham, and Chiara Giorgetti, 
„Interim Measures and Dismissal under the 2006 ICSID Rules‟ in ,The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), Lawrence Collins, Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation (3
rd
 
edn, Maritnus Nijhoff Puplishers1992), Julian, D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M, Kröll Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003), Ali, Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures 
in International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2005), and Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman 
on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice (2
nd
 revised edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006). 
35
 See Italian Code of Civil Procedure No. 40 of 2006 Article 818, Argentina National Code of Civil and 
Commercial Procedure Law 17.454 of 1967 Article 753, Swiss Concordat Article 26, and  Greece Code of Civil 
Procedure (as amended in 1995 and 2012) Article 889. 
36
 See Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 Rule 46, English Arbitration Act 1996 s.44, Algerian Arbitration Law 
No:93-9 of 1993 Article 458(9), ICSID Rules Articles 39 and 41.  
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I1. Methodology 
 
The method most suited for achieving the objective of this study is the comparative analytical 
approach in terms of analysing relevant legal texts to determine the optimal legal approach to 
the issue.
37
 The purpose of the study is to address deficiencies in the Egyptian law – the Code 
of Civil Procedures and Egyptian Arbitration Law – by comparing that law with international 
arbitration laws, practices and conventions. The comparative methodology is – from the 
academic viewpoint – the best approach to achieve this goal, as it compares different 
legislative regimes, their formulation, application and practice, demonstrating the extent to 
which they perform the purpose for which they were designed.  Having considered results of 
this comparison, the author will offer recommendations and solutions that may prove 
significant in addressing deficiencies that may be shown when Egyptian laws are compared 
with other legislations. 
 
II1. Aims of Research  
 
Many jurists in Egypt see the need to amend the Egyptian Civil Procedures Law and the 
Arbitration Act in order to repair the serious defects in the law, which has contributed to an 
increase in the number of cases before the Egyptian courts – a number that in 2004 reached 
12 million cases, a rate of 1 case per 12 people.
38
 Even though this number is not attributable 
to cases diverted from arbitration, it gives a brief idea about the problem that faces litigants 
before Egyptian courts. 
                                                 
37 Patrick McNeill, and Steve Chapman have stated ‗The comparative method has proved itself to be highly 
sustainable as a sociological research tool over the past one hundred years‘ Patrick McNeill, and Steve Chapman 
Research Methods (3
rd
 edn, Routledge ,Taylor & Francis Group 2005) 87.  
38
 See Egyptian ministry of Justice Report (2004) cited in Ahmed Sawy, Arbitration According to Law 27 of 
1994 and International Arbitration Systems (Cairo: Dar-un-Nahda Al-Arabia 2002) 16. 
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The aim of this study is thus to examine the system of interim measures under Egyptian, 
Scottish, and English arbitration legislations, in order to fill gaps in current arbitration law, 
especially the provisions that regulate interim measures. It is hoped that the results of this 
study will help those interested in the reform of the Egyptian legal system in general and the 
Civil Procedure Law in particular, as it aims to highlight international practice in the area of 
interim measures. Those results may help in the development of a new legal system, which 
avoids the shortcomings of the present system and meets the needs of international trade, 
which is one of the pillars underlying economic and social progress within the state. 
III1. Research Outline and Limitation 
 
To achieve the fundamental aim of this study by using the above-mentioned methodology, I 
will examine the following:  
Chapter 1: Definition of provisional measures in national legislation as well as the rules of 
international arbitration institutes, and rules that have been established by the United Nations 
in this regard in the form of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006. 
Chapter 2: Interim measures which are designed to preserve evidence,  
Chapter 3: Interim measures which are designed  to maintain the status quo, 
Chapter 4: Security for Costs,  
Chapter 5: Provisional Payments, 
Chapter 6: Anti-Suit Injunctions, 
Chapter 7: Conditions for granting interim measures, 
Chapter 8: Summary and conclusion. 
 
The forgoing classification naturally excludes certain themes from this study. This study 
intends to cover the notion of the interim measures, their types, and the conditions for 
13 
 
granting them. Since the question of the enforcement of interim measures is logically 
posterior to the granting of such measures, it does not fall within the scope of this study. 
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Chapter 1  
1.1 What Are Provisional Measures?  
1.1.1 Definition 
 
The importance of the definition of interim measures comes from the fact that it reflects, in 
an indirect way, the extent of arbitrators‘ power to issue such measures, in particular 
jurisdictions. For instance, if the law applicable to the arbitration procedure is Egyptian 
Arbitration Law, the arbitral tribunal has to choose from among the interim measures that are 
listed in Article 194. These measures have been exclusively stipulated in that provision. 
Hence, no tribunal is allowed to issue any measures not listed in this Article; otherwise, its 
order will be unenforceable and subject to appeal. 
 
By contrast, if the law applicable to the arbitration is the Scottish or English Arbitration laws, 
the arbitral tribunal will have a wider scope in this regard. As the respective Arbitration Acts 
rules have adopted a broad approach, enumerating examples of measures that may be 
issued,
39
 the arbitral tribunal has the power to issue any measures deemed necessary to 
preserve the parties‘ rights until the final award.  
 
It may be difficult to find a comprehensive definition of interim, provisional and conservatory 
measures that comprises all characteristics and cases. Some writers do not recognize any 
difference between the terms interim measures, interim measures of protection,
40 
 preliminary 
                                                 
39
 Arbitration Scotland Act 2010 rr.35, 49, and 53, English Arbitration Act of 1996 ss.39 and 40. 
40 
See for example, SCC Arbitration Rules 2010 Article 32, Australian Centre for International Commercial 
Arbitration (ACICA) Arbitration Rules 2011 Article 28, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2012 Rule 21, Dutch Civil Procedural Law Article 1022; British 
Columbia International Commercial  Arbitration Act in Canada Article 17(1);  German Arbitration Law 1998 
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measures, provisional remedies, interlocutory orders, conservatory measures 
41
 and protective 
measures so tend to use them all like synonyms.
42 
 Others recognize some differences 
between interim or provisional measures and conservatory measures and have separate 
definitions for each category. Some maintain a single definition encompassing both 
categories: interim and conservatory. 
 
The first group of jurists has not been able to lay down an exact definition
43
 due to variations 
and differences between those different types of measures, but has only maintained the unity 
of purpose from these measures.
44
 In the case of Burlington Resources Inc. and others v 
                                                                                                                                                        
Article 1041; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 Article 26; UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 2006 Article 17,  
available at 
 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf  
41
 Swiss Private International Law of 1987 Article 183. 
40
 Republic of Yemen The Arbitration Act Article 30; see Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M 
Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003) 
586; Ahmad Abu Al-Wafa, Arbitration by the judge's and the reconciliation (Alexandria; Dar Monshaa Al-
Maa'ref 1990) 843. 
43 Stewart J of the United States Supreme Court wrote ‗I know it when I see it‘, mentioned in Stephen R. Bond, 
‗The Nature of Conservatory and Provisional Measures‟  in ,ICC Conservatory and Provisional Measures in 
International Arbitration (Paris, ICC Publishing Inc 1993) 8.  
44 
Advocate General Tesauro stated that ‗the purpose of interim protection is to achieve that fundamental 
objective of every system, the effectiveness of judicial protection‘ cited in Lawrence Collins, Provisional and 
Protective Measures in International Litigation (London: Martinus Nijhoff 1992) 19. Casado v Chile [2001] 8 
ICSID Rep.373 at (26) ‗Provisional measures are principally aimed at preserving or protecting the efficiency of 
the decision that is given on the merits; they are intended to avoid prejudicing the execution of judgment, or 
prevent a party, by unilateral act or omission, infringing the rights of the opposing party‘ 104, ETI Euro Telecom 
International NC v. Bolivia.  
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Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (PetroEcuador),
45
 the 
arbitral tribunal stated that:  
In the tribunal's view the rights to be preserved by provisional measures are not limited to those which 
form the subject-matter of the dispute or substantive rights as referred to by the respondents but may 
extend to procedural rights including the general right to the status quo and to the non-aggravation of 
the dispute. These latter rights are thus self-standing rights. 
 
Those jurists have found that interim measures or provisional measures cannot have a single 
definition that combines all the characteristics of all cases to which they apply. This is due to 
their varying nature depending on the circumstances of each claim, the state and the legal 
system applicable there. Hence, a measure that may be enforceable in the seat of the 
arbitration may not be able to be enforced in the country where relevant assets are located. 
Most international treaties are keen to ascertain the importance of enforcement of arbitration 
awards and of not invoking national laws to obstruct their execution.
46
 However, those jurists 
have found that, despite this difference and diversity of interim measures, they still share a 
number of common characteristics.
47
 
On the other hand, some jurists 
48
 lay down a single definition for each measure. Interim or 
provisional measures are designed to meet the immediate interest of the applicant for the 
                                                 
45
 Burlington Resources Inc. and others V Republic of Ecuador (2009) ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 available at 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1110
_En&caseId=C300> accessed 28 Jun. 13 
46 
 The 1958 New York Convention on The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards did not 
include a special provision on the interim measures. See also the European Convention on International 
Commercial of Arbitration 1961, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration (Amman) 14 April 1987, 
Convention of the Arab League on the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards  on 14 September 1952, 
ICSID Convention (Washington) on 18 March 1965, and Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Panama) on 30 January 1975. 
47
 See later para 1.1.5 of this Chapter. 
48 
Ali AL-Hadidi, Provisional and protective measures in the Voluntary arbitration (Cairo;Dar El-Nahda El-
Arabia 1997) 18-20. 
17 
 
measure, e.g., interim payment, référé-provision until a final award in the case of 
maintenance, freezing order for the vessels in the dock, and sale of perishable goods. All 
these measures are aimed at the immediate protection of applicant. Conservatory measures, 
on the other hand, are aimed at the maintenance of the disputed right in order to secure its 
future when the final award is issued, rather than an immediate response to the needs of the 
applicant for the measure, e.g., attachment, sequestration, hearing a witness, proving the case 
of certain goods before they perish, and preservation of evidence in general. Thus, all these 
measures aim to guard against the risk or potential harm in the future. 
 
Some jurists 
49
 have defined both interim and conservatory measures as the sum of measures 
quickly ordered at the request of a party to help preserve a particular right and ward off any 
imminent or irreparable harm as a step toward achieving this right in the future when 
demanding it before the competent court. Therefore, a definition of "interim" may change 
according to circumstances of each case.
50
 
 
1.1.2 UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 definition 
 
The recent amendment to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration on July 7, 
2006 defined interim measures according to Article 17 (2) as follows:  
                                                 
49
 Wagdi Ragheb, ‗Towards general idea to the interim awards in procedures law‟ (1973) Journal of Legal and 
Economic Sciences, Ain Shams University, cited in Ahmed Sedki Mahmoud, The Provisional Measures and 
Orders Necessity for in Arbitral Litigation (Dar El-Nahda El-Arabia, Cairo 2005) 11-12. 
50
 Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law international, 2003) 586. 
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An interim measure is any temporary measures, whether in the form of an award or in another form, by 
which, any time prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally decided, the tribunal 
orders a party to,: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to cause current or 
imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute.
51
 
 
According to this definition, interim measures are measures, which intend to protect parties‘ 
rights until the final decision is issued, and at the same time protect the continuity of the 
arbitral process.
52
 It seems the UNCITRAL Model Law has divided these measures into two 
types: one to protect the parties‘ rights and another to protect the arbitral process.  
 
The importance of this definition derives from the fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law 
represents the best practice in the field of arbitration. It was the United Nations General 
Assembly, advised by its Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which 
established this law and in 1985 recommended it to all world states for adoption.
53
 Hence, a 
                                                 
51
 Available at <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf> 
52
 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 101. 
53
 The General Assembly ‗Recommends that all States give due consideration to the Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the 
specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice‘ United Nations General Assembly resolution 
40/72 of 11 December 1985, A/40/17,  
available at  <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf>  
see United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/33 of 18 December 2006, A/RES/61/33,  
available at <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/a61-33-e.pdf>  
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large number of states have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law when enacting their 
arbitration laws.
54
  
Thus, the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law's new definition of interim measures could 
be considered as a step towards ensuring greater uniformity of arbitration law by having a 
single definition of these measures in a large number of countries,
55
 which in turn would 
ensure expeditious procedures and implementation of these measures in these countries.
56
 In 
any country that adopts the 2006 version of the Model Law the arbitral tribunal operating 
under the umbrella of this legislation will have a clear vision of its authority to issue such 
measures. This act will create a kind of compatibility between many arbitration laws 
particularly in these countries that have adopted the Model Law, contributing to harmony and 
understanding in international practice in this subject. Hence, it seems the UNCITRAL 
Model Law definition is the most appropriate for interim measures as it addresses all 
arbitration cases in which these measures are likely to be issued, and would create a kind of 
uniform practice on the  international level for these measures. 
 
Article 17(2)(a) protects the status quo by empowering the arbitral tribunal to issue any 
orders or measures that preclude one party from doing any act that may be irreparable, e.g., 
                                                 
54
 See for example, Egyptian Arbitration Act 27 of 1994, The Danish Arbitration Act 2005, Scotland Arbitration 
Act 1990, The Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, Japanese Arbitration Law, No. 138 of 
2003, Omani Arbitration Law No. 47/1997, Tunisian Arbitration Law (Majalat Al Tahkim) No. 42/1993, 
Bahraini Arbitration Law No. 9/19941, More than 50 countries have adopted a version of the Model Law. 
55
 The General Assembly has a function to do initial studies and make recommendations to the member states, 
and these recommendations have a moral obligation value, and the United Nations members should work 
accordingly. See Charter of the United Nation, Chapter IV Article 13.  
Available at<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter>  
56
 Some States have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in their new legislation e.g., the Arbitration 
Amendment Act 2007 in New Zealand, New Arbitration Act in Ireland (9 March 2010), New Arbitration 
Legislative Decree Ne. 1071 in Peru,  New Arbitration Act in Slovenia (25 April 2008), and New International 
Arbitration Act  No. 37 of 2008 in Mauritius. See <www.kluwerarbitration.com/countries.aspx>.   
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by making a Mareva or ‗freezing‘ injunction, 57 preventing the debtor from disposing of or 
removing his assets from the court‘s jurisdiction in order to frustrate the enforcement of the 
award. Another example is an order to continue or to stop certain works such as stopping a 
TV advert dealing with the subject of dispute before the arbitral tribunal investigates it, the 
prevention of any party from using an intellectual property licence in a way that would 
devalue the licensor‘s interest, an order to stop the payment of a letter of guarantee,58 or an 
order to a manufacturer to continue to supply a distributer with goods until the dispute is 
finally adjudicated.
59
  
 
Article 17(2) (b) deals with any act that may cause current or imminent harm or prejudice to 
the arbitral process itself, allowing the arbitral tribunal to take any action or procedure to 
prevent the parties from harming the arbitration process, e.g. granting an anti-suit 
                                                 
57
 It was introduced by the English court in two cases in the 1970s, cited in Alan Redfern, ‗Arbitration and the 
Courts: Interim Measures of Protection-is the Tide about to Turn‟ (1995) 30 (1) Tex.Int'l L.J. 77. The Mareva 
Injunction does not, however, exist in Scotland, and is known under France law as a ‗freezing order‘ - V. V. 
Veeder, ‗The Need for Cross-border Enforcement of Interim Measures Ordered By a State Court in Support of 
International Arbitral Process‘ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), New Horizons in International Commercial 
Arbitration and Beyond, ICCA Congress Series, 2004 Bejing 12 (Kluwer Law International 2005) 243.  
58
 Ali AL-Hadidi, Provisional and Protective Measures in the Voluntary Arbitration (Dar El-Nahda El-Arabia, 
Cairo 1997) 21. Omar Al Jazy, Some Aspects of Jurisdiction in International Commercial Arbitration, (PhD 
thesis, University of Kent at Canterbury 2000) Samir EL-Sharkawi 'The Arab Perspective' in, ICC (ed.), 
Conservatory and Provisional Measures in International Arbitration (ICC Publishing, ICC Publication, 1993) 
104 stated ‗the order addressed to the defendant on the request of the plaintiff to refrain from calling a letter of 
guarantee submitted by the plaintiff to the defendant in construction contracts to guarantee the proper 
performance of the contractual obligation, is one of the most important measures in international commercial 
arbitration‘.See also  Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 100 
59
 Robert L. C. Hunter WS, FCIARB, The Law of Arbitration in Scotland, (T&T Clark Edinburgh 1987) 272, 
Nael G. Bunni, ‗Interim Measures in international Commercial Arbitration: A Commentary on the Report by 
Luis Enrique graham‘ In Albert Jan Van Den Berg(ed), ‗Years of the New York Convention, ICCA International 
Arbitration Conference, ICCA Congress Series, 2009 Dublin 14 (Kluwer Law International 2009) 588-589. 
21 
 
injunction,
60
 an order to refrain from holding a press conference or making a press release, an 
order not to make public certain information or not to breach the confidentiality of an 
amicable dispute resolution forum, and an order to  stop TV adverts dealing with the subject 
of dispute before the arbitration is concluded.
61
  
 
Article 17(2)(c) gives the arbitral tribunal powers to issue conservatory measures to preserve 
assets out of which a subsequent award may be satisfied e.g., ordering their deposit with a 
third person or the sale of perishable goods, ordering a party not to dispose of or relocate 
certain assets, and ordering appointment of an expert.
62
 
 
Finally, Article 17(2)(d) gives the arbitral tribunal the power to issue any measures to 
preserve the evidence in respect of the subject matter, especially that which may disappear or 
fade away during the arbitration process. For example, if the dispute is over the quality of a 
consignment of coffee or cocoa beans, then some measurement of that quality must be made 
before the consignment is either sold or perishes. If, for example, the dispute is over the 
number or quality of reinforcing bars used in the concrete foundation of a road, bridge or 
dam, some record must be preserved, preferably by independent experts, before those 
foundations are covered, and witnesses and experts who may not be present during the 
arbitration process must be heard.
63
 
 
Many countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law have addressed the arbitral 
tribunal's power to request from the court assistance in taking evidence, and order the 
                                                 
60
 The Anti-suit injunction is a Controversial topic. See Chapter 6.  
61
 These measures aim to preserve the impartiality and integrity of the arbitrators. 
62
 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 26. 
63
 Redfern Alan. Hunter, Martin. et., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4
th
 edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell, London 2004). 402-403. 
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witnesses to give oral testimony or produce documents or other material evidence despite the 
fact that in most cases witnesses are not parties to the arbitration agreement.
64
 For example, 
German Arbitration Act 1998 section 1050 stipulates; 
 
The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may request from a court 
assistance in taking evidence or performance of other judicial acts which the arbitral tribunal is not 
empowered to carry out. 
 
Article 37 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law 1994 also allows the arbitral tribunal to request 
the president of the competent court to order witnesses to testify before the tribunal. It 
stipulates; 
The president of the court referred to in Article 9 of this Law is competent, upon the request of the 
arbitral panel, to do the following: a) Condemn any witness who refrains from attending or declines to 
reply, by inflicting the sanction prescribed in Articles 78 and 80 of the Law of Evidence in Civil and 
Commercial Matters.65 
 
It is worth mentioning that some states give the arbitral tribunal wider powers than those in 
the UNCITRAL Model Law. For example, Section 7 of the US Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) stipulates that;  
The power to subpoena witnesses within the jurisdiction either to appear to give evidence or to disclose 
relevant evidence in their possession… The arbitrators… may summon in writing any person to attend 
before them or any of them as witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, 
documents or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.
66 
 
                                                 
64
 See for example, New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996 Article 27 (2), Ireland Arbitration Act 2010 (No. 1 of 
2010) Article 14, German Arbitration Law 1998 section 1050, Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609) 
2010 Articles 35-55, and The Netherlands Arbitration Act 2004 Article 1041. 
65
 See also English Arbitration Act 1996 Section 43; Belgian Judicial Code Section 2(3); French Code of Civil 
Procedure Article 1460; German Arbitration Law 1998 Section 1041. 
66
 Available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/resources/Legal/federal_arbitration_act.html  
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Although the definition of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration of interim 
measures has addressed all cases and situations in which interim measures may be issued, the 
United Nations Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation in 2006 decided against 
amending the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to exactly reflect the changes in the Model 
Law.
67
 It seems that the Working Group did so out of their desire to provide greater 
opportunity for arbitration clients, states or individuals, to choose between more than one 
rules of arbitration. States could adopt the Model Law so that it becomes their national law 
and individuals can choose to apply the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to their disputes like 
the ICC Arbitration Rules or LCIA Arbitration Rules.
68
  
 
The drafters of the 2006 version of the UNCITRAL Model Law may have been misguided in 
making an inventory of cases of issuance of interim measures, especially with regard to 
circumstances that may require the issuance of non-finite measures as well as renewed 
circumstances. That may have been the reason why the second Working Group (on 
Arbitration and Conciliation) devised a new definition of interim measures. In February 2010, 
the second Working Group developed a draft-revised version of the Arbitration Rules and, in 
the proposed text of Article 26, defined interim measures as:  
An interim measure is any temporary measure by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award 
by which the dispute is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party to, including, without 
limitation: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; 
                                                 
67
 Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation on the work of its forty-fifth session (Vienna, 
11-15 September 2006),  
available at < http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V06/575/26/PDF/V0657526.pdf?OpenElement>     
68
 Yang Ing Loong, „Provisional Measures‟ In Albert Jan Van Den Berg (ed), Years of the New York 
Convention ICCA International Arbitration Conference, ICCA Congress Series, 2009 Dublin 14 (Kluwer Law 
International 2009) 606-607. 
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(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to cause, (i) current or 
imminent harm or (ii) prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute.
69
 
 
The above definition is closely analogous to the definition in the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
but might be better because it does not limit the cases in which interim measures may be 
issued as does the Model Law, while it further multiplies examples of interim measures that 
can be issued by the arbitral tribunal. This is the only difference between the UNCITRAL 
Model Law definition and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules definition. 
 
1.1.3 Interim or Provisional  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law chose the term ‗interim‘ rather than ‗provisional‘ in describing 
these protective measures, and many arbitration rules and laws followed the Model Law in 
using the term ‗interim‘ to refer to such measures.70 On the other hand, some arbitration law 
and rules use term ‗provisional‘ to refer to such measures. 71  
 
                                                 
69
 Un Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.157/Add.1  
available at < http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V09/890/01/PDF/V0989001.pdf?OpenElement> 
70
 AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules 2007 Rule 34, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC) Arbitration Rules 2010 Article 32, Australian Centre for International Commercial 
Arbitration (ACICA) Arbitration Rules 2011 Article 28, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2012 Rule 21, ICC Arbitration Rules 2012 Article 28, Dutch Civil 
Procedural Law Article 1022; British Columbia International Commercial  Arbitration Act in Canada Article 
17(1);  German Arbitration Law 1998 Section 1041 
71
 ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules 2006, Article 46, English Arbitration Act Section 39, Chamber 
of Arbitration of Milan (CAM) Arbitration Rules 2010 Article 22 (2) 
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In arbitration practice these terms are used interchangeably as synonyms,
72
 and terms like 
‗partial‘ and ‗award‘ are used to distinguish between such measures and other of the 
tribunal‘s decisions that use the same description. For example, Rule53 of the Arbitration 
(Scotland) Act 2010 uses the term ‗Provisional Award‘ to refer to any kind of pre-final award 
and the drafters of the Act refused to use term ‗interim‘ in order to remove any 
misunderstanding regarding this measure.
73
  
Hence, consistently with the majority of the arbitration laws and rules, the expression 
‗interim‘ will be used in this study to refer to protective measures.   
1.1.4 Order or Award 
 
The expressions used by the arbitral tribunals to describe their decisions vary from case to 
case. Sometimes they use the term interim awards and sometimes the term interim order.
74
 So 
are these expressions synonyms, or do they have different meanings? The legal nature of the 
interim measures and whether they are orders or awards is one of the dialectical topics in 
international arbitration area. The determination of the legal nature for such measures is a 
very important question, because it may determine whether these measures would be 
enforceable, and whether they would be subject to legal challenge. 
 
On 29 October 1993, the Supreme Court of Queensland considered these questions
75
 in 
Resort Condominiums International Inc. v. Bolwell,
76
 in particular the meaning and definition 
                                                 
72
 Emmanuel Gaillard, John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gallard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 1999) 709. 
73
 Policy of Memorandum 2009 para 173. 
74
 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) papa 9.14. 
75 Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law international, 2003) 699. 
76 Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell  [Mot. 389/1993]. 
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of an ‗award‘ for the purposes of enforcement under the New York Convention.77 The 
applicant, Resort Condominiums International Inc. (‗‗RCI‘‘) obtained an ―Interim Arbitration 
Order and Award‖ from an arbitral tribunal seated in the USA ordering the respondents; 
Resort Condominiums International Australasia (‗‗RCI Aust‘‘) and Ray Bolwell (‗‗Bolwell‘‘) 
not to directly or indirectly operate or enter into any agreement with any exchange entity 
other than RCI, or be involved in any way in the exchange of timeshare interests, until a final 
award was rendered. The applicant resorted to the Australian court to enforce the interim 
order.  
Mr. Justice Lee of the Supreme Court examined whether the orders made by the arbitrators 
constitute ‗foreign awards‘ within section 8(2) of the Australian International Arbitration Act 
1974 which would make these orders enforceable in Queensland.
78
 Regarding the nature of 
the interim orders, the court held that; 
These orders are clearly of an interlocutory and procedural nature and in no way purport to finally 
resolve the disputes or any of them referred by RCI for decision or to finally resolve the legal rights of 
the parties. They are provisional only and liable to be rescinded, suspended, varied, or reopened by the 
tribunal which pronounced them. 
 
The court found that the orders issued by the arbitrators were just procedural orders 
concerned with the conduct of the arbitration,
79
 which did not address the merits of dispute. 
These orders just dealt with such matters as the exchange of the annual audits and monthly 
reports, the production of records or data, and enjoined the respondent from disseminating 
                                                 
77
 Michael Pryles, „Interlocutory Orders and Convention Awards: the Case of Resort Condominiums v. Bolwell‟ 
(1994) 10 (4) Arb Intl. 385. 
78 Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell  [Mot. 389/1993] para 11-25. 
79 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) papa 9.09. 
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any confidential information. Lord Goff J in SL Sethia Liners Ltd v. Naviagro Maritime 
Corporation (The Kostas Melas) held that; 
The jurisdiction of an arbitrator was to decide disputes and that an award, interim or final, can only be 
an award in respect of matters referred for decision. Thus, the power to make an interim award was the 
power to decide matters in dispute between the parties and that an arbitrator when making an interim 
award had to specify the issues, claim, or part of a claim, which was a subject matter of that award.
80
 
 
Accordingly, the court found that the orders made by the foreign tribunal in aid of a foreign 
arbitration did not fall within the definition of an ‗arbitral award‘ in Article I of the 
Convention, and so could not be enforced under the Australian Act. Article I (1)(2) of the 
Convention stipulates; 
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory 
of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and 
arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. 2. The term ―arbitral awards‖ 
shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by 
permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted.
81
 
 
The court found that the New York Convention does not cover the interim orders, because 
they do not determine any of the matters in dispute. Mr Justice Lee held that; 
I conclude that the ‗‗Interim Arbitration Order and Award‘‘ made by the arbitrator on 16 July 1993 is 
not an ‗‗arbitral award‘‘ within the meaning of the Convention nor a ‗‗foreign award‘‘ within the 
meaning of the Act. It does not take on that character simply because it is said to be so. 
 
Hence, the Supreme Court of Queensland established an important principle that a tribunal 
decision could not be an award unless it finally determined an issue between the parties, 
                                                 
80 SL Sethia Liners v Naviagro Maritime Corp (The Kostas Melas) [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep.18; [1980] Com. L.R. 3   
81 New York Convention 1958 Article (I),  
available at < http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf>    
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regardless of how the tribunal described its decision.
82
 Therefore, some jurists insist that the 
finality of the decision should be the defining factor in this question.
83
  
In the same vein, the United States Court of Appeals in Publicis Communications and 
Publicis SA v True North Communications Inc held that;  
The tribunal's order was final was grounded on the decision's substantive intent to create immediate 
action. If the tribunal's decision wasn't final, if the tribunal didn't really intend to finalize it until eons 
later, if True North had to wait to enforce this urgent matter until all the other issues were arbitrated to 
finality, then the October 30 decision was a meaningless waste of time. Despite some possible 
superficial technical flaws, and despite its designation as an "order" instead of an "award," the 
arbitration tribunal's decision--as to this chunk of the case--was final. And this is our final judgment.
84
 
 
Moreover, if a decision is considered to be an award, it will potentially be subject to the sorts 
of legal challenge that can be made against awards, while if it is considered to be an interim 
order it is not an award and thus not subject to such challenge.
85
 
Hence, the term "award" should be reserved for a final decision
86
 that adjudicates on the 
substantive matters of the dispute,
87
  regardless of whether it determines the whole merits of 
the dispute or just part of them. In this context, if a tribunal‘s decision determines part of a 
                                                 
82 The US Federal Court of Appeal's decision in True North held that ‗The finality of a decision is the key to its 
recognition or enforcement under the New York Convention‘ cited is Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et 
al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2009) papa 9.16, Michael Pryles, 
„Interlocutory Orders and Convention Awards: the Case of Resort Condominiums v. Bolwell‟ (1994) 10 (4) Arb 
Intl. 394. 
83 Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law international, 2003) 699. 
84 Publicis Communications and Publicis SA v True North Communications Inc 206 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2000) 
available at < https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/206/206.F3d.725.99-3424.99-1199.html>  
85 Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell  [Mot. 389/1993] 
86 
Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) papa 9.09. 
87 David St John Sutton; Judith Gill; Matthew Gearing, Russell on Arbitration (23rd Rev edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2007) para 32-130 
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dispute, this is called a partial award 
88
 or an interim award.
89
 In contrast, if a decision 
facilitates and regulates the arbitration process and does not affect the subject matter of the 
dispute in a permanent way, this should be described as an ‗order.‘  
Therefore, while Section 39 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 is headed ‗Power to Make 
Provisional Awards‘,90 the section employs the term ‗order‘ which more accurately describes 
a tribunal‘s decisions under this section.  
Consequently, the most accurate description of interim measures made by tribunals is the 
term 'Interim Order'. 
1.1.5 Characteristics of Interim Measures 
 
Not all interim measures share the same characteristics, since some derived from the need for 
urgent justice, while others do not, but this does not preclude this study from mentioning the 
most common characteristics of such measures in international arbitration.  
1. Interim measures are based on factual cases not legal principles and therefore cannot 
be limited. Facts vary according to time and place and actually produce new scenarios 
every day.
91
 
In Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company 
v. The Republic of Ecuador, the claimants having requested interim measures in their request 
                                                 
88 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) para 9.19. 
89 David St John Sutton; Judith Gill; Matthew Gearing, Russell on Arbitration (23rd Rev edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2007) para 32-130. 
90 English Arbitration Act 1996 s.39. 
91
 UNCITRAL Model Law Article 17 D ‗arbitral tribunal may modify, suspend or terminate an interim measure 
or a preliminary order it has granted, upon application of any party or, in exceptional circumstances and upon 
prior notice to the parties, on the arbitral tribunal‘s own initiative‘ available at < 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf>.  
ICSID Arbitration Rules rule 39(3) (4), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 Article 26(5).  
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for arbitration in May 2006, amended that request for interim measures at least three times on 
the 18
th
 of October 2006, the 2-3
rd
 of May 2007 and the 25
th
 of May 2007.
92
 
Thus, if circumstances change during the arbitral proceedings, parties may amend their 
requests to reflect the new circumstances. In addition, the arbitral tribunal has the right to 
modify, suspend, or terminate an interim measure it has granted
93
 if conditions which 
justified the interim measures no longer operate.
94
 
 
2. Interim measures have no specific form in which they must be issued. Sometimes they 
come in the form of court order; sometimes in the form of an order from the arbitral 
tribunal.
95
 
3. Interim measures have no necessary bearing on the merits of the dispute, so while 
they may be issued for the benefit of one party, the final award may be in favour of 
the other party. Therefore, interim measures are temporary because they will be issued 
prior to confirmation of the rights of the parties and to ensure the enforcement of the 
final award.
96
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
4. Interim measures may derogate from the freedom of parties to dispose of their assets 
and therefore the arbitrator should be circumspect about ordering such measures and 
only do so where appropriate.
97
 Lord Mustill In Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour 
Beatty Construction Ltd held that: 
I also accept that it is possible for the court at the pre-trial stage of a dispute arising under a 
construction contract to order the defendant to continue with a performance of the works. But the 
                                                 
92
 ICSID case No; ARB/06/11(Decision on provisional measures of 17 August 2007) para 89. 
93
 UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 Article 17D, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 Article 26(5).  
93 
See Chapter 7.  
95 
UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 Article 17(2).  
96
 UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 Article 17A(b). 
97
 UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 Article 17A(1).  
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court should approach the making of such an order with the utmost caution, and should be 
prepared to act only when the balance of advantage plainly favours the grant of relief.98 
5. The Party requesting an interim measure would be responsible for any damage 
consequent on the taking of such interim measures if the tribunal later decides that the 
measure should not be granted.
99
 
1.1.6 Types of Interim Measures 
The arbitration agreement is the backbone of the arbitration process. It regulates the whole 
process including the arbitrator‘s power to issue or grant any interim measures in the 
arbitration case,
100
 even those measures that are not listed in the law of the arbitration seat.  
 
However, this principle could collide with the law of the seat if this law precludes certain 
measures. For example, Article 1468 of the French Code of Civil Procedure stipulates ‗Only 
courts may order conservatory attachments and judicial security.‘101 In such case, while an 
arbitral tribunal‘s attachment order cannot be enforced in France, it may be enforceable 
outside France, depend on the other State's law and whether it allows the enforcement of such 
measures within its territory.
102
 Accordingly, the types of interim measures rely on the 
arbitration agreement and party autonomy as this agreement decides what types of interim 
measures arbitrators can grant.
103
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 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] A.C. 334 at 367. 
99
 UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 Article 17G, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 Article 26(8).  
100
 Kastner v Jason [2004] EWHC 592 (Ch). 
101
 The same limitations apply in Italian Code of Civil Procedure Article 818.  
102
 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) para 11.27. 
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 Egyptian Arbitration Law Article 14, Ahmed Al-Sayyid Sawy, Arbitration According to Law 27 of 1994 and 
International Arbitration Systems (Cairo: Dar-un-Nahda Al-Arabia 2002) 138-139.  
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In addition, arbitration laws and rules provide the arbitrators with a big variety of types of 
interim measures, which vary from one state to another and from one institute or chamber to 
another. Although most of these laws and rules have a common factor, namely the liberty of 
the arbitral tribunal to take any measures deemed necessary to protect the parties' rights,
104
 it 
is difficult to restrict interim measures to a number of types or categories 
105
 as they serve 
many and varied purposes.
106
 However, some measures are commonplace, while others are 
still controversial like anti-suit injunctions.
107
 Apart from this fact, some writers divide it 
various types,
108
 each type encompassing several kinds of these measures.
109
 
The next chapters are mainly concerned with the types of interim measures and the rules, 
which govern them. The types of the interim measures generally fall into these categorised; 
 Measures for taking/preserving evidence 
 Measures for preserving the status quo to secure enforcement of the award  
                                                 
104
 Egyptian Arbitration Law 27 of 1994 Article 24(1), Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 Rule 35, ICC Rules 
Articles 25 and 29, UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 Article 17, ICSID Convention Article 47, ICSID Arbitration 
Rules Article 39, ICDR/AAA's International Rules Article 21, English Arbitration Act 1996 ss.37, 38, 39, 42 
and 44, German Arbitration Law 1998 Section 1041, Oman Arbitration Law Article 14, Jordanian Arbitration 
Law Article 13. Many of these provisions have given the arbitral tribunal the power to grant; for example, a 
seizure order, appointment of experts,  cessation or resumption of construction work, sale of perishable goods, 
sale of assets at risk of loss. 
105 Alan Redfern suggests that ‗it would be unwise to regard the categories of interim measures as being in any 
sense closed‘ see Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, et., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 
(4
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004) 77-78. 
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 Adrian Zukerman, Zukerman on Civil Procedure: Principles and Practice (2
nd
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 
296; Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law international, 2003).595. 
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 See Chapter 6.      
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Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law international, 2003) 595; Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 204-219. 
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Piero Bernardind, „The Power of the Arbitrators‘ in Conservatory and Provisional Measures in International 
Arbitration (ICC Publishing Inc 1993) 23; Adrian Zukerman, Zukerman on Civil Procedure: Principles and 
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 Measures for providing security for costs 
 Measures of interim payment 
 Anti-Suit injunctions  
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Chapter 2 
2.1 Measures for Taking/Preserving Evidence  
 
Preserving evidence represents one of the most important types of interim measures in 
international commercial arbitration. Such measures broadly comprise instruments that may 
be required urgently to preserve the parties‘ rights, such as obtaining a witness affidavit 
before he passes away, appointing an expert to ascertain the quality of goods before they 
perish, or obtaining documents from a non-party that may be related to the dispute. Most 
arbitration laws have dealt with such issues via provisions that address the tribunal‘s power to 
obtain evidence during the arbitral process.
110
 
 
The authority of arbitrators in respect of evidence that may be required during the arbitration 
process generally relates to two possibilities:  
 Preserving evidence related to witnesses and documents 
 Preserving evidence by appointment of experts 
 
2.1.1 Preserving Evidence under Egyptian Laws  
 
In the administration of evidence, there are broadly two systems: common law and civil 
law.
111
 Egypt is considered to be a civil law system in the treatment of evidence in legal 
                                                 
110
 See German Arbitration Act 1998 ss.1049 and 1050, Sweden Arbitration Act of 1999 ss.25 and 26, Swiss 
Rules of International Arbitration of 2004 Articles 24-27, USA Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2003 rules 43-
45, AAA International Arbitration Rules Articles 17-22, Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial 
Arbitration ‗CRCICA‘ Articles 26-27, ICSID Arbitration Rules rr.33-36, ICSID Convention 1966 (Washington) 
Article 43 ICC Arbitration Rules Articles 24-26 
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 William Tetley, „Mixed jurisdictions: common law vs. civil law (codified and uncodified)‟ (1999) 4 
Unif.L.Rev. 877-907 available at<http://www.unidroit.org/English/publications/review/Articles/1999-4-tetley2-
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proceedings. Therefore, this means that the plaintiff must prove the grounds of his claim and 
provide the proper evidence supporting this claim,
112
 as no help may be obtained from the 
other party in this matter.
113
 The court has the full right to evaluate and investigate this 
evidence before it makes a decision and it also has the full right to set aside any proof it 
considers dubious without any supervision from the High Court.
114
 Conversely, in the 
common law system, the parties may be obliged to disclose any evidence they have relating 
to the dispute.
115
 
2.1.1.1 Arbitral Tribunals and Preserving Evidence 
 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 is heavily based on the principle of party autonomy.
116
 
Thus the parties may, subject to mandatory provisions of the Model Law, choose the law that 
governs the arbitral procedure, including the rules of evidence.
117
 In addition, where the 
                                                 
112
 The Egyptian Evidence Law in Civil and Commercial Matters Article 25 states 'The burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff‘, Appeal No. 5469 judicial year 54; Appeals numbers 1799, 2097 and 2243 of judicial year 62 BC; See 
Abdel Razek Ahmed Sanhoori, Al-Waseet to Explain the Civil Law (the Evidence) (1982) 19, Solomon Marks, 
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parties have not agreed on rules of evidence, the arbitrators can choose the most suitable 
rules.
118
 The Egyptian Arbitration Law provides that,   
The two parties to the arbitration are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral panel, 
including the right to submit the arbitral proceedings to the rules prevailing under the auspices of any 
arbitral organization or centre in the Arab Republic of Egypt or abroad. In the absence of such 
agreement, the arbitral panel may, subject to the provisions of this Law, adopt the arbitration 
procedures it considers appropriate.
119
  
However, where the parties or the arbitral tribunal have agreed to choose the Egyptian 
Arbitration  Law or the seat of arbitration in Egypt, the Egyptian Evidence Law in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (hereinafter EEL) promulgated in 1968 will govern evidential 
matters,
120
 with the result that any violation of the rules of evidence will render the final 
awards void.
121
  
 
Based on this, evidential matters in respect of international commercial arbitration in Egypt 
are regulated by two laws. The first law is the Egyptian Arbitration Law 27 of 1994, which 
addresses the arbitrator‘s authority to determine the arbitration procedures to be followed, 
including the means of obtaining and preserving evidence.
122
 The second is the Evidence Law 
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 Appeal No. 86 of judicial year 70 BC, the session 26/11/2002. 
119
 Egyptian Arbitration Law Article 25, UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 Article 19.  
120
 Egyptian Law of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters No. 25 of 1968; Act 23 of 1992; Act No. 18 of 
1999. 
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 Article 71 in Egyptian Evidence Law of 1968. Under this provision the Cairo Court of Appeal has held that 
‗Although the ICC rules were applicable to the dispute under the arbitration agreement, the award had to 
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 These Articles are;  Article 30(3)  
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(EEL), which is considered the general guideline governing all evidence matters in Egypt.
123
 
In addition to these laws, the Civil Procedures Law governs all procedures relating to the 
obtaining of evidence.  
Regarding the Arbitration Law, the preserving of evidence related to witnesses and 
documents is dealt with tacitly by Article 24(1) of the EAL, which regulates the arbitrator's 
power to grant interim measures in the dispute. This stipulates that: 
Both parties to the arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral panel the power to order, upon 
request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject 
                                                                                                                                                        
Article 33/4  
―...The hearing of witnesses and experts shall be conducted without taking an oath‖ 
Article 35  
―If either party fails to appear at any of the meetings or to submit the documents required from it, the 
arbitral panel may continue the arbitral proceedings and make the award on the dispute based upon the 
elements of evidence before it‖  
 Article 36  
―The arbitral panel may appoint one or more experts to submit on specific issues determined by the 
arbitral panel a written report or an oral report to be included in the procès-verbal of the meeting. A 
copy of the terms of reference regarding the mission entrusted to the expert shall be sent to each 
party...The arbitral panel may decide, after the submission of the expert‘s report, whether on its own 
initiative or upon request of a party to the arbitration, to hold a meeting to hear the expert and to 
provide for both parties the opportunity to hear him and to put questions to him about what is contained 
in his report. Each of the parties may present one or more expert witnesses in order to give testimony 
on the issues raised in the report of the expert appointed by the arbitral panel, unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties to the arbitration‖ 
And Article 37(A) ―The president of the court referred to in Article 9 of this Law is competent, upon the request 
of the arbitral panel, to do the following:  
Condemn any of the witnesses who refrain from attending or decline to reply, by inflicting the sanction 
prescribed in Articles 78 and 80 of the Law of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters...‖ 
123
 As regards international commercial arbitration, the Egyptian courts apply this law if it is not in conflict with 
the arbitration agreement or, when the arbitral tribunal requests court intervention, in order to oblige a witness to 
give his testimony. Article 37 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law clearly contemplates a kind of cooperation 
between the Egyptian judiciary and the arbitral tribunal. 
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matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the 
measure ordered.
124
 
 
Therefore, this section illustrates the preservation of evidence in the shadow of these laws. 
 
2.1.1.1.1 Preserving Witness Testimony  
 
In order for the arbitral tribunal have the right to preserve evidence, the parties must have 
agreed in writing to confer on the tribunal the power to make interim or conservatory 
measures.
125
 Thus, unless the parties agree to confer this power, the tribunal has no such 
power. Therefore, the tribunal cannot take any measures of its own motion, even if it is found 
during the process that such measures are urgently required.
126
  
 
Furthermore, Article 24(1) gives the arbitral tribunal the power to take any measures deemed 
necessary, even if such measures are not available to the court, as arbitration can create its 
own regime and the means it uses to support the process may differ from those competent in 
judicial proceedings.127 In Amal Tourism Complex v. Minister of Tourism the Court of 
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 This Article resembles Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model law 1985, Article 23 of the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration and Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
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 Case No 55/122, Cairo Court of Appeal, Seventh Commercial Division 7 April 2009, cited in Jalal El Ahdab 
(ed), (2009) 1 (4) International Journal of Arab Arbitration. 141. 
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Cassation stated that ‗Arbitration is an exception to the jurisdiction of national courts.‘ The 
Arbitration Law No. 27 of 1994 was meant to stand as a self-sufficient regulation of the 
arbitral process from beginning to end and excludes all reference to the rules of procedure 
followed before the courts. 
  
A party who is afraid of losing potential witness testimony because of future events has the 
right to request from the arbitral tribunal a hearing with the prospective witness or to take any 
measures to safeguard his/her testimony,128 e.g. summoning the witness to give an affidavit or 
visiting the witness to record his/her testimony.129 There is no limit to the measures that the 
arbitral tribunal can take to gather the evidence to protect the parties‘ rights.130  
 
However, the tribunal has to take into account factors such as the mandatory rules of 
Egyptian Law governing the arbitration,131 and the law of the place where the order will be 
enforced,132 since if a measure is not known to these laws its enforcement is doubtful.133 
Nevertheless, in emergency cases as where a witness certainly will not be present during the 
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 In the same context some arbitration rules such Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules permit parties to 
request provisional measures immediately after the request for the arbitration, Carolyn B. Lamm , Hansel T. 
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hearing because he will soon leave or pass away, the tribunal can delegate an expert134 or 
anyone else to record his testimony. This need not be done on oath,135  as Article 33(4) of the 
EAL states ―...The hearing of witnesses and experts shall be conducted without taking an 
oath.‖136 It is noteworthy that this Article contradicts Article 86 in the Egyptian Evidence Law 
which stipulates that ―witnesses shall swear the oath.‖  
 
This contradiction could be justified in Egyptian law on the basis that arbitration is a kind of 
voluntary adjudication between parties. Their contract gives the arbitrators power to 
adjudicate on the dispute and to govern only the relationship between the parties. Yet the 
arbitral tribunal has no power to impose its decision on the contractors if one of them refuses 
to obey its decision. Only the national court can force this party to obey the tribunal's 
decision. Therefore, it is unacceptable in Egyptian law to put any witness under oath before a 
voluntary umpire whose power derives merely from an agreement between two parties, when 
he/she is not a party to that this agreement. In the same context, the oath is religious, and 
religion is a personal matter that should not be invoked except when necessary. Therefore, it 
seems that the Egyptian legislator wants to only to demand an oath in obligatory adjudication 
                                                 
134
 The Law No. 96 of 1952 on Expertise matters. In Egypt, there is an Administration of Experts in the Ministry 
of Justice to help courts in any technical issues or in any case needing special skill. The experts have to swear an 
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IBA Rules of Evidence in international Commercial Arbitration” B.L.I issue 2 (2000), International Bar 
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before a court, so that the oath is administered by a competent judge. In voluntary 
adjudication (Arbitration), it is not vital that the oath is administered. Therefore, the ICC 
Therefore, the ICC court just requested the affirmations from the witnesses that they will tell 
the truth with the assertion that they will not be heard under the oath. It was said in an ICC 
case: 
Witnesses of fact will not be heard under the oath but the chairman shall draw to the fact that the 
Tribunal requests them to tell the truth, the entire truth and nothing but the truth and shall ask them to 
confirm that they will comply with this request.
137
 
Nevertheless, the power of the arbitral tribunal to take interim measures to hear witnesses 
works best if the parties have control over the witnesses so as to force them to testify, or 
where it is in the interest of the witnesses to comply with the tribunal's directions 
voluntarily.
138
 The problem arises when the witness is truly a third party, as the tribunal has 
no power except over the parties.
139
 Therefore, the parties have the right to resort to the 
court
140
 referred to in Article 9 in the EAL,
141
 whether before the commencement of the 
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arbitral proceedings or during the said proceedings,
142
 in its capacity as the judge of urgent 
matters to take any measures to preserve the witnesses‘ testimonies.143 Accordingly, the Court 
of Appeal could – upon the party's request – summon any witness to give their testimony144 
and, if this happens after the requirements of the urgent judge are satisfied,
145
 then the court 
could order bringing the witness to give his affidavit.
146  
 
 
However, Article 96 of the EEL has not determined which tribunal the witness should give 
his testimony before. Therefore, the question is whether the court should compel the witness 
testifying before it or before the arbitral tribunal. Article 72 of the EEL seems to have 
answered this question, stipulating that ‗investigations have to be before the court.‘147 Yet 
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this Article has just dealt with the normal case when the court has jurisdiction over the whole 
case, all witness will testify before it, and the court will investigate and decide the dispute. 
 
Therefore, there must be an argument that witnesses should testify before the arbitral tribunal, 
which will determine the substantive dispute, and which must determine the weight of this 
testimony. In addition, the tribunal or the other party may need to examine the witness,
148
 so 
it seems reasonable that the court‘s role should be restricted to obliging the witness to stand 
before the arbitral tribunal to give their testimony. However, if the party requested such an 
order before the formation of the arbitral tribunal, the court should take the witness's affidavit 
without any investigation of his testimony, as the arbitration clause deprives it of jurisdiction 
over the dispute. Thus, the court shall keep any statement until the formation of the arbitral 
tribunal, and then deliver it to the tribunal. The court should take into account that its role is 
just to take the witness's testimony without any estimation of that testimony.
149 
   
Moreover, if the witness disregards the court order or does not show a valid reason for his 
absence, the court may punish him by inflicting the sanction prescribed in Articles 78 and 80 
of the EEL.
150
 It is noteworthy that the court upon request of an arbitral tribunal may 
similarly condemn any witness who refrains from attending or declines to reply to its 
orders.
151
 
 
Yet the penalty mentioned in Articles 78 and 80 – a fine equivalent to £20 - is very 
insignificant, and may have little impact in of forcing the witness to obey the court‘s orders, 
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especially in cases related to international commercial disputes where enormous amounts of 
money may be involved. It is suggested that the amount should be increased so that the 
penalty to might perform its function of encouraging witnesses to testify. Finally, a request 
for interim measures shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate, or as a 
waiver of that agreement.152  
 
2.1.1.1.2 Preserving Documents 153 
 
In international arbitration proceedings, it is often argued that documentary evidence 
constitutes the best evidence.
154
 This is because these documents include the paperwork and 
correspondence between the parties, whether by regular communication or electronic 
means,
155
 such as the internet, electronic, magnetic, optical or similar means like electronic 
data interchange, electronic mail, telegram, and telex or telecopy.
156
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Therefore, these documents sometimes determine who wins the arbitration
157
 because they 
include a lot of information about the subject matter of the dispute and a lot of specific details 
about the contract. For instance, bills of lading must contain particular information 
concerning the general nature of the goods, leading marks, number of packages or pieces, and 
the quantity and the gross weight of the goods.
158
 So, for example, when a dispute arises 
about quantity, such documents are very important in helping the arbitral tribunal resolve the 
dispute.
159
  
In spite of this importance of this point, many Egyptian scholars have not dealt clearly with it 
in their writing, only mentioning it briefly in their discussions about preservation measures.
160
 
They have neither indicated how to preserve particular documents nor have they 
differentiated between the case where a document is in the possession of a party and the case 
where a document is in the possession of a third party.  
 
In order to understand the power of the arbitral tribunal to take measures to preserve 
documents under Egyptian law, we have to distinguish between two groups of measures: 
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interim orders or awards and orders on petitions. There are two main questions to consider 
here: where are these documents kept and are they in a party's hands or in a third party‘s 
possession? 
 
The general principle in Egyptian law is that the arbitral tribunal can take any measures to 
preserve any evidence, including documents,
161
 as it has the entitlement – under the 
arbitration agreement – to order any party (or third party who is joined to the arbitral 
proceedings) to disclose any documents in his possession that may be useful to the case, such 
as the corporation's balance sheet.
162
 However, if a third party refuses to cooperate with the 
arbitral tribunal, the tribunal may decide to proceed with the arbitration without relying on 
these documents, which will then have no impact to on the arbitration.
163
  
Since the arbitral tribunal has no coercive power to force a third party to comply with its 
orders,
164
 a party who wishes to secure documents held by a third party could request the 
arbitral tribunal to allow him/her to ask to the court is stipulated in Article 9 of the EAL (the 
Court of Appeal)
165
 to order the third party to disclose any documents under his/her control. 
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However, the arbitral tribunal can refuse this request if it considers such measures 
unnecessary or not required to avoid irreparable harm.
166
 
 
The problem with the arbitral tribunal taking preservation measures in Egyptian law is not 
with the tribunal's authority to grant such measures, but with the enforcement of these 
measures if parties refuse to disclose these documents or comply with the tribunal orders 
voluntarily. In this situation, court intervention would be necessary to rescue the arbitration 
proceedings and help the arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute, and at this point, the problem 
begins. 
 
In order to comprehend this problem, we should study the court's authority to issue interim 
measures related to obtaining documents in Egyptian law. Here, a distinction should be made 
between two groups of court decisions: interim orders and orders on petitions. 
2.1.1.2 The Egyptian Courts’ Powers regarding the Preservation of Evidence 
 
Article 45 of the Egyptian Civil Procedures Law (ECPL) is considered to be the main source 
of the court's power to make any interim order, urgent order and order on petition. Under this 
the court can issue any interim order to protect the parties‘ rights from any predictable 
damage that may happen in the future. The parties can request the court, whether before or 
after the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, to issue an interim order to preserve 
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any evidence crucial for resolving their dispute.
167
 In order for the court to be empowered to 
do so, a request should take the form of a lawsuit, and the court should verify that the claim 
has met the conditions for it to have lawsuit to issue these measures, namely urgency and the 
fact that it will not prejudice the substantive case, which is subject to arbitration.
168
 If the 
claim has not met these conditions, the court would be incompetent to deal with it whatever 
the damage that may ensue.
169
     
 
A party to the arbitration must to file a suit before at the same time as submitting a petition to 
the registrar of the court to appoint a date for hearings and pleadings. Therefore, the petition 
has to contain the details stipulated in Article 63 of the ECPL,
170
 and Article 58 of the 
Advocacy Law 17 of 1983,
171
 as well as the details stated in Article 9 of the ECPL.
172
 When 
these requirements met, the registrar will subpoena the defendant at his address to come 
before the urgent judge to rebuff the plaintiff‘s allegations during the 24 hours following the 
petition‘s registration. If the defendant received and signed the subpoena in person, the judge 
may reduce that 24 hours period.
173
 When all these prerequisites are satisfied, the court can 
issue any measures to preserve the evidence, including documentary evidence, and may 
exercise its coercive power to order the parties and third parties to disclose the relevant 
documents in their possession. However, the main question here is whether the Egyptian 
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courts can make inspection orders regarding the property of third parties in order to seize any 
documents related to the arbitration dispute before or after the dispute arose. 
 
Unlike the practice in Scotland and England, the Egyptian Civil Procedures Law and the EEL 
have no precise provisions addressing the power of the court to take inspection measures,
174
 
whether against a party or non-party. Meanwhile England addresses such matters in Rule 
25(I) (j) of the Civil Procedures Rules and s.38 (4) of the Arbitration Act 1996. Scotland 
follows suit in Rule 28(2) (iii) of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010, and the Administration 
of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972 s.1.
175
  
 
Article 45 of the Egyptian Civil Procedure Law merely allows the court to take any interim 
measures to protect the parties‘ rights, but the interpretation and implementation of this 
Article does not refer to any inspection measures that may apply in preserving documents.
176
 
The Cairo Court of Appeal in Case No. 55/122 on the 7
th
 April 2009 rejected the petitioner's 
request to annul an arbitration award because the tribunal had inspected a sample of the 
goods on ground that this procedure was not stipulated in neither the Egyptian Civil 
Procedure Law or the Egyptian Evidence Law, and so in breach of these laws. The Court of 
Appeal observed: 
Arbitration proceedings are part of a settlement system which is distinct from the court proceedings. 
Arbitration has its own rules and concepts, which might differ from judicial proceedings… such 
                                                 
174 
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arbitrators-experts, are not bound by any judicial rules and more specifically by the Law of Evidence 
and the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure.
177
 
 
This judgment indirectly indicates that inspection measures were not stipulated upon in the 
Egyptian law, so that if such an order was issued by any court, its judgment could be set 
aside. Consequently, courts may not make any interim order to inspect a party‘s property.  
On the other hand, Article 20 of the EEL regulates a party‘s right to request from the court an 
order to force his opponent to disclose any documents in his possession. This Article, 
however, is only applicable when there is already a lawsuit before the court, one of the parties 
has already relied on these documents in litigation, and these documents must be shared 
between him and his opponent, e.g. copies of contracts, statement of payments, and bills…,178 
Therefore, Article 20 of EEL cannot be used as a basis for requesting interim measures. In 
arbitration the application of Article 20 only allows the court to order a party to disclose any 
documents in his/her possession. However, if this party refuses or denies that these 
documents are in his/her possession, the court can impose the ‗Threatening Fine‘ which is an 
amount of money decided by the judge for each day of delay in the implementation of its 
decisions, although in practice judges have no power to enforce such fines.
179
 The last resort 
available to the court is that it can just put the party in question under oath. If that party swore 
that -under oath- he did not have the documents, the court would accept his word. However if 
a party refused to take the oath, the court could proceed on the basis of photocopies offered 
by the opponent. If the opponent had no documents to offer, the court may accept his 
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testimony about the content of the documents on which s/he wants to rely – those, which the 
party refused to reveal.
180
 
 
Notwithstanding, the court has jurisdiction over the documents as evidence if these 
documents have already been submitted to the court by the parties or have been in a public 
authority's hands. Then the court could take this material into custody, order this institution to 
offer these documents to arbitration parties, present them to an expert who is appointed by the 
arbitral tribunal, put them in a guardian's possession, or keep them in a secure place.
181
   
 
2.1.1.2.1 Petition orders 
 
Petition orders are characterized as an easy way to get a quick protection of rights. The 
plaintiff submits two copies of an application for a petition order to the president of the court 
accompanied by evidence supporting the request.
182
 The president of the court, after 
considering the petition, shall issue on one copy of the application a reasoned judgment 
explaining the grounds of the judgment and how he reached his conclusion, whether against 
or in favour of the applicant, and must do this on the second day after submission.
183
 The 
court officer has to provide the plaintiff with the order, including a warrant for execution 
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where appropriate, no later than the second day after the judgment 
184
 since ‗the executive 
bodies shall help in the enforcement of this order using all available legal means‘185. Any 
affected party may challenge this order before the competent court or before the same judge 
within ten days from the date of (a) its issuance, or (b) its enforcement, or (c) its intimation to 
the party concerned.
186
 
 
Despite the facility of the system of petition orders, the Cairo Court of Cassation in 1996 
established a very important legal principle by holding that that ‗courts may not issue any 
orders outside of Article 194 of the ECPL; otherwise their judgments will be annullable.
187
 
This principle effectively made petition orders unavailable, as it treated Article 194 as 
definitive, and meant that courts could not issue any orders outside the cases stipulated in this 
Article.
188
   
 
Nonetheless, Egyptian lawmakers adopted the system of petition orders in Article 179 of the 
New Egyptian Intellectual Property Protection Act No 82 of 2002. Article 179 gives the court 
the power to take any protective measure via petition orders in case of any breach of 
intellectual property rights,
189
 upon a party request. In addition, this Article provides several 
examples of how the court can take such potential measures without limits. Thus, if the 
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arbitration dispute is in any way related to intellectual property, the Cairo Court of Appeal 
can take any measures via a petition order to protect the parties‘ rights.190  
 
Accordingly, it seems that this distinction will lead to a contradictory legal situation, possibly 
in the same case. For instance, the court could take a interim measure, including making a 
petition order, to prevent a party from using an intellectual property license in a way that 
would devalue the licensor‘s interest,191 or it could take any measures – exclusive of 
inspection property measures – to preserve documents of the dispute, as long as these 
measures are related to intellectual property law. On the other hand, the court cannot adopt a 
petition order if the dispute is related to project assets or project documents that clarify the 
parties' rights, e.g. contracts, bills, and correspondence letters, as these requests do not relate 
to intellectual property disputes. 
Therefore, a party who seeks measures to protect evidential documents should use another 
process before the same court, despite the unity of the parties and the subject matter of the 
dispute. There is now a difference between the protection of parties‘ rights in an intellectual 
property dispute or any other dispute. It seems to the author that the legislator should 
intervene to modify Article 194 of the ECPL to allow the court to issue petition orders in any 
case, as long as the relevant conditions are satisfied, especially as it is the easiest and fastest 
way to get protection of the parties‘ rights. 
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2.1.1.2.2 Third party possession of documents 
 
Regarding documents in the possession of third parties, an arbitral tribunal cannot take any 
measures against someone who is not a party to the arbitration agreement as Egyptian Law 
does not allow a tribunal to issue a Norwich Pharmacal Order.
192
 Thus, the only way to get 
documents in the possession of a third party is to request the competent court to order the 
third party to disclose such documents, as Article 27 of the EEL gives the court the power to 
order a non-party to exhibit any documents in their possession:  
Anyone who possesses any material the right to which is claimed by another is compelled to show it to 
that other party whenever examination is required… The judge may order the material to be shown to 
those concerned and to be submitted before the court.193 
 
This Article illustrates that anyone who possesses any documents or materials related to an 
ongoing dispute or one that may be arise in the future has to expose them to anyone who 
alleges rights to them, even if there is no existing claim before the court. The court also has 
the right to order the holder to show this data to those concerned. In cases of necessity, the 
court has the right to order bringing this data before it, and may request a security from s/he 
                                                 
192
 Appeal 26/11/2002 No.86 judicial year 70. This approach has been changed in some leading cases in the 
English Courts, see  Norwich Pharmacal co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] A.C. 133, HL, 
Bankers Trust Co v Shapira 10 LDAB 235, and United Co Rusal plc v HSBC Bank plc) [2011] EWHC 404 
(QB). The English courts have adopted the approach that they may take interim measures against a third party 
if s/he has in his possession any information or documents maybe help a party to vindicatet his rights, Lord 
Reid opined in Norwich Pharmacal that a third party ‗comes under a duty to assist the person who has been 
wronged by giving him full information...‘ But this power is not unqualified. Lord Reid observed that ―This 
new jurisdiction must, of course, be carefully exercised. It is a strong thing to order a bank to disclose the 
state of its customer's account and the documents and correspondence relating to it...for instance when the 
customer has got the money by fraud‖.  
193
 EEL Article 27.   
55 
 
who wants to examine this data as a kind of compensation for any potential harm to the 
data.
194
          
 
In conclusion, the issuance of interim measures by courts for preserving evidential 
documents, whether in arbitration disputes or in the general case, has not been well regulated 
by the Egyptian law. Even though Article 45 of the ECPL allows the court to take any interim 
measures to protect the parties' rights, the interpretations and applications of this Article do 
not address these measures to the preservation of documents.
195
 Moreover, one of the 
applications of this Article is judicial receivership,
196
 but this measure only applies to a 
party‘s assets as a means of protecting and administering property which is considered a 
guarantee of the enforceability of the final award – and a measure applicable only if certain 
conditions have been met, e.g. the existence of a dispute, urgency, the danger of dissipation, 
and the possibility that these assets may be administered by a third party.
197 
Therefore, it seems that the Egyptian legislator should intervene to plug this loophole in the 
Civil Procedure Law and the Egyptian Arbitration Law by introducing clear provisions 
allowing the court to issue interim orders such as orders allowing property inspection, 
attachment on banks accounts, and detention of a party‘s electronic devices (computers and 
electronic data storage facilities). The latest amendments of in the UNCITRAL Model Law 
(2006) have treated the subject of interim measures in a comprehensive manner, and a lot of 
countries around the world have adopted these amendments. It is suggested that the adoption 
of Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law by Egyptian lawmakers would lead to the 
uniformity of practice regarding these measures, and will make such measures more efficient, 
                                                 
194
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195
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since they will be more enforceable. Without such adjustments the interim measures regime 
will lose much of its effectiveness and will hardly assist international arbitration. 
 
2.1.1.3 Preserving evidence by appointment of experts 
 
Evidential matters are considered among the most important elements in determining 
disputes. Therefore, it might be supposed that parties to arbitration disputes may request the 
national courts or arbitral tribunal to take any interim measures necessary to secure such 
evidence.
198
  
National courts might be considered the obvious bodies to take measures to secure evidence 
or to assist arbitral tribunals in doing so.
199
 Arbitral tribunals can also by virtue of the 
arbitration agreement take any measures deemed necessary to preserve evidence.
200
  
However, interim measures have a dual nature. Sometimes they are legal and sometimes 
technical.
201 For instance, some measures need specific legal actions, such as taking a 
witness's testimony, ordering a party to disclose any documents in their possession; or 
obtaining documents in a third party's possession. All these measures have a legal nature. 
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Considering that the arbitral tribunal may be constituted from engineers,
202 scientists, or 
other experts with no legal knowledge, rather than itself immediately taking measures to 
safeguard evidence and protect parties‘ rights by using their own experience in their own 
fields 
203
 it may choose to appoint legal advisers to determine which measures should be 
taken in the dispute.
204
  
 
The protection of particular kinds of evidence may further require a specialist who knows 
how to deal with such evidence, how to take samples from it and how to preserve it – 
knowledge which is sometimes lacking in the arbitral tribunal. Moreover, some interim 
measures have purely technical characteristics and need special knowledge in some areas 
such as mathematics, geography, construction engineering, etc.
205
 These matters may be 
known before the start of proceedings or may arise during the arbitration process: e.g., in 
disputes related to bills of exchange, liquidation, bank reports or bankruptcy. Resolving such 
issues may require financial and accounting experts to help the tribunal understand these 
matters.
206
  
 
Disputes dealing with cargos and maritime transaction may also need an expert in 
engineering of vessels who is able to correctly calculate the weight of the vessel and the 
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weight of the cargo it can carry during its voyage.
207
 In such situations, the work of experts 
becomes indispensable 
208
 and expert reports to the arbitral tribunal in these cases become the 
cutting edge in resolving a lot of arbitration disputes.
209
 Therefore, the arbitration process 
often needs the work of experts to preserve evidence and determine the facts of the dispute. 
 
The importance of the experts' work has pushed a lot of arbitration laws to recognise the 
arbitral tribunal's power to appoint one or more experts to make a decision on technical or 
other issues beyond the arbitral tribunal's expertise.
210
 In addition, some institutional rules 
have adopted special rules to regulate the work of experts in international arbitration disputes. 
Examples are the Code of Practice for Experts and the Protocols for the use of experts.
211
 
Furthermore, there is the process of Expert Determination by virtue of an expert determines 
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the resolution of the dispute question – a decision binding on the parties unless they agree 
otherwise.
212
  
2.1.1.4 Expert appointments in Egyptian Law   
 
The Egyptian Arbitration Law has addressed the appointment of experts in Article 36 which 
stipulates that: 
1. The arbitral panel may appoint one or more experts to submit on specific issues determined by the 
arbitral panel a written report or an oral report to be included in the procès-verbal of the meeting. A 
copy of the terms of reference regarding the mission entrusted to the expert shall be sent to each party.  
2.  Each party shall provide the expert with all relevant information concerning the dispute or produce 
or provide access to relevant documents, goods or other property for his inspection. The arbitral panel 
shall decide on any controversy arising in this respect between the expert and one of the parties.  
3.  The arbitral panel shall send to each party a copy of the expert‘s report immediately after its 
submission, granting each party the opportunity to express its opinion thereon. Each of the two parties 
is entitled to review and examine the documents upon which the expert relied in his report.  
4.  The arbitral panel may decide, after the submission of the expert‘s report, whether on its own 
initiative or upon request of a party to the arbitration, to hold a meeting to hear the expert and to 
provide for both parties the opportunity to hear him and to put questions to him about what is contained 
in his report. Each of the parties may present one or more expert witnesses in order to give testimony 
on the issues raised in the report of the expert appointed by the arbitral panel, unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties to the arbitration.‖
213
 
 
This Article shows that the Egyptian arbitration law has adopted both ways found in 
arbitration laws for using experts in arbitration disputes - the tribunal-appointed expert ‗the 
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arbitral panel may appoint one or more experts 
214
 and the party-appointed expert ‗Each of the 
parties may present one or more expert witnesses.‘215 The expert presents a report to the 
arbitral tribunal about specific issues determined by the arbitral tribunal in the terms of 
reference of the expert's appointment. Whether written or oral, this report is to be included in 
the minutes of the hearing, and the arbitral tribunal shall rapidly communicate a copy of it to 
the parties immediately after its submission and in advance of the hearing.
216
 In this way, the 
arbitral tribunal gives the parties a proper opportunity to examine the expert's report and 
study any materials that the expert has relied on in his/her report.
217
 Following the submission 
of the expert's report, the arbitral tribunal may hold a hearing – whether of its own initiative 
or upon the parties' request – to hear the expert's opinions, and shall allow the arbitration 
parties or their expert to examine the expert's opinions or his report. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that the Egyptian Arbitration Law does not determine the form of 
expert examination, so the arbitral tribunal can use any common means to examine expert 
testimonies in international arbitration such as Expert Conferencing,
218
 as this method is 
commonly used in international arbitration and can save a lot of time.
219
 Thus, the parties‘ 
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advocates are usually permitted to use it when they want to accelerate the arbitration 
process.
220
    
The parties should provide the tribunal-appointed expert with any documents or information 
s/he may need in his/her mission. They should also allow the expert to access any sites or 
properties s/he wishes to visit and to take any samples deems necessary.
221
 The arbitral 
tribunal is competent to adjudicate on any controversy arising between the parties and the 
expert.
 222
 As regards the scope of cooperation between the parties and the tribunal-appointed 
expert, Egyptian Arbitration Law has not addressed the issue where one of the parties refuses 
to cooperate with the expert. Article 36 of this law does not grant the arbitral tribunal any 
discretion to resort to the court to oblige the recalcitrant party to cooperate with the tribunal-
appointed expert. If a party refuses to allow the expert to inspect his/her properties, or refuses 
to disclose any information or documents in his/her possession to be examined by the expert, 
the arbitral tribunal cannot force this party to comply with its decisions as it does not have 
coercive power to do so and, according to Article 36, it cannot resort to the court to intervene 
to enforce its decision.
223
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Furthermore, Article 36 does not impose any sanction on a party's refusal to cooperate, does 
not discuss this rejection of the tribunal's decision and does not allow the arbitral tribunal to 
continue the arbitration procedures to issue a final award. Yet this defect is remedied by 
Article 35 which grants the arbitral tribunal power to continue the arbitration process and 
issue a final award regardless of the missing documents which the party refused to submit to 
the tribunal: 
If either party fails to appear at any of the meetings or to submit the documents required from it, the 
arbitral panel may continue the arbitral proceedings and make the award on the dispute based upon the 
elements of evidence before it.
224
 
 
The issue of access to the court to request its help to oblige the party to cooperate with the an 
expert in his/her mission is different in the EEL where Article 148 stipulates ‗The expert can 
ask the court impose on a party who does not comply with his requests one of the sanctions 
provided in Article 99 of the Civil Procedure Law.‘ The sanctions listed in Article 99 are: 
If one of litigants did not comply the court orders to submit any documents or reject its orders to attend 
before the court or refused to comply with expert requests which caused some delay to its mission or 
made it difficult to do so, that the court may impose on him a fine of not more than 1000 Egyptian 
pound or may suspension the litigation procedures for 3 months.  
 
Hence, Articles 148 and 99 have addressed this gap in the arbitration law if the seat of 
arbitration was in Egypt. In this case, Egyptian law including both the Egyptian Arbitration 
Law and the EEL Law would be the applicable laws, so this defect in the appointment of 
experts in Egyptian Arbitration Law no longer exists. The problem would still stand, though, 
if the seat of arbitration was out of Egypt but the Egyptian Arbitration Law was to apply to 
the dispute as a result of the agreement of the parties.     
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Clearly, Article 36 has addressed the general Rule of using experts in normal circumstances 
but not as an interim measure. If the use of experts was an interim measure in urgent 
circumstances to preserve evidence, according to the wording of Article 36 the arbitral 
tribunal could either resort to the court of its own initiative or allow the party in favour of 
whom it has issued this measure to oblige his opponent to comply with the tribunal's 
decision. This is based on Article 24 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law which gives the tribunal 
the power to permit any party to take the necessary procedures to enforce tribunal decisions, 
including his right to resort to the ‗Article 9 court‘ to help in enforcing the tribunal's 
decision.  However, if the arbitral tribunal has, in normal circumstances, appointed an expert 
under Article 36, the arbitral tribunal would then be incompetent to permit the parties or even 
itself to resort to the court to enforce its decisions. If it did, its procedure would be void, as it 
is not competent under the law that governs the arbitration procedure. 
 
2.1.1.5 Conclusion  
 
There are two issues that should be modified in Article 36 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law. 
Firstly, regarding the appointment of experts in urgent circumstances as an interim measure 
or the appointment of experts in normal circumstances as a normal procedure, this point 
needs clarification by adding the following clause to Article 36: 
If the appointment of experts is in urgent circumstances, the arbitral tribunal is competent to estimate 
this case as an interim measure and is free to consult with parties as regards this appointment. If this 
order is challenged by one of the arbitration parties, this shall not affect the expert's continued work, 
nor shall it affect the arbitral tribunal's right to take any security in connection with this measure.
225
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It would thus be possible to preserve evidence of the dispute and at the same time prevent any 
attempt to frustrate or delay the arbitration process. The possibility of requiring security 
further protects the opponent from any damage that may occur due to these measures.     
Secondly, concerning the arbitral tribunal's power to request from the court – or even to 
permit the parties to resort to the court – to use its power to enforce the non-compliant party 
to co-operate, this issue, it is suggested, becomes insignificant when the place of arbitration is 
Egypt. As the procedural law of the arbitration would be Egyptian, the EEL would be the law 
governing the expert work in Egypt, and this law gives the tribunal the power to request from 
the court to oblige the non-compliant party to cooperate with the expert in his/her mission. 
The problem resurfaces, however, when the Egyptian Arbitration Law is the applicable law in 
arbitrations seated outside Egypt, for Article 36 as it stands now does not grant the tribunal 
the power to have recourse to the court for help to enforce the arbitral tribunal's decisions. 
It seems that Article 36 should be amended by adding another clause that gives the arbitral 
tribunal the power to resort to the court in any way, which would secure the enforceability of 
its decisions and protect the continuity of the arbitration process. The amendment should at 
least consider a party's refusal to cooperate as creating an evidential presumption against that 
party. Otherwise, the power to resort to an expert could be rendered meaningless if a party 
could with impunity refuse to cooperate with the tribunal-appointed expert. 
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2.1.2 Preserving Evidence in the Scottish Arbitration Act 
 
2.1.2.1 Outline of the Scotland (Arbitration) Act 2010 
 
In June 2010 the new Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 
226
 was enacted to create a single 
statutory framework for arbitration in Scotland, and to remove all the inadequacies and 
lacunae in the previous statutes.
227
 The Act integrated most arbitration law in one statute. 
Before the enactment of this law, arbitration in Scotland was governed by different Scottish 
laws, both common law and a variety of statutes such as Article 25 of the Articles of 
Regulation of 1695,
228
 the Arbitration Scotland Act of 1894,
229
 and s.3 of the Scotland 
Administration of Justice Act of 1972.
230
 Moreover, the old arbitration laws did not cover 
some important areas in the field of arbitration, such as privacy and confidentiality, as well as 
the relationship between court rules of evidence 
231
 and the arbitration procedures.
232
 Because 
arbitration law was often unclear to both arbitrators and parties, a lot of arbitrators felt 
compelled to employ clerks, normally solicitors experienced in Scots arbitration law,
233
 to 
advise and assist them in understanding the arbitration process in Scotland. This, 
unsurprisingly, tended to increase the cost of arbitration there. Thus, the complexity of 
procedures and the unjustified costs often forced arbitrating parties to reject Scotland as a 
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venue to resolve their disputes.
234
 All these reasons spurred the Scottish legislator to pass the 
new Act to cover all arbitration issues in one law, thus facilitating the use of arbitration in 
Scotland.
235
 
The new Act echoes the fundamental principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law in most of its 
rules.
236
 Therefore, the general principle which governs arbitration procedures is party 
autonomy.
237
 This means that the Act lays down most provisions dealing with procedural 
matters as default rules,
238
 and gives parties the freedom to modify, add to or even exclude 
such rules.
239
 Another aspect of the Act is that provisional measures are considered one of the 
important means to protect arbitration parties during the course of arbitration, and the first 
type of these measures aims to preserve the dispute evidence. 
2.1.2.2 Preserving Evidence under the Scottish Arbitration Act 
 
Before examining the preservation of evidence under the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010, it 
is useful to mention the rules dealing with or related to these measures. As regards preserving 
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evidence as a type of provisional measure, the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 has come up 
with six rules to govern such matters Rules 28, 31, 35, 38, 39, and 53. They read as follows, 
Rule 28: Procedure and evidence 
(1) It is for the tribunal to determine— 
(a) the procedure to be followed in the arbitration, and 
(b) the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence. 
(2) In particular, the tribunal may determine 
(a) When and where the arbitration is to be conducted, 
(b) Whether parties are to submit claims or defences and, if so, when they should do so and the extent 
to which claims or defences may be amended, 
(c) Whether any documents or other evidence should be disclosed by or to any party and, if so, when 
such disclosures are to be made and to whom copies of disclosed documents and information are to be 
given, 
(d) Whether any and, if so, what questions are to be put to and answered by the parties, 
(e) Whether and, if so, to what extent the tribunal should take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and 
the law, 
(f) The extent to which the arbitration is to proceed by way of 
(i) Hearings for the questioning of parties, 
(ii) Written or oral argument, 
(iii) Presentation or inspection of documents or other evidence, or 
(iv) Submission of documents or other evidence, 
(g) The language to be used in the arbitration (and whether a party is to supply translations of any 
document or other evidence), 
(h) Whether to apply rules of evidence used in legal proceedings or any other rules of evidence. 
 
Rule 31: Tribunal directions  
(1) The tribunal may give such directions to the parties as it considers appropriate for the purposes of 
conducting the arbitration. 
(2) A party must comply with such a direction by such time as the tribunal specifies.  
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Rule 35: Powers relating to property 
The tribunal may direct a party— 
(a) to allow the tribunal, an expert or another party— 
(i) to inspect, photograph, preserve or take custody of any property which that party owns or possesses 
which is the subject of the arbitration (or as to which any question arises in the arbitration), or 
(ii) to take samples from, or conduct an experiment on, any such property, or 
(b) to preserve any document or other evidence which the party possesses or controls.
240
 
 
Rule 38: Failure to attend hearing or provide evidence 
Where— 
(a) a party fails— 
(i) to attend a hearing which the tribunal requested the party to attend a reasonable period in advance of 
the hearing, or 
(ii) to produce any document or other evidence requested by the tribunal, and 
(b) the tribunal considers that there is no good reason for the failure, the tribunal may proceed with the 
arbitration, and make its award, on the basis of the evidence (if any) before it. 
  
Rule 39: Failure to comply with tribunal direction or arbitration agreement 
(1) Where a party fails to comply with— 
(a) any direction made by the tribunal, or 
(b) any obligation imposed by— 
(i) the arbitration agreement, 
(ii) these rules (in so far as they apply), or 
(iii) any other agreement by the parties relating to conduct of the arbitration, the tribunal may order the 
party to so comply. 
(2) Where a party fails to comply with an order made under this rule, the tribunal may do any of the 
following—  
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(a) direct that the party is not entitled to rely on any allegation or material which was the subject-matter 
of the order, 
(b) draw adverse inferences from the non-compliance, 
(c) proceed with the arbitration and make its award, 
(d) make such provisional award (including an award on expenses) as it considers appropriate in 
consequence of the non-compliance 
 
Rule 53: Provisional awards 
The tribunal may make a provisional award granting any relief on a provisional basis which it has the 
power to grant permanently. 
 
The aforementioned rules show that the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 has distinguished 
between three kinds of power that the arbitral tribunal can use to preserve evidence: 
1. Power to give directions to the parties 
2. Power to issue a provisional award under Rule 39(2)(d) as a sanction for non-
compliance  
3. Power to issue a provisional award as a protective measure. 
Furthermore, the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 has recognized the principle of concurrent 
jurisdiction 
241
 between arbitral tribunal and courts to aid arbitration to reach to the final 
award. Every one of the following categories has some function to preserve evidence.  
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2.1.2.2.1 The power of the tribunal to preserve evidence by directions and 
orders 
 
The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 empowers the arbitral tribunal to preserve evidence by 
giving directions to the parties to refrain from taking certain actions e.g. moving their 
evidence in the form of documents or property out of the tribunal's jurisdiction, or to perform 
certain actions, such as allowing a tribunal appointed expert to carry out inspections, take 
samples or access properties. It is noteworthy that the Act uses the term 'direction' as a 
synonym of 'order', so any directions issued by the arbitral tribunal should be treated as 
orders.  
 
The first Rule in the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 dealing with this power is Rule 28(2) 
which regulates the arbitrator‘s power to conduct the arbitration proceedings and regulates 
evidence whether documentary or otherwise.
242
 Rule 28 does not deal directly with the 
preservation of evidence as a provisional measure, even though it addresses some issues that 
may be related to the evidence in the arbitration, such as documents that may be disclosed 
during the arbitration process or documents that need inspection,
243
 but these issues are 
related to the arrangement of proceedings more than the topic of provisional measure.
244
  
The second Rule in the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 that deals with this issue is Rule 31, 
which expressly indicates that the arbitral tribunal can give directions or orders as to 
conducting the arbitration process. This rule, however, uses a broad language that may 
encompass any issues whether related to management of the case,
245
 the preservation of 
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243
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244
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(Kluwer Law international, 2003) para 24-5. 
245
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evidence by procedural orders 
246
 or matters related to the purpose of conducting the 
arbitration. Therefore, this Rule implicitly gives the arbitral tribunal power to preserve 
evidence by directing parties to take measures considered appropriate for the purposes of 
conducting the arbitration.
247
 Rule 31(2) also requires the parties to comply with its directions 
within the time specified in these directions to avoid any delay or unnecessary cost in the 
arbitration process.
248
    
 
The most important Rule in relation to preservation of evidence is Rule 35, which is the main 
Rule in the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 addressing preservation of evidence as a 
provisional measure. This Rule gives the arbitral tribunal power to give directions and take 
measures to protect parties‘ property,249 a term with a broad interpretation.250 It may give 
directions regarding the inspection, photographing, custody of property, or directions 
designed to preserve evidence or documents in the party's possession or under his/her control.  
 
Rule 35 is nearly equivalent to Article 17(c)(d) of the UNCITRAL Model Law as it covers 
many interim or protective measures related to property and evidence.
251
 Therefore, Rule 35 
is considered the main source of arbitral tribunal power to take any measures to preserve 
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247
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 Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd, [2005] EWCA Civ 618. 
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 Fraser Davidson, Hew R. Dundas, David Bartos, Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (W.Green 2010)198. 
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topic of evidence preservation.  
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evidence, e.g. issuing a disclosure order for some specific documents 
252 
or a freezing order 
(known in England as a Mareva injunction) 
253
 regarding custody of disputed property,
254
 or 
an order to sell perishable goods. Generally speaking, the arbitral tribunal under this Rule has 
nearly the same power mentioned in Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
 
However, the title of this Rule is ‗Powers Relating to Property‘. Does that mean that the 
arbitral tribunal is entitled to take preservation measures related only to property, or may it 
take any measures deemed necessary in the course of the arbitration? The answer to this 
question is important, considering that some protective measures are not related to property – 
measures like taking testimony from a witness who may be dying or moving out of the 
tribunal's jurisdiction during the process; security for costs, making an interim payment that 
may be required during the arbitration process or resumption of project works. Does the 
arbitral tribunal's power under Rule 35 include these measures or not?  
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 Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd - [2008] EWCA Civ 184 (Jan), Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd,  
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 Mobile Telesystems Finance SA v Nomihold Securities Inc, [2011] EWCA Civ 1040; Masri v Consolidated 
Contractors International Co SAL [2008] EWCA Civ 303; (Comm), Kastner v Jason, [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
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It seems Rule 35 of the Act just covers two kinds of measures; one related to property and the 
other related to evidence. The Policy Memorandum states that: 
One of the features of arbitration in Scotland will be an arbitrator‘s ability to make orders for the 
preservation etc. of property owned or possessed by a party as a protective measure pending the 
outcome of an arbitration and also for the purpose of being used as evidence during the proceedings.
255
 
 
Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal can take a witness's testimony and can order resumption of 
works as these measures go under both categories. The tribunal can further take any measures 
to preserve evidence to secure the outcome of the arbitration (the final award related to 
property) based on this rule. Moreover, this Rule is equivalent to Article 17(c)-(d) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, which covers these kinds of measures.
256
 Thus, the arbitral tribunal 
under this Rule is entitled to take all kinds of protective measures whether related to evidence 
or property under dispute by giving directions to the parties to do so. 
 
Considering security for costs, interim payments or any measures related to finance that may 
be required during the course of arbitration, it is doubtful that the arbitral tribunal under Rule 
35 can make any directions or orders to regulate these issues, as these measures are not 
related to protective measures regarding property or evidence. In addition, there is no 
reference to such kind of measures either in the text of Rule 35 or in the Policy 
Memorandum. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal cannot take these measures under Rule 35 of 
the Act, but may be able to do so under other rules. For example, an interim payment could 
be the subject of a provisional award under Rule 53.
257
 
 
                                                 
255
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256
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2.1.2.2.2 Tribunal's power to preserve evidence by provisional awards 
 
It is obvious that Rule 35 relies on voluntary party compliance with the tribunal's directions, 
and in turn the preservation of evidence according to this Rule relies on the parties‘ 
cooperation with the arbitral tribunal. However, in case of party failure to comply with the 
tribunal‘s directions or party refusal to cooperate with it regarding evidence, for example, if 
the party refuses to disclose documents in his possession or if the party refuses to allow the 
tribunal‘s experts to access, inspect or take samples from the subject matters of the dispute 
(goods) in the party's property and persists in his intransigence, the arbitral tribunal can make 
a new order based on Rule 39 to induce this party to comply with its directions, and if he fails 
to comply with this new order, the tribunal can go to the next level of by:
 
 
(a) Directing that the party is not entitled to rely on any allegation or material which was the subject-
matter of the order, 
(b) Drawing adverse inferences from the non-compliance, 
(c) Proceeding with the arbitration and making its award, 
(d) Making such provisional award (including an award on expenses) as it considers appropriate in 
consequence of the non-compliance. 
Rule 39(2)(d) clearly considers a provisional award as a sanction,
258
 and the arbitral tribunal 
may only revert to it in face of non-compliance with its direction. What is the nature of 
provisional awards under this rule? 
 
 
                                                 
258
 The Policy Memorandum para 165 stated that ‗Rule 35 gives the arbitrators further powers to deal with 
failure on the part of the parties, this time in relation to failure to comply with an arbitrator‘s direction or the 
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2.1.2.2.2.1 The concept of a provisional award under Rule 39(2)(d) 
 
 
First of all there is no equivalent provision to Rule 39(2)(d) in the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
the Egyptian Arbitration Law 27 of 1994, or English Arbitration Act of 1996.
259
 There is no 
further reference to the term 'provisional award' in the whole Act – except in Rule 53 which 
stipulates ‗The tribunal may make a provisional award granting any relief on a provisional 
basis which it has the power to grant permanently.‘ Therefore, a provisional award under this 
Rule deals with a particular issue by granting relief for only a short period of time on a 
provisional basis until the final determination of the dispute by the final award.
260 
For 
example, the tribunal may issue a provisional award to make an interim payment to one party 
who needs a quick financial relief or else will face bankruptcy.
261 
This example illustrates that 
provisional awards deal with temporary issues that may arise during the course of arbitration 
and need swift responses in order to protect the arbitration process. Such provisional awards 
may be confirmed or reversed by the final award.  
 
There are two approaches to the subject of provisional awards in the Act: Rule 39(2)(d) treats 
such an award as a sanction, while Rule53 sees a provisional award as a form of relief. With 
regard to Rule 39(2)(d), there is a need for a precise treatment or definition of provisional 
awards as a sanction. In most cases, provisional awards or orders are used to protect a variety 
                                                 
259
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of rights.262 What, sanction is envisaged by empowering the tribunal to make a provisional 
award? The arbitral tribunal has no power to fine or expropriate a party. It can only impose 
procedural sanctions such as those stipulated upon in, for instance, Rule 39(2)(a),(b) and (c) 
of the Act, and s.41(5),(6) and (7) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. Thus, the tribunal 
may, for example, ignore the documents, which a party refuses to disclose, continue the 
arbitration proceedings, or make its award, drawing adverse inferences from the non-
compliance when deciding upon the award. This description of provisional measures as a 
sanction might cause some misunderstanding among arbitration users in Scotland, as they 
might think that imposing a sanction is one of the aims of provisional measures. However, 
none of the above sanctions need be imposed in the form of a provisional award.
263
 They 
should fall within the tribunal's normal power to conduct the arbitration proceedings.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Moreover, according to Rule 71(3), no appeal may be made against a provisional award.
264
 
Hence, a provisional award (including an award imposing a sanction) would not be subject to 
judicial review. This situation may lead to frustrate the provisional measures system, as 
parties may refrain from conferring the power to issue provisional awards on the arbitral 
tribunal in case it uses that power to impose sanctions without them having the potential to 
challenge it.
265
 Moreover, the issue of provisional awards is considered controversial even in 
Scotland,
266
 and it is desirable to avoid any bifurcation of this idea which may cause 
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problems in arbitration practice and lead to misunderstanding to the meaning of the concept 
of provisional measures.  
 
In conclusion, it seems the use of provisional awards as a sanction conflicts with the purpose 
and nature of these measures as a relief. These measures were created to protect parties‘ 
rights during the arbitration process and to guarantee the continuity of that process, not for 
use as unchallengeable sanctions against the parties. Thus Rule 39(2)(d) causes inconsistency 
and overlap of functions of provisional measures in the Act. It would surely make more sense 
if it were rephrased, especially since this will not impact on the consistency and coherence of 
the rest of Rule 39. Indeed, it may rather increase the consistency between this Rule and other 
rules dealing with the topic of provisional measures, while at the same time maintaining the 
arbitrator's power at an acceptable level. Furthermore, this proposal would not affect 
arbitration parties‘ rights to resort to the Sheriff Court or Court of Session to seek measures to 
preserve evidence or protect the parties‘ rights under Rule 45.267 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
confer such a power by agreement. There is no guidance as to how this wide power is to be operated in practice. 
There is no differentiation made between ―provisional‖ remedies for example an urgent need to regulate 
possession of perishable goods which may be the subject of dispute and ―interim‖ awards which would fall 
within 'provisional award…‘ 
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2.1.2.2.2.2 The concept of a provisional award under Rule 53 as procedural 
relief 
 
In light of the previous explanation, a provisional award is an award that deals with a 
particular issue only for a short period of time until final determination by the final award.
268 
An interim payment request, for example, is a temporary issue that may arise during the 
course of arbitration. Such situations may need a quick response to protect the weaker party 
who needs quick financial relief to avoid insolvency.
269
 Such provisional measures may be 
confirmed or reversed by the final award.  
 
Rule 53 stipulates that ‗The tribunal may make a provisional award granting any relief on a 
provisional basis which it has power to grant permanently.‘ This Rule gives the arbitral 
tribunal a wide power to make any provisional award deemed necessary during the arbitration 
proceedings.
270
 The Policy Memorandum paragraph 173, states that ‗The arbitrator is able to 
make provisional awards for relief. It is considered that this may in practice protect the 
weaker party financially during the arbitration process.‘ While the Policy Memorandum 
suggests that the term ‗relief‘ in Rule 53 might be interpreted to mean financial relief 
exclusively, on the plain words of the Rule the power is not limited in this way, even if in 
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practice financial relief  is most likely to be granted under this rule.
271
 Therefore, it is 
submitted that an arbitral tribunal may grant a provisional award to preserve evidence. 
 
It is noteworthy that Rule 53 has dealt with some ambiguous issues in the topic of provisional 
measures: 
a. Rule 53 has solved the terminological confusion in this area by choosing the term 
'provisional' rather than the term 'interim' used in Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 
272
 and in the old Scottish arbitration laws.
273
 This step makes the provisional 
measures system under the 2010 Act more understandable, since the term 
‗provisional‘ will mean an award which is binding till the final award is issued.274 
Whatever the chosen term, this step provides arbitration practitioners and clienteles 
with a definite legal treatment for their requested measures, which helps them to 
request the proper measures to protect their rights in the future. 
b. Rule 53 considers these measures as awards, not as orders. Hence, will be treated as 
awards, and will be enforceable in Scotland under s.12 of the Act whether issued 
within or outside the territory. However, if a provisional award is sought to be 
enforced in Scotland the rules that will apply to such enforcement will depend on 
where the award is made. Therefore, a provisional award made in Scotland or 
anywhere else in the UK will be subject to enforcement under s.12 of the Act which 
stipulates that: ―The court may, on an application by any party, order that a tribunal‘s 
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award may be enforced as if it were an extract registered decree bearing a warrant for 
execution granted by the court…‖  
 
Yet a provisional award made outwith the UK it will normally be enforceable under the New 
York Convention and thus enforced s.19 of the Act which stipulates that:  
Recognition and enforcement of New York Convention awards; (1) A Convention award is to be 
recognised as binding on the persons as between whom it was made (and may accordingly be relied on 
by those persons in any legal proceedings in Scotland) (2) The court may order that a Convention 
award may be enforced as if it were an extract registered decree bearing a warrant for execution 
granted by the court.  
 
However, the capability of provisional awards to be enforced under New York Convention 
remains uncertain in international arbitration practice 
275
 as this Convention does not define 
what an award is 
276
 and just addresses the recognition and enforcement of the final and 
binding awards 
277
 without any definition of the term ‗award‘. 
c. Rule 53 is a default Rule and arbitration parties are free to modify, add to, or exclude 
it.
278
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2.1.2.3 Court power to preserve evidence under the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 
2010 
 
Court intervention in arbitration process is sometimes very important to assist the arbitral 
tribunal to do its job whether that assistance is rendered before or after the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, during the arbitration proceedings, or even after the issue of the final 
award.
279
 
 
As regards preserving evidence, court intervention is sometimes essential to preserving such 
evidence as ―documents, information, deeds, or any material evidence‖ if this evidence is in 
third-party possession.
280
 Court intervention may also be vital for securing the attendance of 
witnesses at the arbitration 
281
 or for enforcing tribunal directions if they are not respected by 
one party.
282
 Generally speaking, the court's intervention is required in any measure that 
needs to be enforced, e.g. the sale of property,
283
 detention orders,
284
 or the appointment of a 
guardian.
285
 
In a number of its rules, the Scotland (Arbitration) Act 2010 has addressed court power to aid 
the arbitral tribunal. As regards provisional measures, it has regulated this power in Rules 45 
and 46 of Arbitration (Scotland) Act, and Section 1 of the Administration of Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1972: 
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Rule 45 Court‘s power to order attendance of witnesses and disclosure of evidence  
(1) The court may, on an application by the tribunal or any party, order any person— 
(a) To attend a hearing for the purposes of giving evidence to the tribunal, or 
(b) To disclose documents or other material evidence to the tribunal. 
(2) But the court may not order a person to give any evidence, or to disclose anything, which the person 
would be entitled to refuse to give or disclose in civil proceedings. 
(3) The tribunal may continue with the arbitration pending determination of an application. 
(4) The court‘s decision on whether to make an order is final. 
Rule 46 Court‘s other powers in relation to arbitration  
(1) The court has the same power in arbitration as it has in civil proceedings— 
(a) To appoint a person to safeguard the interests of any party lacking capacity, 
(b) To order the sale of any property in dispute in the arbitration, 
(c) To make an order securing any amount in dispute in the arbitration, 
(d) To make an order under section 1 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972 (c.59), 
(e) To grant warrant for arrestment or inhibition, 
(f) To grant interdict (or interim interdict), or 
(g) To grant any other interim or permanent order. 
(2) But the court may take such action only— 
(a) On an application by any party, and 
(b) If the arbitration has begun— 
(i) With the consent of the tribunal, or 
(ii) Where the court is satisfied that the case is one of urgency. 
(3) The tribunal may continue with the arbitration pending determination of the application. 
(4) This Rule applies— 
(a) To arbitrations which have begun, 
(b) Where the court is satisfied— 
(i) That a dispute has arisen or might arise, and 
(ii) That an arbitration agreement provides that such a dispute is to be resolved by arbitration. 
(5) This Rule does not affect— 
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(a) Any other powers which the court has under any enactment or Rule of law in relation to 
arbitrations, or 
(b) The tribunal‘s powers. 
 
Section 1 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972: 
Without prejudice to the existing powers of the Court of Session and of the sheriff court, those courts 
shall have power, subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, to order- 
(1) the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody and detention of documents and other property 
(including, where appropriate, land) which appear to the court to be property as to which any question 
may relevantly arise in any existing civil proceedings before that court or in civil proceedings which 
are likely to be brought,  
(2) the production and recovery of any such property, the taking of samples thereof and the carrying 
out of any experiment thereon or therewith. 
(3) any person to disclose such information as he has as to the identity of any persons who appear to 
the court to be persons who— 
(a) might be witnesses in any existing civil proceedings before that court or in civil proceedings which 
are likely to be brought; or 
(b) might be defenders in any civil proceedings which appear to the court to be likely to be brought. 
 
Other rules recognize the right of arbitral tribunal and the parties to resort to the courts 
(Sheriff Court and Court of Session) to support the arbitration process.  
2.1.2.3.1 Court intervention to preserve evidence under Rule 45  
 
Rule 45(1) aims to secure evidence and protect the arbitration process from any non-
compliance, whether by the parties or a third party, by making Rule 45 mandatory. Thus, the 
parties cannot modify this Rule or exclude it.
286
 In addition, no one can disrupt the arbitration 
process because Rule 45(1), upon a request from the arbitral tribunal or from a party, gives 
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the court the power to order any person to testify or present any documents or material in his 
possession. The use of the term ‗any material‘ in the Rule gives the court a wide discretion to 
include anything it considers evidence, such as electronic data storage, electronic mail and 
the like. 
 
It may be noted that Rule 45 does not require previous permission from the arbitral tribunal to 
allow the parties to resort to court,
287
 a provision that totally contrasts with Article 24(2) of 
Egyptian Arbitration Act. The Rule considers that the parties have an inherent right to request 
the court‘s help, if there are an appropriate circumstances that justify this intervention.288  
2.1.2.3.1.1 Application Procedures  
 
Court intervention may be requested by the arbitral tribunal or the parties in three ways: 
petition, note, or summary application form. Application to the Court of Session may be by 
petition 
289
 or note,
290
 employing the appropriate court application forms. Such applications 
should be lodged in the Court of Session, fulfilling the requirements of r.14.4 and the 
requirements of r.15.2.and Ch.99 for notes. An application submitted to the Sheriff Court 
291
 
should be in summary application form.
292
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At the same time, Rule 45(2) has made it clear that the court may not order any prospective 
witnesses who are under a legal duty of confidentiality, e.g. solicitors, to disclose any 
information in their possession, and the court must apply rules of confidentiality or 
privilege.
293
 Yet there are several exceptions to this rule, for example, where fraud or other 
illegality is alleged against a party in relation to a transaction in which the solicitor was 
concerned.
294
 However, the court‘s decisions under Rule45 are unchallengeable and final.295 
 
 
2.1.2.3.2 Court intervention to preserve evidence under Rule 46  
 
Rule 46 is a spare provision dealing with the need for a provisional measure, whether before 
arbitral tribunal formation upon a party‘s application296 or after the start of arbitration process 
with tribunal permission.
297
Rule 46 also emphasises the court‘s general jurisdiction to 
intervene in all cases of urgency whether before or after the tribunal's constitution, and with 
or without tribunal's permission.
298
 Rule 46 covers all types of provisional measures that the 
court may grant in the course of arbitration. For example, Rule 46(1)(a), (b) and (f) regulate 
the status quo,  Rule 46(1)(c), (e), (f) and (g) look to stabilize legal relations between parties 
and regulate security for costs and interim payments, while Rule 46(1)(d) and (g) cover 
preservation of evidence. However, Rule 46(1)(d) and (g) address the court power to take 
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measures in nearly the same way as Rule 35 addressed tribunal powers relating to property. 
Rule 46 has, nonetheless, put a few conditions to the court's exercise of this power. 
 
2.1.2.3.2.1 Conditions for court intervention under Rule 46  
 
 
Rule 46(2) addresses the conditions that should be satisfied before the court can exercise its 
powers under Rule 46. If the arbitration has not started, a party should submit an application 
requesting the court's intervention. Without this application, the court cannot intervene in the 
arbitration process.
299
 A party may submit the application to the court by any means, and the 
court should, before examining the application, ascertain that the dispute has been agreed to 
be resolved by arbitration.
300
 If the court is satisfied on this issue, it may exercise its power to 
take any measures to secure the evidence. It may be added that, quite apart from the 2010 
Act, a party may seek the assistance of the court under s.1 of the Administration of Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1972, which allows the court to offer assistance in civil proceedings, civil 
being defined so as to include both litigation and arbitration tribunal.
301
 Consequently, 
arbitration parties may rely on either s.1 of the 1972 Act or Rule 46 of the 2010 Act in their 
applications.
302
 
 
It may also be suggested that, in extraordinary circumstances,
303
 the parties may apply to 
Court of Session to use its power under the nobile officium 
304
 to obtain any measures (as 
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there is no limit to what the court may do) 
305
 to face any unpredictable difficulties before the 
start of the arbitration process.   
Secondly: If the arbitration has started, there are two further conditions for court intervention: 
1. The Arbitral tribunal‘s consent, or  
2. The case is urgent. 
If these conditions are met, the court‘s intervention would be justified. However, if the 
arbitral tribunal refuses permission to resort to the court, or the case is not urgent, the court 
cannot take any measures.
306  
2.1.2.4 Conclusions 
 
In the 2010 Act, the preservation of evidence by the arbitral tribunal is dealt with in Rules 28, 
31, 35, 38, 39 and 53, while the preservation of evidence by the court is dealt with in Rules 
45 and 46.  
 
A comparison between Scottish provisions and Egyptian Arbitration Law 27 of 1994 
provisions reveals the following:  
1. Preservation of evidence measures in the Scottish Act are governed by five rules 
while in the Egyptian Arbitration Act they are governed by two rules: 14 and 24. That 
means the Scottish Arbitration Act is more detailed as regards the kinds of 
preservation measures available, whether related to property, documents or other 
kinds of evidence, the fact which facilitates arbitral tribunal‘s mission. This area in 
Egyptian Arbitration Law is dealt with in a very limited way. There are no 
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305
 Hoekstra v HM Advocate (NO 1) 2000.J.C 387. 
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88 
 
explanations or examples of preservation measures, which renders the preservation of 
evidence very difficult, especially if the arbitral tribunal is constituted from non-legal 
experts. This, in turn, may require court intervention – an intervention that may 
undermine the autonomy of the arbitration process.    
2. The Scottish Act has explicitly covered on the court‘s role in the preservation of 
evidence in Rules 45 and 46, going into instances and conditions in some detail. The 
Egyptian Arbitration Act addresses the court‘s role in a concise manner, without 
proper explanation of this role as regards the preservation of evidence, and avoiding 
any indication of instances or even specification of its conditions. In addition, Article 
14 of the EAL does not illustrate the kind of procedures to be followed in party 
applications for provisional measures and only refers to the competent court: ―The 
court referred to in Article 9 may order the taking of an interim or conservatory 
measure‖.307 
 
The Scottish Arbitration Act has clearly treated preservation of evidence – whether by the 
arbitral tribunal or by the court – in a better way than the Egyptian Arbitration Law 27 of 
1994. Therefore, Egyptian legislators should modify Articles 14 and 24 by doing the 
following: 
1. Defining precisely the kind of measures – whether related to property or evidence 
– the arbitral tribunal can take in the arbitration process, adding examples of these 
measures, e.g. inspection and disclosure orders, orders for the custody of property 
or the sale of perishable goods. This should keep arbitral tribunal well informed 
about the nature of provisional measures, especially if the arbitrators are 
inexperienced in these legal issues.   
                                                 
307
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2. Add a new Article to Egyptian Arbitration Law that addresses the court‘s role in 
preservation of evidence and determines this role separately in arbitration process 
to avoid any overlap between court‘s role in civil litigation and its role in 
arbitration claims, and to avoid any misunderstanding between court‘s powers in 
both subjects. The proposed Article should further specify the conditions under 
which the court may intervene to facilitate preservation of evidence, both before 
and after the formation of the arbitral tribunal, as in the Scottish Arbitration Act 
2010. 
 
Finally, the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 has addressed the topic of provisional measures 
(Interim Measures) in Article 17, so Egyptian legislators may rely on this Article as a starting 
point to reform the subject of provisional measures in Egyptian Arbitration Law. 
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2.1.3 Preserving Evidence in the English Arbitration Act 1996 (EAA) 
 
2.1.3.1 Outline of the English Arbitration Act 
 
In June 1985, the UNCITRAL Model Law came into being.
308
 Despite England playing a 
significant role in drafting the Model Law, in 1989, the Departmental Advisory Committee‘s 
(DAC) report recommended that England should not adopt it.
309 
Instead, it proposed an 
alternative reform of its somewhat fragmentary arbitration law 
310 
by enacting a new Act 
encompassing all important principles embodied in both English law 
311 
and the Model 
Law.
312
 After seven years of work, deliberations, and debates around the question role of the 
Model Law legislation appeared in the form of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (hereinafter 
the 1996 Act).
313
 The new Act received Royal Assent on the 17th of June and came into force 
on 31st of January 1997.  
 
The 1996 Act responded to the recommendations of the1989 DAC report
 314
 that any new Act 
should feature user-friendly language and be free from technicalities in order to be 
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comprehensible to the user.
315
 In Seabridge Shipping AB v AC Orssleff EFTS A/S, Thomas J 
noted that: 
One of the major purposes of the Arbitration Act 1996 was to set out most of the important principles 
of the law of arbitration of England and Wales in a logical order and expressed in a language 
sufficiently clear and free from technicalities to be readily comprehensible to the layman. It was to be 
'in user friendly language.
316
  
 
Woolf M.R in Patel v Patel Lord opined that ‗I would accept that the Act was intended to 
make the law of arbitration clear and more straightforward. Furthermore, the Act makes the 
law less technical than it has been hitherto.‘317 The 1996 Act replaced the Arbitration Acts of 
1950-1979 and governs both domestic and international arbitration disputes.
318
 
The 1996 Act contains two kinds of provisions: mandatory and non-mandatory.
319
 The first 
category comprises 21 sections, which are applicable when the seat of arbitration is in 
England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, whether or not the parties agree to their application. 
Examples of these provisions include ss.9-11 governing court proceedings, s.13 on limitation 
and s.43 on the parties' right to resort to court to secure a witness's attendance.
320
 These 
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provisions require no prior agreement between parties to apply and cannot be excluded or 
overridden by the parties.
321
  
 
Non-mandatory provisions 
322
 are the exact opposite of the first category and represent the 
vast majority of the 1996 Act‘s provisions. Parties are free to adopt, modify, or even 
exclude non-mandatory provisions.
323
 For example, parties are free to exclude s.39 which 
addresses the subject of the making of provisional awards or orders.  
 
The 1996 Act adopted a very different new approach from that of the 1950 Arbitration 
Act.
324
 The latter did not grant the arbitral tribunal much power in questions of evidence, 
limiting it to issues such as examining witnesses under oath and demanding that parties 
come forward with any evidence or documents in their possession. The 1950 Act did not 
give the arbitral tribunal any power to take action against a non-compliant party, and 
s.12(1) left issues like disclosure and inspection orders undecided.  
 
By contrast, the 1996 Act adopts the principle of party autonomy 
325
 and sets the arbitration 
agreement as the foundation stone in arbitration process.
326
 It has reduced the power of the 
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court to intervene to minimal levels,
327 
limiting its role to helping the arbitral tribunal to act 
when it has no power to act or is unable to act effectively,
328
 e.g. when documents or 
evidence are in third party possession,
329
 or when the tribunal needs to secure a witness's 
attendance to testify or disclose any evidence under his control.
330
 To achieve this aim, the 
1996 Act only allows court intervention subject to pre-conditions, e.g. permission from the 
arbitral tribunal for parties to resort to court, or agreement between the parties for such 
intervention.
331 
 
Provisional measures are one of the topics addressed in detail by the 1996 Act – their types 
and methods of operation whether via the tribunal or the court. The first type of provisional 
measure relates to the preservation of evidence, first by the arbitral tribunal and secondly 
by the court.
332
 
2.1.3.2 The Arbitral Tribunal's Power to Preserve Dispute Evidence  
 
Evidential matters mostly encompass three subjects; witness testimony, documents and the 
appointment of experts. To avoid repetition it is proposed to examine the first two points 
together under the preservation of evidence, and the appointment of experts separately. It is 
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helpful to start with all the provisions dealing with or related to these measures, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, in the 1996 Act.  
 
The provisions covering the types of provisional measures in the 1996 Act are ss.34, 37, 
38, 39, 41, and 48.  Section 34: 'Procedural and evidential matters', stipulates that:  
(1) It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right of 
the parties to agree any matter.  
(2) Procedural and evidential matters include-  
(a)when and where any part of the proceedings is to be held 
(b)the language or languages to be used in the proceedings and whether translations of any relevant 
documents are to be supplied 
(c)whether any and if so what form of written statements of claim and defence are to be used, when 
these should be supplied and the extent to which such statements can be later amended 
(d)whether any and if so which documents or classes of documents should be disclosed between and 
produced by the parties and at what stage; page "17" 
(e)whether any and if so what questions should be put to and answered by the respective parties and 
when and in what form this should be done 
(f)whether to apply strict rules of evidence (or any other rules) as to the admissibility, relevance or 
weight of any material (oral, written or other) sought to be tendered on any matters of fact or 
opinion, and the time, manner and form in which such material should be exchanged and presented 
(g)whether and to what extent the tribunal should itself take the initiative in ascertaining the facts 
and the law; 
(h)whether and to what extent there should be oral or written evidence or submissions. 
(3)The tribunal may fix the time within which any directions given by it are to be complied with, 
and may if it thinks fit extend the time so fixed (whether or not it has expired). 
 
Section 37: 'Power to appoint expert, legal advisor or assessor', stipulates that:  
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties-  
(a) the tribunal may-  
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(i) appoint experts or legal advisers to report to it and the parties, or  
(ii) appoint assessors to assist it on technical matters, and may allow any such expert, legal adviser or assessor 
to attend the proceedings; and  
(b) the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to comment on any information, opinion or advice 
offered by any such person.  
(2) The fees and expenses of an expert, legal adviser or assessor appointed by the tribunal for which the 
arbitrators are liable are expenses of the arbitrators for the purposes of this Part. 
 
Section 38: 'General power exercisable by the tribunal', stipulates that:  
(1) The parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal for the purposes of and in 
relation to the proceedings.  
(2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties the tribunal has the following power  
(3) The tribunal may order a claimant to provide security for the costs of the arbitration.  
This power shall not be exercised on the ground that the claimant is-  
(a) an individual ordinarily resident outside the United Kingdom, or  
(b) a corporation or association incorporated or formed under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom, 
or whose central management and control is exercised outside the United Kingdom.  
(4)  The tribunal may give directions in relation to any property which is the subject of the proceedings or as to 
which any question arises in the proceedings, and which is owned by or is in the possession of a party to the 
proceedings-  
(a) for the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody or detention of the property by the tribunal, an 
expert or a party, or  
(b) ordering that samples be taken from, or any observation be made of or experiment conducted upon, the 
property. 
(5)  The tribunal may direct that a party or witness shall be examined on oath or affirmation, and may for that 
purpose administer any necessary oath or take any necessary affirmation.  
(6)  The tribunal may give directions to a party for the preservation for the purposes of the proceedings of any 
evidence in his custody or control. 
 
Section 39: 'Power to make a provisional award', stipulates that:  
(1) The parties are free to agree that the tribunal shall have power to order on a provisional basis any relief 
which it would have power to grant in a final award.  
(2)  This includes, for instance, making-  
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(a) a provisional order for the payment of money or the disposition of property as between the parties, or  
(b) an order to make an interim payment on account of the costs of the arbitration.  
(3) Any such order shall be subject to the tribunal's final adjudication; and the tribunal's final award, on the 
merits or as to costs, shall take account of any such order.  
(4)  Unless the parties agree to confer such power on the tribunal, the tribunal has no such power. This does not 
affect its powers under section 47 (awards on different issues, &c.).  
 
Section 41: 'Power of the tribunal in case of party‘s default', stipulates that:  
(1)  The parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal in case of a party's failure to do something 
necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration.  
(2)  Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the following provisions apply.  
(3)  If the tribunal is satisfied that there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the claimant in
 pursuing his claim and that the delay-  
(a) gives rise, or is likely to give rise, to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair resolution of the 
issues in that claim, or  
(b) has caused, or is likely to cause, serious prejudice to the respondent, the tribunal may make an award 
dismissing the claim.  
(4)  If without showing sufficient cause a party-  
(a) fails to attend or be represented at an oral hearing of which due notice was given, or  
(b) where matters are to be dealt with in writing, fails after due notice to submit written evidence or make 
written submissions, the tribunal may continue the proceedings in the absence of that party or, as the case may 
be, without any written evidence or submissions on his behalf, and may make an award on the basis of the 
evidence before it.  
(5)  If without showing sufficient cause a party fails to comply with any order or directions of the tribunal, the 
tribunal may make a peremptory order to the same effect, prescribing such time for compliance with it as the 
tribunal considers appropriate.  
(6)  If a claimant fails to comply with a peremptory order of the tribunal to provide security for costs, the 
tribunal may make an award dismissing his claim.  
(7)  If a party fails to comply with any other kind of peremptory order, then, without prejudice to section 42 
(enforcement by court of tribunal's peremptory orders), the tribunal may do any of the following-  
(a) direct that the party in default shall not be entitled to rely upon any allegation or material which was the 
subject matter of the order  
(b) draw such adverse inferences from the act of non-compliance as the circumstances justify  
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(c) proceed to an award on the basis of such materials as have been properly provided to it  
(d) make such order as it thinks fit as to the payment of costs of the arbitration incurred in consequence of the 
non-compliance.  
 
Section 48: 'Remedies', stipulates that:  
(1) The parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal as regards remedies.  
(2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal has the following powers.  
(3) The tribunal may make a declaration as to any matter to be determined in the proceedings.  
(4) The tribunal may order the payment of a sum of money, in any currency.  
(5) The tribunal has the same powers as the court-  
(a) to order a party to do or refrain from doing anything  
(b) to order specific performance of a contract (other than a contract relating to land);  
(c) to order the rectification, setting aside or cancellation of a deed or other document. 
 
Based on these provisions, under the English Arbitration Act 1996 the arbitral tribunal 
clearly has power to award two kinds of orders: 
1. Tribunal‘s directions in the form of an interim protection order and – in the case 
of non-compliance – a peremptory order;  
2. A provisional award or order.  
 
2.1.3.2.1 Arbitral Tribunal Directions (Interim Protection Order)333 to 
Preserve Dispute Evidence 
 
 
The 1996 Act has dropped all technicalities used in earlier legislation, which may have led 
to some misunderstanding among arbitration users.
334
 One of these dropped technicalities 
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is the term 'interim order'.
335
 The 1996 Act does not use the term 'interim order' probably to 
prevent any potential confusion regarding the meaning and function of this term and the 
term 'provisional award' (order). Instead, it has used the terms 'directions' or 'orders.'
336
 In 
spite of this, some jurists use the term 'interim order' to refer to tribunal directions or 
orders.
337
  
 
In ss.34 and 38 the 1996 Act has further organized all evidential matters whether related to 
documents, witness testimony or property. Section 34
338
 generally addresses all procedural 
and evidential matters in the arbitration. Hence, it does not deal directly with preservation 
of evidence measures even though it organizes a number of its topics. This section mostly 
addresses the tribunal‘s power to conduct the arbitration proceedings, e.g. the tribunal's 
decisions on which documents or classes of documents should be disclosed between 
parties,
339
 on the admissibility, relevance, and weight of evidence or whether the 
submissions should be written or oral. Section 34(2)(b) also empowers the tribunal to 
determine the language of the arbitral proceedings.   
 
Obviously, s.34 regulates the tribunal's power to manage arbitration procedures.
340
 The 
tribunal‘s power in this regard is not absolute and is restricted by s. 33 which lays down 
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duties that should be respected by the tribunal during the arbitration process.
341
 Though it 
seems that s.34 deals with some evidential matters, it clearly has no direct connection with 
preservation of evidence as a provisional measure. 
 
Section 38 of the 1996 Act is the cornerstone of the subject of preservation of evidence, as 
it is equivalent to Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 1985.
342
 This section covers 
most conservatory and protective measures such as preservation of evidence (s.38 (6)) and 
security for costs (s. 38(3)). Section 38(4) (a) and (b) cover all property preservation 
measures such as goods, sites or land, electronic devices, documents and the like. The 
arbitral tribunal may, accordingly, direct that goods and vessels be taken into custody, that 
sites or land be inspected, that samples or photographs be taken, or that observations or 
experiments be carried out in relation to any kinds of property or evidence. 
In addition, s.38 (6) empowers the arbitral tribunal to direct the parties to take any 
measures for preservation purposes (interim protection orders)
343
 for evidence in their 
custody or control. Under s.38 (5) the tribunal may also direct parties or witnesses testify 
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under oath or affirmation.
344
 Nonetheless, if a witness refuses to appear before the tribunal 
or to produce any documents or material in his possession, a party may under s. 43, with 
the permission of the tribunal or the agreement of the other parties, request from the court 
to secure the attendance of the witness to give oral testimony or produce any documents 
other evidence under his control.
345
 
 
2.1.3.2.1.1 Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller Relief under Section 38   
 
 
May the arbitral tribunal under s.38 issue freezing injunctions (Mareva injunctions) or search 
orders (Anton Piller relief) 
346
 seeking to preserve evidence, especially evidence in the form 
of property? The answer is simply ―no‖.347 The arbitral tribunal under s.38 can neither issue a 
Mareva Injunction 
348
 nor Anton Piller relief, whether for preservation purposes or any other 
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objective, even though the parties have agreed to transfer this power to the tribunal.
349
 The 
DAC Report has confirmed this, when it said that ―These Draconian powers are best left to be 
applied by the Courts, and the provisions of the Bill with respect to such powers have been 
adjusted accordingly.‖350 Thus, such remedies are exclusively within the power of the court.  
However, with all due respect to the DAC, it seems to the author that the arbitral tribunal's 
power under s.38 is broadly enough drawn to encompass Mareva injunctions and Anton 
Piller relief. 
 
2.1.3.2.1.1.1 Mareva Injunction  
 
 
Section 38 might include power to issue Mareva injunctions for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the logic used to justify giving power to the tribunal to take any measures and exercise any 
power in arbitration proceedings is the principle of party autonomy.
351
 Section 38(1) 
stipulates that ‗the parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal 
for the purposes of and in relation to the proceedings.‘ So any restriction on the powers which 
may be conferred by the parties undermines the principle of party autonomy, and may 
circumvent the parties' agreement, especially if they have agreed expressly to confer such 
power on the tribunal. A corollary to this principle is that the arbitral tribunal should be 
empowered to issue Mareva injunctions when the parties so agree, and lack such power in the 
absence of such agreement,
352
 like the power to make provisional awards under s.39(4). 
According to Lord Mustill,   
                                                 
349
 Robert Merkin, Arbitration Law (Lloyd‘s of London Press LTD 2001) para 12.53(c); Lord Mustill, Stewart 
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350
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Unfortunately the passage in the DAC Report of February 1996 paragraphs 201-203 does not make it 
clear whether or not it was intended that these powers should be excluded altogether or whether they 
were to be excluded unless the parties agreed that the tribunal should have the power to order them.353  
 
The DAC Report states in Paragraphs 215 and 216 that 
we have stipulated that except in cases of urgency with regard to the preservation of assets or evidence, 
the Court can only act with the agreement of the parties or the permission of the tribunal‖ 
354
and ―… if 
a given power could possibly be exercised by a tribunal, then it should be, and parties should not be 
allowed to make unilateral applications to the Court.
355
   
 
Secondly, gathering all provisional measures in the arbitral tribunal‘s rather than the court's 
hands would better preserve the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings, as a jurist states 
that ―confidentiality would typically be lost when a party turns to a court of law‖.356 This 
would also accelerate the arbitration process and increase the effectiveness of the arbitral 
award due to the bilateral protection of evidence.
357
  
 
Thirdly, while Lord Mustill believes that the granting of a Mareva injunction is not within a 
tribunal's power, but nonetheless admits that a Mareva injunction is always followed by 
further orders, judgment, or execution, and is designed to aid the execution of the final 
                                                 
353
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award.
358
 So, if a Mareva injunction is not final,
359
 and if its main characteristic is that it is 
followed by a further order, why should the tribunal be unable to grant it?  
Lord Bingham in Fourie v Le Roux stated that; 
Mareva (or freezing) injunctions were from the beginning, and continue to be, granted for an important 
but limited purpose: to prevent a defendant dissipating his assets with the intention or effect of 
frustrating enforcement of a prospective judgment. They are not a proprietary remedy. They are not 
granted to give a claimant advance security for his claim, although they may have that effect. They are 
not an end in themselves. They are a supplementary remedy, granted to protect the efficacy of court 
proceedings, domestic or foreign‘360 
It seems there is no major difference between a freezing injunction and a number of measures 
that have the same aims.
361
 A freezing injunction is an order that restrains one of the parties 
to the arbitration from disposing of or dealing with his assets.
362
 This prohibition may extend 
to all his assets or be confined to some of them.
363
 Custody or detention orders do the same 
job. They deprive a party from his right to dispose of or deal with some of his property. 
Freezing injunctions and detention or custody orders share another common feature in that 
both measures are followed by a further order or decision. Custody orders may appear stricter 
                                                 
358
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than freezing injunctions as the former keeps property out of a party‘s possession 364 while 
the latter allows a party to retain possession of property 
365
 and indeed may be substituted by 
providing security of equal value,
366
 although this of course does not include any property 
that constitutes evidence.    
Thus if an arbitral tribunal has power to grant some measures that share key features with the 
freezing injunction, why then can it not grant that measure? In addition, freezing injunctions 
are sometimes used for preservation purposes and the tribunal is already empowered to take 
such measures.
367
   
Fourthly, the Court of Appeal in Kastner v Janson did not deny the tribunal‘s power to issue 
a freezing order and refrained from commenting on its ability to do so.
368
If the Court of 
Appeal had believed that the tribunal had no power to issue freezing injunctions, should have 
revoked tribunal‘s order. Since it did not do this, the court must then believe under the party 
autonomy principle the tribunal may be empowered by the agreement of the parties to grant 
any provisional remedies, including freezing injunctions. Rix opined that: 
[I]n the absence of parties agreeing to confer such power on arbitrators, there would normally be no 
jurisdiction in an arbitration held under English law for the arbitrators to make a freezing order at an 
interim stage prior to a final award.
369
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He added that ‗[I]f the tribunal was empowered to grant freezing injunction, then the English 
law would strive to give effect to its orders.‘  
 
Fifthly, the tribunal is the original forum for seeking protective and preservative measures 
during arbitral proceedings, and court intervention in this regard should be minimized.
370
  
 
In conclusion, it seems that the view of Professor Steven Gee that the arbitral tribunal under 
s.38 has power ‗to preserve property which is the subject of proceedings or as to which any 
question arise‘371 should be followed. The arbitral tribunal should be empowered to grant any 
freezing injunction to preserve evidence 
372
 especially when the language used in s.38(1) is 
broad enough to carry this generous interpretation, and this injunction is normally suspended 
where a the security is provided by the claimant.
373
  
 
2.1.3.2.1.1.2 Anton Piller Relief 374 
   
An Anton Piller order is an ex parte search order made to safeguard vital evidence needed to 
prove the claim.
375
 Such an order is used to obtain evidence and information from a party‘s 
property by carrying out inspections, taking copies, photographs, or samples of it, and even 
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taking it away to safekeeping. Moreover, it extends to giving information about passwords to 
computer systems and electronic data.
376
  
 
Section  38(4) gives the arbitral tribunal the power to take any measures related to property, 
whether related to evidential matters, ‗inspection, taking samples‘377 or for preservation 
purposes ‗custody or detention of property‘. Hence, the granting of an Anton Piller order 
seems to be within the tribunal‘s power under s.38(4). However, there are two difficulties 
related to Anton Piller relief; one related to making such an order against a third party, and 
the other related to its ex parte nature. 
It is universally acknowledged in the field of arbitration that a tribunal has no power over and 
cannot take any measures against someone who is not a party to the arbitration agreement 
derives no benefits or rights from it,
378
 even when the third party possesses key property or 
holds evidence.
379
  Therefore, if the tribunal wants to involve a third party in the proceedings, 
e.g. by taking his testimony or obtaining documents in his possession, it must ask the court to 
order the third party cooperate.
380
  
 
Regarding an ex parte order, whether related to Anton Piller or not, this is a controversial 
topic in arbitration, especially in the area of provisional measures.
381
 However, the ex parte 
feature of an Anton Piller order, is considered a very important element in achieving the 
preservation of evidence by surprising the party and preventing him from taking any action 
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that may destroy it. This feature – the element of surprise – is very important in evidential 
matters and urgent cases to secure evidence of the claim.
382
 Why then should the arbitral 
tribunal not be able to take advantage of this?  
 
In a similar context, the Working Group on the UNCITRAL Model Law II did not totally 
reject this idea, instead recommending that an extra precaution should be taken in exercising 
this power:   
A strong view was expressed that, given the ex parte nature of the order and the potentially serious 
negative impact on the party against whom such a measure was taken, it was important to include 
certain safeguards in the provision. Such safeguards might include the requirement that the party 
seeking such a measure should provide appropriate financial security to avoid frivolous claims and that 
such an order should only be made in exceptional or urgent circumstances.
383
 
 
Although the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 did not adopt the above view and did not allow 
the arbitral tribunal to grant ex parte interim measures, it recognized the arbitral tribunal's 
power to grant ex parte preliminary orders.
384
 Article 17(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
allows any of the arbitration parties to submit a dual application before the tribunal: an 
application for an ex parte preliminary order and a request for an interim measure.
385 
The 
application should satisfy the whole conditions for granting interim measures in Article 
                                                 
382
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17(A). The main distinction between preliminary orders and interim measures is that only an 
interim measure is subject to court enforcement.
386
  
 
However, the enforceability of the tribunal‘s orders is not the question here, but the ability of 
the tribunal to make such orders. The Model law has answered this question and empowered 
it to take preliminary orders, specifically ex parte preliminary orders, but its application 
needs to expand to encompass ex parte interim measures. Therefore, the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (the 'CAS') in Lausanne, Switzerland, conditionally adopted this view in Rule37 of 
its Arbitration Rules, allowing the arbitral tribunal to make ex parte orders in urgent cases:  
In case of utmost urgency, the President of the relevant Division, prior to the transfer of the file to the 
Panel, or thereafter the President of the Panel may issue an order upon mere presentation of the 
application, provided that the opponent is heard subsequently.
387
  
Additionally, the 1995 July draft of the English Arbitration Act 1996 adopted this view, 
allowing the arbitral tribunal to order ex parte Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller relief.
388
 
It is true this view was dropped in the final draft, but the view seems to this author to be more 
consistent with the principle of party autonomy and s.38(1) of the Act. Lastly, it seems to this 
author that the same justifications that the author used to support the tribunal's power to issue 
freezing injunctions in arbitration disputes, especially those justifications related to principles 
of party autonomy, confidentiality of proceedings and the right of parties to confer such 
power to the arbitral tribunal,
389
 are equally valid here in supporting its power to make ex 
parte Anton Piller orders.  
                                                 
386
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In conclusion, s.38 should be applied and interpreted in the shadow of the principle of party 
autonomy, so as to allow the parties to agree on the tribunal's powers over them as long as it 
does not conflict with the public interest.
390
    
 
2.1.3.2.1.2 Preservation of Evidence by the Tribunal’s Peremptory Orders 
 
 
The English Arbitration Act 1996 s.41 deals with the possibility of non-compliance by any of 
the parties by allowing the tribunal to issue a peremptory order 
391
 against any party who fails 
to comply with its directions.
392
  Such failure could be inadvertent or deliberate, and the 
tribunal may act where the party concerned fails to show a sufficient cause for non-
compliance.
393
 However, the arbitral tribunal cannot resort directly to a peremptory order in 
the first place to deal with preservation of evidence. It needs first to make a direction or order 
against one of the parties and then find that this party continues to disobey its directions.
394
  
According to the DAC Report:  
It will be noted that a peremptory order must be ‗to the same effect‘ as the preceding order which was 
disobeyed (subsection 5)). It could be quite unfair for an arbitrator to be able to make any type of 
peremptory order, on any matter, regardless of its connection with the default in question.
 395 
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If a party continues to defy the tribunal‘s directions even after being given a time limit within 
which to for comply,
396
 the arbitral tribunal has two choices. Firstly, resort can be made to the 
court to enforce the relevant order under s.42.  The court may act on an application by the 
tribunal itself or on an application by a party where the tribunal has given its permission, or 
where the parties have agreed the court should have this power.
397
 The court must also be 
satisfied that the applicant has exhausted all the available arbitral remedies
398
 and that the 
recalcitrant party has failed to comply with the tribunal‘s order within the time prescribed in 
the order (or within a reasonable time if the order prescribed no time limit).
399
 If these 
conditions have been satisfied, the court may make an order requiring the non-compliant 
party to comply with tribunal‘s orders.400 If the party does not obey the court order, he will be 
in contempt of court, and may be punished with a fine, sequestration of assets, or even a 
prison term.
401
 According to the DAC Report in Paragraph 212:   
In our view there may well be circumstances where in the interests of justice, the fact that the Court has 
sanctions which in the nature of things cannot be given to arbitrators (e.g. committal to prison for 
contempt) will assist the proper functioning of the arbitral process. 
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However, if the peremptory order was for the security for costs and the party did not provide 
such security, the arbitral tribunal may make an award dismissing the claim.
402
  
 
Secondly, in addition to the tribunal‘s power to resort to court to enforce its orders, the 
tribunal under s.41(7) has power to take a number of steps 
403
 to induce the reluctant party to 
comply with its directions. It could state that the party may not be entitled to rely upon any 
allegation or material which was the subject matter of the order, or draw adverse inferences 
from the act of non-compliance, proceed to issue its award by relying on the materials that 
have been provided to it, or make an order for payment costs incurred in consequence of the 
non-compliance.
404
  
 
2.1.3.2.1.3 Preservation of Evidence by an Provisional Award or Order 405 
 
Section 39 of the 1996 Act creates via the provisional order system a kind of financial 
relief should this be required during the arbitration proceedings.
406
 This is clearly shown in 
Paragraph 21 of the 1996 DAC Report: 
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In The Kostas Melas [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 18, 26, Goff J, as he then was, made clear that it was no 
part of an arbitrator's function to make temporary or provisional financial arrangements between the 
parties…We should note in passing that the July 1995 draft would arguably (and inadvertently) have 
allowed arbitrators to order ex parte Mareva or even Anton Piller relief. These Draconian powers are 
best left to be applied by the Courts, and the provisions of the Bill with respect to such powers have 
been adjusted accordingly‖.407 ―We envisage that this enlargement of the traditional jurisdiction of 
arbitrators could serve a very useful purpose, e.g. in trades and industries where cash-flow is of 
particular importance.408  
 
The DAC Report illustrates that the system of provisional orders under s.39 has only been 
designed to address and govern ‗financial arrangements‘ or organize ‗cash-flow‘ requests. 
Therefore, s.39 regulates the maintenance of the status quo more than it does the 
preservation of evidence.
409
 Furthermore, s.39(1) stipulates ‗The tribunal shall have power 
to order on a provisional basis any relief which it would have power to grant in a final 
award.‘ The phrase ‗grant in final award‘ and the reliefs set out in s.48 indicate that the 
final awards mostly deal with financial issues,
410
 including damages, interest
 411
 and 
costs.
412
 Moreover, s.39(2) confirms this view by giving two examples of a financial 
nature: 
(a) A provisional order for the payment of money or the disposition of property as between the 
parties, or  
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(b)  An order to make an interim payment on account of the costs of the arbitration 
 
These examples clearly show that provisional orders aim merely to address the financial 
relationship between parties during the arbitration process. Therefore, only the arbitral 
tribunal under s.39 
413
 can decide provisionally on financial affairs, and these reliefs would 
be subject to review in the final award.
414
  Hence, s.39 does not regulate evidential matters 
or any other measures of a non-financial nature like freezing injunctions or search 
orders.
415
  
It is worth noting that s.39 is not a default provision
416
 but an ‗opt in‘ provision,417 which 
means the arbitral tribunal has no power to take these measures unless the parties so 
empower it by written.
418
 Without such agreement,
419
 the tribunal has no such power.
420
 
The conclusion then is that the tribunal cannot make provisional orders to preserve 
evidence under s.39. 
2.1.3.2.1.4 Preservation of Evidence under Section 48  
 
Section 48 has lists the remedies
421
 that the tribunal can grant in the award. Section 48 is 
just one of a number of sections grouped under the heading ‗The Award‘.422 Therefore, the 
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remedies mentioned in s.48 do not cover the preservation of evidence or any other 
provisional measure.
423
 
2.1.3.2.2 Court Power to Preserve Evidence in the English Arbitration Act 1996   
 
Section 1(3) establishes the governing principle of court intervention in the English 
Arbitration Act in stating that „in matters governed by this Part the court should not 
intervene except as provided by this Part.‘ Generally intervention is only contemplated 
where it is necessary to assist arbitral tribunal to carry out its task. Court intervention in the 
arbitration process is addressed by ss.42- 44. These sections are: 
42. Enforcement of Peremptory Orders of Tribunal   
(1)  Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court may make an order requiring a party to comply with a 
peremptory order made by the tribunal.  
 (2)  An application for an order under this section may be made-  
(a)by the tribunal (upon notice to the parties), 
(b)by a party to the arbitral proceedings with the permission of the tribunal (and upon notice to the other 
parties), or 
(c)where the parties have agreed that the powers of the court under this section shall be available. 
(3)  The court shall not act unless it is satisfied that the applicant has exhausted any available arbitral process in 
respect of failure to comply with the tribunal's order.  
(4)  No order shall be made under this section unless the court is satisfied that the person to whom the tribunal's 
order was directed has failed to comply with it within the time prescribed in the order or, if no time was 
prescribed, within a reasonable time.  
(5)  The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section. 
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 43. Securing the Attendance of Witnesses   
(1)  A party to arbitral proceedings may use the same court procedures as are available in relation to legal 
proceedings to secure the attendance before the tribunal of a witness in order to give oral testimony or to 
produce documents or other material evidence.  
(2)  This may only be done with the permission of the tribunal or the agreement of the other parties.  
(3)  The court procedures may only be used if-  
(a)the witness is in the United Kingdom, and 
(b)the arbitral proceedings are being conducted in England and Wales or, as the case may be, Northern Ireland. 
(4)  A person shall not be compelled by virtue of this section to produce any document or other material 
evidence which he could not be compelled to produce in legal proceedings.  
 
44. Court Power Exercisable in Support of Arbitral Proceedings  
For the purposes of and in relation to arbitral proceedings the same power of making orders about the matters  
listed below as it has for the purposes of and in relation to legal proceedings.  
(2)  Those matters are-  
(a)the taking of the evidence of witnesses 
(b)the preservation of evidence 
(c)making orders relating to property which is the subject of the proceedings or as to which any question arises 
in the proceedings-  
(i)for the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody or detention of the property, or 
(ii)ordering that samples be taken from, or any observation be made of or experiment conducted upon, the 
property; and for that purpose authorising any person to enter any premises in the possession or control of a 
party to the arbitration  
(d)the sale of any goods the subject of the proceedings 
(e)the granting of an interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver. 
(3)  If the case is one of urgency, the court may, on the application of a party or proposed party to the arbitral 
proceedings, make such orders as it thinks necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets.  
(4)  If the case is not one of urgency, the court shall act only on the application of a party to the arbitral 
proceedings (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) made with the permission of the tribunal or the 
agreement in writing of the other parties.  
(5)  In any case the court shall act only if or to the extent that the arbitral tribunal, and any arbitral or other 
institution or person vested by the parties with power in that regard, has no power or is unable for the time 
being to act effectively.  
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(6)  If the court so orders, an order made by it under this section shall cease to have effect in whole or in part on 
the order of the tribunal or of any such arbitral or other institution or person having power to act in relation to 
the subject matter of the order.  
(7)  The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section. 
 
It is obvious that court intervention in arbitration proceedings is subject to conditions that 
should be fulfilled to justify it, whether or not this intervention is for preservation purposes.  
 
2.1.3.2.2.1 Conditions for Court Intervention in Arbitration Proceedings 
 
Court intervention in arbitration proceedings takes place in either of two cases: a non-
urgent case when the tribunal cannot act effectively or needs the court‘s assistance to 
enforce its orders 
424
 and an urgent case that needs immediate action. The preconditions for 
court intervention vary from one case to another. 
 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1 Court Intervention in Non-urgent Cases  
 
Notwithstanding that the arbitral tribunal is the original forum for arbitration parties to seek 
any protective measures, there are many cases that need court intervention to render the 
tribunal‘s decisions effective, or where the court requires take some measures that the 
tribunal cannot take because it has not yet been constituted or because these measures are 
against a third party. Section 42 addresses one of the non-urgent cases. It is titled 
'Enforcement of Peremptory Orders of Tribunal‘, which means that court intervention 
would give effectiveness to the tribunal‘s peremptory orders by giving and vesting them 
                                                 
424
 DAC Report 1996 para 215, Robert Merkin, Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
th
 edn, Informa, London 
2008) 106, Lord Mustill, Stewart C. Boyd Commercial Arbitration (2
nd
 edn, Butterworths, London and 
Edinburgh, 2001) 324.   
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with the same authority as courts orders. In addition, it makes non-compliance with these 
orders a contempt of court.
425
 Therefore, the court may impose sanctions on a recalcitrant 
party including fines or even imprisonment. To activate court intervention under this 
section, a party ‗or the tribunal‘ should submit an application to the court in the form 
prescribed by the Civil Procedures Rules (CPR), Practice Direction (PD) 49G –
Arbitrations
.426
 
 
Section 43 of the Act addresses a key evidential matter, namely, the ability of parties to use 
the court to secure witnesses' attendance to present their affidavits or to disclose any 
documents or materials in their possessions. These procedures are set out in CPR Part 34
427
 
as applied by CPR PD 62,
428
 and Order 38 Rule19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court that 
regulates the duration of subpoenas.
429
   
 
Even though witness video-conferencing is commonly used to collect witness affidavits, it 
is not clear under CPR Part 34 whether or not the court can adopt it.
430
 According to 
Professor R. Merkin ‗The better view is that the court‘s power to order a witness to be 
                                                 
425
 See earlier Chapter 2 para 2.1.3.2.1.2. See Bruce Harris, Rowan Planterose, Jonathan Tecks, The Arbitration 
Act 1996: A Commentary (Blackwell Science, 2006) 172-173; Lord Mustill, Stewart C. Boyd, Commercial 
Arbitration (2
nd
 edn, Butterworths, London and Edinburgh, 2001) 322. 
426
 This Practice Direction (PD) Supplements CPR Part 49 and replace, with modification, Order 73 of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court.  
427
 Available at < http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/contents/parts/part34.htm#IDAKS0HC>  
428
 Robert Merkin, Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
th
 edn, Informa, London 2008) 103. 
429
 Available at < 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/ManageHighlights/366/Rules%20of%20Court%202006%20Rev%20E
d.pdf>   
430
 Robert Merkin, Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
th
 edn, Informa, London 2008)104. 
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examined by VCF (video-conference) is available under section 44(2).‘431 However, in 
court proceedings, only the court determines what is the right way and proper place to take 
a witness's statements (before the judge or elsewhere, by cross-examination or video- 
conference).
432
 Section 43(4) makes clear that the court shall not compel any prospective 
witnesses to produce any document or other evidential materials which he would not be 
compelled to produce in legal proceedings, thus preserving the rules of privilege and 
confidentiality.
433
 
 
Most provisions regulating court intervention are laid down by s.44, coverings most 
instances where court intervention in the arbitration process may be needed. Section 
44(2)(a)-(b) cover all kinds of preservation of evidence areas - witness testimony, 
documentary evidence and search orders. Section 44(2)(c) covers orders related to property 
- inspection, custody, detention, and taking samples. Section 44(2)(d) covers the sale of 
goods, and s.44(2)(e) covers the granting of interim injunctions (including freezing 
injunctions) and the appointment of receivers. 
 
The court‘s powers in s.44 are wider than the tribunal‘s powers in s.38, being almost 
equivalent to the power in Rule 25.1(1) of the CPR and associated Practice Directions.
434
 
                                                 
431
 
431
 Robert Merkin, Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
th
 edn, Informa, London 2008)104. 
432
 CPR, PD rule 34.8.  
433
 CPR, PD, rule 34.2(5)  
434
 Rule 25.1 of the CPR covers all kind of interim measures that the court may issue in civil proceedings. 
R.25.1 states (Orders for interim remedies) 
(1) The court may grant the following interim remedies – 
(a) an interim injunction(GL); 
(b) an interim declaration; 
(c) an order – 
(i) for the detention, custody or preservation of relevant property; 
(ii) for the inspection of relevant property; 
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However, it is obvious that ss.38 and 44 work together. Therefore, parties are obliged to 
resort to a court in some instances measures and to a tribunal in others. Some measures lie 
within the exclusive province of the tribunal, e.g. security for costs order under s.38(3), 
while others lie within the exclusive province of the court, e.g. orders for sale of goods 
                                                                                                                                                        
(iii) for the taking of a sample of relevant property; 
(iv) for the carrying out of an experiment on or with relevant property; 
(v) for the sale of relevant property which is of a perishable nature or which for any other good reason it is 
desirable to sell quickly; and 
(vi) for the payment of income from relevant property until a claim is decided; 
(d) an order authorising a person to enter any land or building in the possession of a party to the proceedings for 
the purposes of carrying out an order under sub-paragraph (c); 
(e) an order under section 4 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 19771 to deliver up goods; 
(f) an order (referred to as a ‗freezing injunction(GL)‘) – 
(i) restraining a party from removing from the jurisdiction assets located there; or 
(ii) restraining a party from dealing with any assets whether located within the jurisdiction or not; 
(g) an order directing a party to provide information about the location of relevant property or assets or to 
provide information about relevant property or assets which are or may be the subject of an application for a 
freezing injunction(GL); 
(h) an order (referred to as a ‗search order‘) under section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act 19972 (order requiring a 
party to admit another party to premises for the purpose of preserving evidence etc.); 
(i) an order under section 33 of the Supreme Court Act 19813 or section 52 of the County Courts Act 19844 
(order for disclosure of documents or inspection of property before a claim has been made); 
(j) an order under section 34 of the Supreme Court Act 19815 or section 53 of the County Courts Act 19846 
(order in certain proceedings for disclosure of documents or inspection of property against a non-party); 
(k) an order (referred to as an order for interim payment) under rule 25.6 for payment by a defendant on account 
of any damages, debt or other sum (except costs) which the court may hold the defendant liable to pay; 
(l) an order for a specified fund to be paid into court or otherwise secured, where there is a dispute over a party‘s 
right to the fund; 
(m) an order permitting a party seeking to recover personal property to pay money into court pending the 
outcome of the proceedings and directing that, if he does so, the property shall be given up to him; 
(n) an order directing a party to prepare and file accounts relating to the dispute; 
(o) an order directing any account to be taken or inquiry to be made by the court; and 
(p) an order under Article 9 of Council Directive (EC) 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
(order in intellectual property proceedings making the continuation of an alleged infringement subject to the  
lodging of guarantees). 
(Rule 34.2 provides for the court to issue a witness summons requiring a witness to produce documents to the 
court at the hearing or on such date as the court may direct) 
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under s.44(2)(d) or the appointment of a receiver under s.44(2)(e).
435
  It is noteworthy that 
the court‘s power under s.25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act 1982 has no 
application to foreign arbitrations.
436
 Hence, arbitration proceedings and the powers of both 
tribunals and courts relating thereto are regulated by the English Arbitration Act 1996. This 
can be contrasted with Egyptian Law, under which arbitration proceedings are regulated by 
several laws,
437
 thus weakening the arbitration process, and leading to contradictory 
judgments.
438
 
 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1.1 Conditions for Court Intervention in Non-urgent Cases 
 
Sections 42, 43, and 44 tend to agree on certain conditions that should be satisfied before the 
court can act: 
 The absence of agreement preventing court intervention (Sections 42 and 44); 
 The arbitral tribunal requesting action or permitting an application for it;  
 Written agreement of parties allowing court intervention.  
 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1.1.1 Absence of Agreement to Prevent Court Intervention 
 
Sections 42 and 44 of the Act are non-mandatory, which means parties can agree to 
exclude them and thus the court‘s power to intervene under those provisions.439 Section 43, 
                                                 
435
 See CPR, r 25.1(1)(c)(v). 
436
 ETI Euro Telecom International NV v Republic of Bolivia and another, [2008] EWCA Civ 880. See Robert 
Merkin, Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
th
 edn, Informa, London 2008) 107.  
437
 Evidence Law, Civil Procedure Law, and Arbitration Law. 
438
 See appeal No 1975 for the year 66 BC. On December 12 of 1996. 
439
 Bruce Harris, Rowan Planterose, Jonathan Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary (Blackwell 
Science, 2006) 179. 
121 
 
however, is a mandatory provision 
440
 and arbitration parties cannot exclude or modify 
court‘s power under it.  
 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1.1.2 Arbitral Tribunal's Permission or Request 
 
In order to secure appropriate arbitration proceedings being carried out, ss.42(2)(b), 43(2), 
and 44(4) require prior permission from the tribunal before a party may have recourse to the 
court. The DAC Report shows the reason behind this in Paragraph 213:  
The reason for this is to make sure that this procedure is not used to override any procedural method 
adopted by the tribunal, or agreed by the parties, for the arbitration. Thus, for example, if the 
tribunal has decided that there shall be no oral evidence, then (unless all parties agree otherwise) this 
procedure cannot be used to get round that decision. 
 
Therefore, the party should refer to the tribunal's permission in his application, under CPR, 
PD 49G, and should give notice to the other party of its application; otherwise, the 
application will not proceed.
441
 Where the tribunal itself asks the court to enforce its order, 
the tribunal should give the parties notice of the application.
442
  
 
 
 
                                                 
440
 Section 4(1) and Schedule 1. 
441
 Section 42(2)(b). Keren Tweeddale, Andrew Tweeddale, A Practical Approach to Arbitration Law 
(Blackstone Press Limited, 1999) 229. 
442
 Section 42(2)(a). See Robert Merkin, Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
th
 edn, Informa, London 2008) 
102 
122 
 
2.1.3.2.2.1.1.1.3 Written Agreement of Parties Allowing Court 
Intervention 
 
Under ss.42(2)(c), 43(2), and 44(4) the court can exercise its powers where the parties have 
conferred the authority to do so by written agreement.
443
 This agreement will determine the 
extent of court power in such cases, so a party should refer to this agreement in the 
application.  When the application, under CPR, PD 49G, fulfils this condition, the court may 
act. For example, if the application is made under Section 42, the court may issue an order 
requiring a party to comply with the tribunal's peremptory order. If the application is made 
under Section 43, the court may issue a witness summons.  However, the court's support in 
arbitration proceedings should not constitute an interference in or usurpation of the arbitral 
process.
444
 
2.1.3.2.2.1.2 Court Intervention in Urgent Cases  
 
Section 44(3) stipulates ‗If the case is one of urgency, the court may, on the application of a 
party or proposed party to the arbitral proceedings, make such orders as it thinks necessary 
for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets.‘ Hence, in urgent cases, there are no 
preconditions for court intervention and even prior notification to the other party is not 
required. A court‘s power in emergency cases extends to responding to applications, whether 
ex parte or inter parties.   
 
                                                 
443
 Section 5(1).  
444
 DAC Report 1996 para 215.  
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Therefore, the court may take any necessary measures to preserve evidence or assets.
445 It 
may, for instance, issue an ex parte injunction preventing the transfer of money or vessels, 
issue a search order for documents, or appoint a receiver.
446
 Toulson J in Petroleum 
Investment Co Ltd v Kantupan Holdings Co Ltd the court stated that:  
Unless giving notice would be impossible or impracticable, e.g., because of the urgency of the 
situation, an application for an injunction should only be made without notice to the respondent in 
circumstances where it would be likely to defeat the purpose of seeking the injunction if forewarning 
were given.447 
 
Moreover, under s.44(3) the court may, in connection with s.44(2), take any necessary 
measures whether or not related to preservation of evidence. Clarke LJ In Cetelem SA v 
Roust Holdings Limited observed that: 
It is also important to note that s 44(3) is not restricted to orders for the preservation of evidence or 
assets. Under the subsection ―the court may . . . make such orders as it thinks necessary for the 
purpose of preserving evidence or assets‖. As I see it, the effect of subsection (3) is that the court 
may make any order which it could make under subsection (1) provided that it thinks that it is 
necessary for that purpose. It may thus make an order about any of the matters set out in subsection 
(2), provided that it is ―necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets.
448
 
The court construction of s.44(3) in Cetelem is consistent with Article 9 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, which allows the court to take any interim measures of protection during or 
after the arbitration process.  
 
                                                 
445
 Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Limited, [2005] EWCA Civ 618. 
446
 Lord Mustill, Stewart C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (2
nd
 edn, Butterworths, London and Edinburgh, 
2001) 324; Robert Merkin, Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
th
 edn, Informa, London 2008) 111.   
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 Petroleum Investment Co Ltd v Kantupan Holdings Co Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 416 (Oct) at para 70. 
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124 
 
However, s.44(5) requires in all cases that the court should be satisfied that the arbitral 
tribunal is unable to act effectively or has no power to act.
449
 Moreover, the CPR, PD 
r.62.4(1)(f) requires that the applicant must show that the case is urgent, requiring 
immediate action to preserve evidence or assets, and needs to specify the grounds of his 
claim.
450
  
2.1.3.2.2.1.3 Revision of Court Orders by Arbitral Tribunal 
 
 
Section 44(6) stipulates: 
If the court so orders, an order made by it under this section shall cease to have effect in whole or in 
part on the order of the tribunal or of any such arbitral or other institution or person having power to 
act in relation to the subject matter of the order. 
  
This provision shows clearly that the arbitral tribunal or any person empowered by the 
parties may terminate the effect of a court order, modify it, or even set them aside, if the 
court has so stipulated.
451
 But can an arbitral tribunal terminate or modify an order without 
its leave? Does a tribunal have inherent power to terminate court orders when it is able to 
act? The answer to this question is important because it determines who is in charge of 
conducting the arbitration process. It also draws the line between court intervention to help 
the arbitral tribunal to do its job, and its intervention that may negatively affect the 
tribunal's power to manage proceedings. 
The DAC Report in Paragraph 216 states that ‗The Court, after making an order, can in 
effect hand over to the tribunal the task of deciding whether or not that order should cease 
                                                 
449
 See Pacific Maritime (Asia) Ltd v Holystone Overseas Ltd [2007] EWHC 2319 (Comm).  
450
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451
 Robert Merkin, Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (4
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 edn, Informa, London 2008) 112. 
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to have effect.‘452 According to Professor Robert Merkin, ‗Section 44(6) is a novel power 
which allows the court to stipulate in any order made by it that the order may be varied or 
set aside by the arbitrators themselves.‘453 Lord Mustill maintains: 
‗In any case the court has power to order that its order shall cease to have effect in whole or in part 
on the order of the tribunal,‖ and ―The court is not empowered to usurp the functions of the agreed 
tribunal.‘
454
 
The foregoing texts suggest that the arbitral tribunal cannot modify or set aside the court‘s 
order unless the court so provides in its decision. Otherwise, the arbitral tribunal has no 
power or right to modify or set aside the court‘s order; even after its constitution or even if 
it can act effectively in the proceedings. It seems that this approach leads to unfortunate 
results. It prevents the arbitral tribunal from looking into a question that the court has 
already dealt with.
455 
 It further makes the tribunal‘s power to deal with a particular issue 
dependent on the court‘s permission. Such restrictions leave the tribunal's hands tied in the 
proceedings, which may constitute a breach of the arbitration agreement and the principle 
of party autonomy.
456
 
 
 
 
Moreover, s. 44(5) makes court intervention in the arbitration process conditional on the 
absence of the tribunal or its inability to act effectively in the dispute. Lord Mustill 
maintains that the court ―should only act where the tribunal's powers are absent or 
ineffective,‖457 which means the court only acts on behalf of the tribunal or during its 
                                                 
452
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absence. Thus, when the tribunal is constituted or can act effectively, court intervention 
should terminate and full power should return to the tribunal to deal with all matters, 
whether or not they have previously been dealt with by the court,
458
 otherwise, the court's 
role in the arbitration process will usurp the tribunal's power.  
 
Hence, it seems it is only appropriate to give the tribunal inherent power to review the 
court‘s orders, especially those relating to issues which arose before the existence of the 
tribunal. Of course, the tribunal would never have power to review orders relating to third 
parties. 
  
In conclusion, the English Arbitration Act 1996 has carefully drawn the lines between the 
powers of the tribunal and the court regarding the preservation of evidence as a type of 
provisional measure. The English Act, like the Scottish Act, deals with such preservation 
whether by the tribunal 
459
 or the court 
460
 in detail. In addition, the Act has clearly takes 
the view that the provisional awards are designed only for financial relief. Preservation of 
evidence as a type of provisional measure in the English Act is characterized by two 
features. It features a clear provision that the tribunal has power to make a peremptory 
order as a kind of sanction against a non-compliant party, which order can be enforced by 
the court.
461
 It also took a step towards giving the arbitral tribunal more control and 
independence during arbitration proceedings by giving it the right to review a court order 
(even if this is dependent the court‘s permission).462 
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2.1.3.2.3 Appointment of Experts, Legal Adviser or Assessors in English 
Arbitration Act 1996 
 
Section 37 of the Act addresses the tribunal's power to appoint experts, legal advisers, or 
assessors. It stipulates that: 
(1)Unless otherwise agreed by the parties- (a) the tribunal may-  
(i) Appoint experts or legal advisers to report to it and the parties, or  
(ii) Appoint assessors to assist it on technical matters, and may allow any such expert, legal adviser or assessor to 
attend the proceedings; and   
(b) The parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to comment on any information, opinion or advice offered 
by any such person.  
(2) The fees and expenses of an expert, legal adviser or assessor appointed by the tribunal for which the arbitrators 
are liable are expenses of the arbitrators for the purposes of this Part. 
 
Accordingly, the tribunal can, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, appoint an expert, 
legal adviser 
463
 or assessor ‗a tribunal appointed expert‘ to report to it and the parties on 
any matters, whether relating to evidence or any technical issue outwith of the tribunal's 
expertise.
464
 The parties should also have a reasonable opportunity to comment on this 
report. Therefore, the tribunal should deliver the report once it receives it, and should not 
conduct any meeting with the expert without the parties' attendance or consent.
465
  
On the other hand, the parties may use their own experts to refute what has been mentioned in 
the tribunal-appointed expert report.
466
 The tribunal under s.34 may decide how this 
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 Hussmann (Europe) Ltd v Al Ameen Development & Trade Co & Ors [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 83.  
464
 See Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 6 of the IBA Rules. 
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 A meeting between the tribunal and the expert in the absence of the parties may not constitute serious 
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procedure should be done: by cross-examination or expert conferencing (hot tube), or by even 
by creating its own unique technique.
467
 However, the appointment of experts in the English 
Arbitration Act does not properly belong to the system of provisional measures.   
 
2.1.3.2.4 Conclusion 
 
 
Based on the previous study, the best treatment of preservation of evidence as the first type 
of provisional measures can be found in the English and Scottish Arbitration Acts for the 
following reasons: 
1. The English and Scottish Acts contain unambiguous provisions regulating 
preservation of evidence whether by the tribunal or by the court. The Egyptian 
Arbitration Act does not contain any separate provision dealing individually with 
this subject. Instead, it regulates provisional measures in only two Articles.   
2. The English and Scottish Arbitration Acts address all the potential forms of 
evidence - property, documents, and witness testimony. They describe the tribunal's 
power over this evidence by giving many examples illustrating the power, e.g., 
inspection, photocopying, and custody. The Egyptian Arbitration Act does not 
contain any example or explanations. It only mentions the tribunal has power to 
take such measures without any further elucidation.  
3. The court‘s role is well defined in the English and Scottish Acts in terms of cases, 
conditions, limitations on intervention, and the practical requirements for making 
application. Egyptian Law does not regulate court intervention in the Arbitration 
Law but in the Civil Procedure Law of 1968. This loophole has led to significant 
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confusion between the court's role in assisting the tribunal to do its job by applying 
arbitration law and its role to support it by applying the Civil Procedure Law. This 
has led to unacceptable results and judgments in arbitration in Egypt.
468
  
 
The foregoing reasons show that a new prospective Egyptian law can plug all these 
loopholes by doing the following: 
1. Adopt a new version of arbitration law that prevents any confusion between the 
various laws dealing with the preservation of evidence in arbitration 
proceedings, especially the Civil Procedure Law, Arbitration Law, and 
Evidence Law. In this regard, the new law could adopt the same approach used 
in the English and Scottish Acts that have mixed the philosophy of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law with their own judicial traditions. The Egyptian 
legislator could incorporate modern provisions from the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and the English and Scottish Acts, e.g. rules of confidentiality and interest, 
while at the same time retaining important authentic provisions of the Egyptian 
law, e.g. excluding any Rule that may contradict with Islamic Law (Shari' a).
469
  
2. Modify the Egyptian Civil Procedures Law by adding provisions to govern 
evidential matters in arbitration disputes and making sure these provisions are 
connected to the new arbitration law regulating all arbitration matters. Such 
proposal should help facilitate the parties‘ recourse to the court without 
confusion the rules of civil procedure and arbitration law. It should further grant 
the court flexible powers to deal with arbitration issues and face any uncommon 
requests from arbitration parties. 
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Adopting these suggestions should, in the author‘s view, secure the ability of the tribunal to 
conduct arbitration proceedings in an effective manner by granting it independence from 
the courts. It should further increase the ability of arbitration parties to secure and preserve 
evidence by facilitating the procedures for courts to assist in the taking of provisional me 
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Chapter 3 
 
3.1. Measures to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable harm.470 
 
Many arbitration rules and laws determine the time limit in which the arbitration process 
must be concluded, usually between six to twelve months.
471
 To avoid any damage or loss 
that may happen during the process, rules may give the arbitral tribunal power to take interim 
measures to prevent any harm. These measures aim to preserve the status quo and prevent 
any irreparable damage to the parties‘ contractual rights,472 or any aggravation of the dispute 
between them.
473
 
 
These kinds of measures come in many shapes. Sometimes they come in the form of an order 
and affect the subject matter of the dispute. Sometimes they take the form of an injunction
474 
 
affecting parties‘ right to dispose of property or act as they wish.475 For example, the tribunal 
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may give an order to safeguard goods, e.g. to take specific safety measures, to sell perishable 
goods or to appoint an administrator of assets, or store an asset for maintenance purposes.
476 
In addition, it may order a party to deposit money in a bank account,
477
 or order him not to 
obtain the value of a letter of guarantee, which threatens to lose his opponent money and 
aggravates the harm,
478
 or not to dispose of property to preserve the status quo,
479
 till the final 
award is rendered. In addition, the tribunal may order the continued performance of a contract 
during the arbitral proceedings e.g., ordering a contractor to continues construction work 
despite its claim that it is entitled to suspend this work.
480
 
 
In the foregoing examples, the tribunal's orders have directly dealt with and affected the 
subject matter of the dispute, and the main types of these measures (sale, storage, deposit) 
may affect parties‘ rights to use this money or these goods.  
 
An injunction is an order that prevents someone from acting in a particular way.
481
 
Injunctions may be used to prevent any action, which may threaten the status quo, and thus 
help secure the enforcement of the final award.
482 
In addition, they are used to protect the 
arbitration process itself by preventing parties from taking steps that could violate the 
                                                 
476
 UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration, 32
nd
 session, Vienna, 20-31 March 2000, para 63,  
available at < http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/530/64/PDF/V0053064.pdf?OpenElement>   
477
 Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, (S.D.N.Y.1982) 532 F.Supp. 901.   
478
 Buhler W. Michael and Jarvin, Sigvard, 'The Arbitration Rules of the ICC' in Weigand, Frank-Bernd (ed), 
Practitioner‟s Handbook on International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2009) 
15.876 . 
479
 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 - Procedural Order No. 2, October 
28, 1999. 
480
 Channel Tunnel Group v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] 1 All E.R. 664.  
481
 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v Republic of Ecuador. ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Meiki Co. Ltd., 
Licensor (Japan) v Bucher-Guyer S.A., Licensee (Switzerland), ICC Award No. 2114. 
482
 Kastner v Jason and others Sherman and another v Kastner [2004] EWHC 592 (Ch). 
133 
 
arbitration agreement.
483
 For example, the tribunal could order a party to continue paying the 
fees necessary to extend the validity of an intellectual property right. On the other hand, it 
could order him to stop using intellectual property for a specified period or until the final 
award is rendered.
484
  
 
Thus, the arbitral tribunal aims by these measures to preserve the status quo, keeping the 
parties‘ rights stable and safe, by taking an appropriate step whether by preventing or 
ordering some action. 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law has emphasized the importance of preserving the status quo in 
Article 17(2)(a) and (b) which allow the arbitral tribunal to order a party to ‗(a) maintain or 
restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; (b) take action that would 
prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to cause, current or imminent harm or 
prejudice to the arbitral process itself‘. In addition, Article 17(B) creates an analogous 
method to the interim measures system in order to preserve the status quo - the preliminary 
order system that may be requested without notice to any other party (ex parte).
485 
Moreover, 
the parties may use this process at the same time as requesting interim measures.
486 
However, 
interim measures that are used to preserve the status quo are still of vital importance in the 
arbitration field. 
 
                                                 
483
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3.1.1. Measures to regulate the status quo and prevent irreparable harm in Egyptian 
Arbitration Law 
3.1.1.1. The arbitral tribunal preserving the status quo.   
 
Interim measures in Egyptian Arbitration Law 27 of 1994 are addressed by two provisions, 
Articles 14 and 24. The former stipulates:  
‗Upon request of either party to the arbitration, the court referred to in Article 9 may order the taking of 
an interim or conservatory measure, whether before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings or 
during said proceedings‘  
 
While Article 24(1) stipulates:  
Both parties to the arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral panel the power to order, upon 
request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject 
matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the 
measure ordered 
 
Neither Articles explains or defines the concept of interim measures in arbitration law.
487
 
However, Article 24 refers to the parties‘ agreement as a criterion to determine the extent of 
the tribunal's power regarding these measures. Article 24 is a default provision, so if the 
parties did not exclude or modify this Article, the arbitral tribunal‘s power will be very wide.  
 
The arbitral tribunal in accordance with this Article has a wide discretion to take any 
measures to preserve the status quo and prevent any irreparable harm.
488 
For instance, it 
might issue a freezing order over a party‘s assets preventing him from disposing of his 
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property.
489
  Moreover, it can order continuance of production, the storage of goods in a 
warehouse, or their deposit with a third party.
490
 Or it could order sub-contractors to continue 
construction works,
491
 or the suppliers to continue to supply goods.
492
 Furthermore, the 
tribunal may restrain a party from withdrawing or liquidating a letter of guarantee before the 
final award,
493
 or may order him to stop licensing the use of intellectual property, or order 
non-disclosure of trade secrets.
494
 
 
Some scholars argue that the arbitral tribunal under Article 24 has implied power to take any 
measures and does not need any prior agreement or permission from the parties to take such 
measures. Moreover, the tribunal can grant any measures it deems necessary from its own 
motion 
495 
as long as these measures do not invoke power of the state.
496
 Yet the plain words 
of Article 24 contradict this view, as it is clear that the tribunal‘s power to take interim 
measures is an opt-in power, and it has no such power unless the parties so agree.
497 
For this 
reason other Egyptian jurists prefer to stipulate clearly that the power to take provisional 
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measures under Article 24 needs prior agreement, in the same way as s.39(4) of the English 
Arbitration Act.
498
 
 
3.1.1.2. The court and preserving the status quo 
 
Article 14 talks of the Article 9 courts taking an interim or conservatory measures in the 
arbitration. Article 9 confers jurisdiction on the Cairo Court of Appeal in international 
disputes, and confers jurisdiction on any Court of Appeal having original jurisdiction over the 
dispute in domestic arbitration. The Court of Appeal in this regard is bound to apply the 
provisions of the Civil Procedures Law. Article 45 of this law authorises the Court of Appeal, 
in the capacity of the urgent judge, to take any urgent measures whether before, during or 
after the arbitration process. Consequently, the Court of Appeal in arbitration disputes can 
take any measures to preserve the status quo or to prevent any irreparable harm. Therefore, 
the Court of Appeal under Article 45 of the ECPL can order, for example, freezing or 
sequestration order in relation the subject matter of the dispute,
499
 or prevent the liquidation 
of a letter of guarantee. Furthermore, it can order the sale or storage of goods, or the cessation 
of licensing the use of intellectual property, etc.
500
  
 
In order for the Court of Appeal to exercise its power, it should first ascertain that the parties' 
application has satisfied the claim that is required before the judge of urgent matters.
501
 These 
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are the existence of an urgent case and that the measure that requested is provisional.
502 
Moreover, the court‘s power in this regard would depend on the way a party resorted to it. If 
the party raised a lawsuit, the court could exercise its power under Article 45 of the ECPL, 
which gives it wide powers to take any measure to preserve the status quo. If he presented a 
petition, the court's power would be restricted to the instances mentioned in Article 194 of the 
ECPL 
503
, and thus it could not, for example, order a party not to realise the value of a letter 
of credit or guarantee.
504
   
 
3.1.1.2.1. Lawsuit   
 
Article 45 of the ECPL gives the Court of Appeal, in its capacity as urgent judge, a general 
power by lawsuit to take any measures to preserve the status quo or to prevent any potential 
harm. The court, for instance, may order sale of perishable goods, freeze property, determine 
the custody or order the detention of a party‘s vessels in harbour, order the deposit of money 
in an escrow account, or stop the liquidation of a letter of guarantee.
505
  
 
In addition to Article 45, there are many provisions in Egyptian laws, which confer such 
jurisdiction on the judge of urgent matters or on any authorized court. This means that the 
president of the Court of Appeal can rely on Article 45 or any other provision stipulated in 
Egyptian laws as a ground for any protective measure to be issued in the dispute. For 
example, Article 316 of the ECPL allows a creditor to request a freeze and the attachment of 
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the debtor‘s assets in case of a threat to his rights.506 Article 859(2) of the Civil Law No.131 
of 1948 stipulates, ‗In any case, the judge of urgent matters may order the execution of urgent 
repairs.‘507 Article 1119 of the same law stipulates that: 
[I]f the thing pledged appears to be in danger of perishing, deteriorating or diminishing in value, to 
such an extent that there is a danger that it will not suffice to secure the claim of the pledgee, and the 
pledger does not apply for the restitution of the thing in exchange for another thing, either the pledgee 
or the pledger may apply to the judge for authority to sell the thing pledged by public auction or at its 
value at the time on the stock exchange or on the market.
508
  
 
The judge shall make an order for the deposit of the price, and in such a case, the creditor's 
right is transferred from the thing concerned to the money so deposited. In addition, Article 
226 of the Egyptian Commercial and Maritime Law No. 17 of 1999 stipulates that ‗the seller 
may by petition request from the judge of urgent matters permission to sell perishable stuffs 
if the buyer refused to accept that.‘ A party must refer in his application to court to the 
existence of the arbitral proceedings, or to the existence of the arbitration agreement if the 
issue arises before the commencement of such proceedings. 
 
3.1.1.2.2. Petitions   
 
Although the petition system is easier and quicker 
509
 than a lawsuit,
510 
the provisions 
governing it are scattered across various branches of Egyptian law, such as Family Law, Civil 
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Law, and Civil Procedure Law.
511 
Therefore, resorting to a petition in order to preserve the 
status quo in arbitration is very exhausting and highly risky,
 
as it requires detailed knowledge 
of Egyptian law to ascertain that the application would fall within those cases where petitions 
are competent.
512
 
 
Egyptian laws deal with the petition system as an exceptional approach to be used in special 
cases. Hence, the power of the Court of Appeal, as a judge of urgent matters, is restricted to 
these limited cases.
  
For example, a party cannot have recourse to a petition to request the 
court to stop the liquidation of a letter of guarantee, because it is not listed among the cases 
covered. Thus if the court wrongly grants a petition in such an instance, its judgment will be 
susceptible to annulment.
513
 The difficulties attendant on petitions could drive arbitration 
parties away from petitions order, despite their simplicity, towards lawsuits, despite their 
complexity,
514
 which may affect negatively on the arbitration process.
515 
 
In conclusion, the petition system in Egyptian Law, especially when related to arbitration, 
needs to be more flexible to correspond to the needs and nature of arbitration. In addition, the 
scope of the system should be expanded to cover any applications, while judges should be 
given a general power to grant any measures regardless of the form of the application that a 
party has used, as long as the arbitration agreement does not prevent this.  
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3.1.2. Measures to regulate the status quo and prevent irreparable harm in the 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 
 
The arbitration agreement may indicate the types of interim measures that may be available 
during the proceedings.
516
 However, in the absence of such agreement it is the procedural law 
of the arbitration that determines tribunal power regarding such measures. Certain such 
measures may aim to preserve the status quo in order to prevent any possible harm that 
occurs or happen during the arbitration.
517
 
 
3.1.2.1. Preservation of the status quo by the arbitral tribunal 
 
The contract between the arbitration parties generates many mutual obligations some of 
which must be carried out at a particular time, and sometimes of which need to be carried out 
on a continuing basis.
518
 Rule 35 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 gives the tribunal 
power to manage and protect parties‘ obligations and rights. The tribunal under term 
‗preserve‘ in this Rule can take interim measures such as providing for the custody of or 
detaining property.
519
 Moreover, the tribunal can order that money be deposited in a bank 
account, that the licensing of intellectual property should cease, or that the liquidation of a 
letter of guarantee be stopped, as long as such property is involved in the dispute, and the 
measures taken are preservative in nature. 
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However, some measures have not been mentioned in Rule 35, even though they are 
specified in other rules, like the power of the court to sell property under Rule 46(1)(b). This 
raises the question whether the measures available under Rule 35 are limited to those, which 
have been listed, or whether those listed are just examples, so that the powers of the arbitral 
are more extensive. For example, could the arbitral tribunal under Rule 35 grant an order 
directing a party to sell certain goods? 
 
According to Rule 35(a), the arbitral tribunal can take any of the measures listed regarding 
property to preserve the status quo. For example, it can inspect, photograph, preserve, or take 
custody of land, vessels, sites etc.  On the other hand, the sale of property is only mentioned 
explicitly in Rule 46, addressing the court's power in the arbitration proceedings. Imposing a 
literal interpretation approach, and based on the difference in the expressions used in the two 
rules, it would seem that the sale of property is a measure exclusive to the court and lies 
outwith the tribunal's power. 
Yet it may be argued that a purposive interpretation approach should be adopted where it is 
more compatible with Paragraph 163 of the Policy of Memorandum, which states, 
One of the features of arbitration in Scotland will be an arbitrator‘s ability to make orders for the 
preservation etc. of property owned or possessed by a party as a protective measure pending the 
outcome of an arbitration and also for the purpose of being used as evidence during the 
proceedings…Rule 35 will promote the smooth running of the arbitral process because it will no longer 
be necessary for parties to go to court to obtain orders presently available from arbitrators.
  
Moreover, Professor Fraser Davidson comments, 
Recourse may be had to the court either when Rule 35 has been excluded or restricted, or when the 
property concerned is in the ownership or possession of a third party, since the power of the tribunal 
extends only to the parties.
520
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Consequently, it is submitted that the arbitral tribunal should be empowered to give order to 
the party to sell property for the following reasons. Firstly, the Policy Memorandum
521
 
indicates that the tribunal has been given a wide power to take any protective measures in 
order to minimize the need for court intervention (known as a subsidiary principle of the 
court intervention).
522
 Hence, saying that the arbitral tribunal is not empowered to order a 
party to sell property totally contradicts the words of Paragraph 163. Moreover, Paragraph 
163 has equated the powers of the tribunal and the court in saying „these are similar to the 
powers of the court‘, so any diminution in the tribunal‘s power would threaten this similarity. 
One Scottish legal institution sees that a great difficulty will be avoided if the provision in 
relation to ―provisional award‖ could be expanded to encompass the sale of perishable 
goods.
523
 
 
One may argue that empowering the tribunal to order the sale of property undermines the 
arbitral process if the power is inappropriately used. Therefore, the Scottish Act prefers to 
confine this power to the court in Rule 46(1) (b). Yet this author is not persuaded by this 
view. Rule 53 allows the tribunal to make a provisional award to order an interim payment, 
although this “bold” 524 step might well deprive the final award of effect, if the power was 
misused. Nevertheless, most arbitration rules and laws recognise the tribunal‘s right to take 
such a measure, even with the danger involved. The only thing that scholars call for in this 
regard is that special care should be taken when granting this relief.
525 
Therefore, it seems to 
this author that granting the tribunal power to order the sale of property is no more dangerous 
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than empowering it to order interim payment under Rule 53. Thus, what considerations 
would prevent the arbitral tribunal granting the former measure while allowing it to order 
interim payment?   
 
Secondly, Rule 35 is equivalent to Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006, which 
covers most types of interim measure.
526
 Article 17(2)(b) gives the tribunal broad authority to 
grant the parties the necessary means to maintain and preserve their assets by such steps as 
the sale of perishable goods.
527 
Rule 35(a)(i) stipulates; 
The tribunal may direct a party (a) to allow the tribunal, an expert or another party (i) to inspect, 
photograph, preserve or take custody of any property which that party owns or possesses which is the 
subject of the arbitration‘  
 
The use of the term ‗preserve‘ in Rule 35 could be construed in the light of Article 17 as 
allowing protection of the  parties' assets, whether they are preserved in their original form 
(e.g. by depositing them with a third person), or preserved in the form of their value by 
selling them.
528
 Consequently, the sale of property falls within the arbitral tribunal's power in 
under Rule 35 to preserve the status quo and the parties‘ assets.    
 
Thirdly, Article 17(E)(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law ‗Provision of security‘ stipulates, 
‗The arbitral tribunal may require the party requesting an interim measure to provide 
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appropriate security in connection with the measure.‘529 This Article assumes that the arbitral 
tribunal has power to request an applicant party to provide appropriate security as a guarantee 
to cover his opponent‘s loss, in case the final award went against him.530 
Rule 64(1) ‗Security for expenses‘ of Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 stipulates that: 
The tribunal may;  
(a) Order a party making a claim to provide security for the recoverable arbitration expenses or any part 
of them, and  
(b) If that order is not complied with, make an award dismissing any claim made by that party.
  
 
Hence, the arbitral tribunal, should it shrink from ordering the sale of goods, can under Rule 
64 require a party to provide security to guarantee the recovery of the value of the goods. 
Some may argue that Rule64 just regulates ‗Security for expenses‘, so that the requested 
security does not fall within its ambit. Yet Rule 59(c) defines ‗arbitration expenses‘ as 
mentioned in Rule 64(1)(a) as 'the parties' legal and other expenses‘, hence, the arbitral 
tribunal‘s power under ‗other expenses‘ would cover this kind of security.531  
 
Moreover, the arbitral tribunal under Rule 31 has a wide power to make any directions 
deemed appropriate for the purposes of conducting the arbitration. Thus, by linking these 
rules we can infer that the tribunal can request a party to provide security as a guarantee to 
cover any damage or loss that might happen due to his request.
532 
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Fourthly, many arbitration disputes require special knowledge and skill among the arbitrators 
panel to understand the nature of the dispute and to reach to the proper decision.
533
 Therefore, 
the possession by the arbitrators of specific qualifications and expertise, often-legal 
knowledge or a special knowledge in a particular field such as grain, are common conditions 
in arbitration laws and rules.
534
 In such cases, the arbitrator will be the best-qualified person 
to make a right decision on the necessity for the sale of property. Moreover, arbitrators would 
have expertise in such matters as conditions, prices and sale proceedings, which would 
prevents any tampering with property  by the parties, which expertise may not available to the 
court. Hence, the arbitral tribunal would be the most appropriate body to decide whether to 
grant such measures.  
Fifthly, according to the Policy Memorandum the assumption is that the arbitral tribunal is 
the primary resource for any relief, rather than the court, which should only intervene in cases 
of urgency and when the tribunal is unable to act. Thus, the view that the arbitral tribunal has 
no power to order a party to sale the property makes the authority of the tribunal meaningless 
or at least incomplete. In addition, resorting to the court would threaten the principle of the 
confidentiality of arbitration mentioned in Rule 26.
535
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In conclusion, the foregoing arguments illustrate that the interim measures that have been 
mentioned in Rule 35 of the Act are surely just examples of what the arbitral tribunal can do 
regarding the sale of property falling within the tribunal's power. Therefore, on a purposive 
interpretation the arbitral tribunal‘s power extends to encompass the order for selling of any 
property as long as it is subject of the arbitration.  
 
In this regard, Article 25(b) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules takes the same approach by 
stipulating ―The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power…to order the preservation, storage, 
sale, or other disposal of any property or thing under the control of any party and relating to 
the subject matter of the arbitration.‖  
 
However, alongside the arbitral tribunal the court may have the same or even a broader power 
to preserve the status quo. 
3.1.2.2. Preservation of the status quo by the court 
3.1.2.2.1. Sale of property order 
 
Rule 46(1) of the Scottish Arbitration Act in a number of instances gives the court the same 
power as it has in civil proceedings. Therefore, the court‘s powers in preserving the status 
quo are undoubtedly wider than the tribunal‘s. The court can for example; order the sale of 
any property preserve its value even if was in the possession of a third party‘s hand.536 In 
addition, the court can make an order securing any amount in dispute,
537
 by ordering the 
                                                 
536
 See Rule 46(1)(b). 
537
See Rule 46(1)(c).   
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applicant party to provide caution
 
for his claim or by lodging part or the whole of the disputed 
sum with the court.
538  
 
3.1.2.2.2. Warrants for arrestment or inhibition orders  
 
The most powerful measure that the court can take to preserve the status quo is the warrant 
for arrestment or inhibition, which is known as diligence on the dependence. These kinds of 
warrants are normally used against the party who risk being insolvent 
539
 or who are likely to 
dispose of or disburden themselves of some or all of their assets.
540
 The court‘s power here is 
very wide as it could grant this remedy ex parte 
541
 or suspend until the hearing.
542
  
 
The effect of the warrant in preserving the status quo from the date of its registration.
543  
Therefore,
 the pursuer, after this date is authorized to freeze all or some of the respondent‘s 
property to satisfy the outcome of the arbitration from it.
544
 Therefore, any transactions 
involving the assets covered by the warrant for arrestment may be revoked in favour of the 
pursuer. 
 
It is obvious that a warrant for an arrestment or inhibition order is very rigid, as it may freeze 
all the respondent‘s assets and prevents him from using them. Therefore, the respondent 
                                                 
538
 Scottish Power Generation Ltd v British Energy Generation (UK) Ltd, 2002 S.C. 517, George Cohen, Sons 
& Company v. Jamieson & Paterson, 1963 S.C. 289. 
539
 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 s. 15E(2)(i).  
540
 Section 15E(2)(ii). 
541
 Section 15E(1).  
542
 Section 15F(1).  
543
 Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007 s.149(1).  
544
 Fraser Davidson, Hew R. Dundas, David Bartos, Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (W.Green Thomson 
Reuters 2010) 230. 
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could apply to the court under s.15K(2) of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 to recall the 
warrant or restrict it to certain assets, releasing the rest. In addition, s/he can request the court 
to allow to him to provide caution
545
 such as a bond from insurance company to cover the 
alleged sum.
546
 It is obvious that the warrant of arrestment is a kind of freezing order to 
preserve the status quo till the final award is rendered.  
 
3.1.2.2.3. Interdict  
 
In the same context, Rule 46(1)(f) gives the court a power to grant an interdict or interim 
interdict. An interdict is an order from the court prohibiting particular conduct.
547
 This order 
preserves the status quo by preventing the respondent from taking any action could breach his 
obligations. Therefore, this order could be permanent or interim.
548
 Nevertheless, in the scope 
of arbitration, the court is empowered only to issue an interim interdict since a permanent 
interdict would effectively adjudicate upon the subject of the dispute, which is within the 
exclusive power of the arbitral tribunal under Rule 49(b). Moreover, the court should bear in 
mind before granting an interdict where the balance of convenience between the arbitration 
parties lies.
549
  
 
The role of the interim interdict is very important in preserving the status quo, as any breach 
of this order would amount to a contempt of court. 
                                                 
545
 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, Section 15K(2)  
546
 Fraser Davidson, Hew R. Dundas, David Bartos, Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (W.Green Thomson 
Reuters 2010) 231. 
547
 Stanley Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict (London/ Edinburgh: Butterworth & Co 1987) 1. 
548
 Fraser Davidson, Hew R. Dundas, David Bartos, Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (W.Green Thomson 
Reuters 2010) 231. 
549
 WAC  Ltd and others v. Whillock [1990] IRLR 23. 
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3.1.2.2.4. Interim or permanent orders 
 
Rule 46(1) (g) gives the court a wide power to make ‗any other‘ interim or permanent order 
whether to preserve the status quo or for any other purpose. This is a “catch-all”550 
provision. Therefore, the court could easily ground any of its interim measures on this rule. 
This provision is equivalent to s.44(3) of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which gives the 
court the power to make any interim order it thinks necessary for preserving evidence or a 
party‘s assets.551  
 
In conclusion, after considering the previous provisions, the court under Rule 46 has a very 
wide power to take any measures in arbitration disputes. Correspondingly, the arbitration 
party should be careful in using Rule 46, when applying for an interim measure. In this 
regard, Rule 46(1)(g) could be properly invoked if a party is uncertain of his case and cannot 
decide which provision is most suitable for his application. It is obvious that the Scottish Act 
2010 has tended to favour of the court rather than the arbitral tribunal in helping to preserve 
the status quo contrary to our understanding of previous provisions. 
 
3.1.3. Preserving the status quo in the English Arbitration Act 1996 
 
The 1996 Act made parties' agreement the decisive element as regards the types of interim 
measures that can be made available in arbitration.
552
  In the case of lack of agreement on this 
                                                 
550
 Fraser Davidson, Hew R. Dundas, David Bartos, Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (W.Green Thomson 
Reuters 2010) 234. 
551
 Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Limited [2005] EWCA Civ 618. 
552
 English Arbitration Act 1996 s.38(1).  
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question, the arbitral tribunal under the Act has a default power to take such measures.
553
 
However, what is this default power? The preservation of the status quo under the 1996 Act 
could be achieved by the arbitral tribunal or the court.   
 
3.1.3.1. Preservation of the status quo by the arbitral tribunal. 
 
Section 38 of the 1996 Act is quite similar to Rule35 of the Scottish Act and the expressions 
used are largely the same. Therefore, studying measures for the preservation of the status quo 
in the English Act will not go far from what has been addressed in relation to the Scottish 
Act.
554
 Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal can take measures to preserve the status quo such as 
ordering a party to deposit money in an escrow bank account.
555
 Regarding performance, the 
tribunal can order a contractor to continue construction works,
556
 or order him to stop using 
the licensing the use of intellectual property,
557
 or order a supplier to continue provide the 
products at the agreed time,
558
 or order a party not to dispose of or alienate property or take it 
out of the tribunal‘s jurisdiction.559 Regarding Mareva injunctions, it is submitted that the 
arbitral tribunal cannot take this measure to preserve the status quo.
560  
  
                                                 
553
 Section 38(2)-(6) 
554
 See Preserving the Status Quo under Scottish Arbitration Act.  
555
 Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, (S.D.N.Y.1982) 532 F.Supp. 901.   
556
 Channel Tunnel Group v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 664.  
557 
Resort Condominiums International Inc v Bolwell [1995] 1 Qd R 406 at 428-32; (Supreme Court of 
Queensland (Lee J.), 29 October 1993), see UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration, 32
nd
 session, Vienna, 
20-31 March 2000, para 63(b).  
Available at < http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V00/501/85/PDF/V0050185.pdf?OpenElement>   
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Alan Redfern, J.Martin H. Hunter, et., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4
th
 edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004) 405.  
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 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 - Procedural Order No. 2, October 
28, 1999. 
560
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2.1.3.2.1.1  
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It is worth mentioning that some scholars believe that the arbitral tribunal under s.38(3), 
‗security for costs‘, could demand security from the requesting party as a condition for 
granting interim measure of protection.
561
 This view considers that the definition of costs 
under s.59 of the Act 
562
 is broad enough to cover security for this kind of cost.
563
 This view 
is consistent with Article 17E(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006. 
 
However, the DAC Report says nothing about the tribunal‘s powers in relation to preserving 
the status quo's as it was considered that possession of such powers was self-evident.
564
 In 
addition, it says nothing about the question of whether the tribunal can order the sale of 
goods. This question has been addressed in relation to Rule 35 of the Scottish. Therefore, one 
should refer to that discussion to avoid the repetition since the points made seem equally 
applicable to the 1996 Act.
565
  
 
3.1.3.2. Preservation of the status quo by the Court. 
 
Section 44 of the 1996 Act gives the court a wide power to preserve the status quo. The most 
significant provisions in this regard are ss.44(2) and 44(3). Under these provisions, the court 
                                                 
561
 Bruce Harris, Rowan Planterose, Jonathan Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary (1
st
 edn, 
Blackwell Science, 1996) 161.  
562
Section 59 stipulates; 
(1) References in this Part to the costs of the arbitration are to- (a) the arbitrators' fees and expenses, (b) the fees 
and expenses of any arbitral institution concerned, and (c) the legal or other costs of the parties.  
(2) Any such reference includes the costs of or incidental to any proceedings to determine the amount of the 
recoverable costs of the arbitration (see section 63) 
563
 Bruce Harris, Rowan Planterose, Jonathan Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary (1
st
 edn, 
Blackwell Science, 1996) 161. 
564 
DAC Report 1996 para 199. 
565
 See above para 3.1.2.1. 
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can sell goods 
566
 and make custody or detention orders in relation to property whether in 
possession of the parties or a third party.
567
 In addition, s. 44(2)(e) gives the court unlimited 
power 
568
 to issue „Mareva‟ injunctions,569 anti-suit injunctions,570 or interim injunctions 571 
whether to preserve the status quo or to secure the arbitration outcome.
572
 For example, it can 
take an injunction to stop a call for a performance bond 
573
 or letter of guarantee, stop the 
operation of an intellectual property or product distribution license,
574
 or restraining a party 
from withdrawing equipment.
575
 
 
However, Hiscox Underwriting Ltd v Dickson Manchester & Co Ltd 
576
 held that the court 
can, by virtue of s.44(3), issue an injunctions even if this is not otherwise authorised by 
s.44(2)(e), as long as the case is one of urgency. However, in the absence urgency the ability 
of the court to intervene in the arbitration procedures will depend on the parties‘ agreement or 
tribunal permission.
577
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3.1.4. Conclusion  
After careful consideration of the subject of preserving the status quo under Egyptian, 
Scottish, and English law, it can be seen that the treatment of this subject under these systems 
suffers from some loopholes: 
- Regarding the situation under Egyptian Law, whether the Arbitration Law or Civil 
Procedure Law, there are no separate provisions governing preservation of the status 
quo or describing the tribunal's power in this regard. Such ambiguity threatens the 
parties‘ contractual rights and even their assets during the arbitration process.  
- Moreover, the generality of Article 24 of the Arbitration Law and the disorganization 
of provisions dedicated to preserving the status quo in the Civil Procedure Law may 
lead to contradictory interpretations, which may lead eventually to contradictory 
awards and judgments.
578
  
In this regard, the Egyptian law should adopt new provisions regulating in a clear way the 
question of maintaining the parties' rights by preserving the status quo. It seems the adoption 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006, especially Article 17, could be useful as a starting 
point.  
 
Regarding the Scotland and England Arbitration Acts, the situation under these systems is 
more developed than the position in Egypt Law. Nonetheless: 
- There is no explicit provision under these Acts regulates this point like Article 
17(2)(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
- Moreover, the exclusion of certain measures from the tribunal's power, e.g. power to 
order the sale of goods, may detract from its efficacy in preserving the status quo, and 
may encourage parties to divert from arbitration to the court.    
                                                 
578
 See Soares Da Costa Construction Company v Arab Company for Investment, Cairo Court of Cassation, 
appeal No 1975 for the year 66 BC on 12 December 1996. 
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Therefore, it would be proper to include in both laws a clear provision outlining the range of 
whole measures that may be used in preserving the status quo, without excluding any 
measures from the tribunal's power. 
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Chapter 4  
4.1 Security for Costs Measure 
4.1.1 Preamble 
 
Arbitration, whether ad hoc or institutional, is a private mechanism that contains very 
complex procedures. It is a process encompassing many elements that work simultaneously, 
and its procedures are sometimes conducted in different countries. This, of course, consumes 
much time and money. The cost of an arbitration in some cases could exceed US$1 million, 
divided among fees of arbitrators; experts, witnesses, officers, interpreters, translators, the 
costs of travel and accommodation, the places of hearing, and many other administrative 
matters.
579
 The traditions of arbitration practice indicate that the losing party is responsible 
for all arbitration costs,
580
 so that and the successful party can retrieve his costs from his 
opponent.
581
 Expenses arising from the successful bringing or defence of an arbitration claim 
582
 should be compensated 
583
  otherwise the party concerned will suffer an unjustified loss. 
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Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) para 9.88. 
580
 Alastair Henderson, ‗Security for Costs in Arbitration in Singapore‟ (2011) 7 (1) A.I.A.J. 66. 
581
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156 
 
Security for (legal) costs is often determined by the parties' agreement,
584
 which may for 
example divide liability between them equally.
585
 Alternatively,
 
the parties may agree that 
each should take care of his own costs.
586
  
 
However, in arbitration the claimant is usually the party responsible for providing security for 
costs whether to the court or the tribunal.
587
 Nonetheless, if both parties submit a claim in the 
arbitration, both may seek security for costs, because each is both a claimant and defendant at 
the same time.
588
 In addition, a third party may seek security for costs when he is joined as a 
party to the arbitration.
589 
It is also the case that under some arbitration laws, the arbitral 
tribunal may make an award to dismiss the claim 
590
 if a party failed to comply with an order 
to provide security for costs. Alternatively, it may terminate the arbitration without prejudice 
to the parties' rights.
 591 
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4.1.2 Security for Costs: Definition 
 
Security for (legal) costs in basic legal language is a sum payable by a claimant as a condition 
of being permitted to continue with the proceedings.
592
 In other words, it is a sum of money 
that should be furnished by the plaintiff when there is a reason to believe that s\he will be 
unable to pay the defendant‘s cost if ordered to do so.593 These definitions illustrate that 
security for costs is a financial precondition for hearing the applicant‘s claim. Security for 
costs thus could be used to preclude or impede the claimant from submitting or continuing his 
claim, which could form a kind of denial of justice,
594 
especially if the claimant faces 
financial problems and cannot comply with this condition.
595 
For that reason, the countries 
that recognise the power to demand security for costs, in order to avoid any misuse of this 
measure by the defendant tend to set some conditions that should be satisfied before such an 
order is made.
596
 
 
 
Hence, the tribunal or court should strike a balance between the defendant's right to request 
security for costs and the plaintiff's right to have access to justice. In Re Unisoft Group Ltd 
(No 2) 
597
, Sir Donald Nicholls noted that: 
In exercising its discretion, the court had to balance the threat that an impecunious company could put 
unfair pressure on a defendant against the wrong that would be caused to a company which was 
successful and should not have borne any costs at all‘  
 
                                                 
592 
Glafki Shipping Co SA v Pinios Shipping Co No.1 (The Maira) [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 257.   
593
 P.H. Richards,L.B.Curzon, Longman Dictionary of Law (8
th
 edn, Pearson Education 2011).   
594
 Daniel Brawn, „Security for Costs in England and Wales‟ (2003) 6 (6) Int. A.L.R. 195. 
595 
Porzelack KG v Porzelack (UK) Ltd, [1987] 1 All E.R. 1074.  
596
 See for example the English Arbitration Act 1996 s.38(3)(a)-(b).  
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For example, the claimant's financial circumstances, such as impecuniosity or insolvency, 
should be taken into account when determining the application. Nonetheless,
598 
the case of 
insolvency is not easy to prove since the main point is the inability of the claimant to repay 
the defendant's cost if he lost the claim. Thus, in Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techniki SA, Robert 
Goff L.J. felt that the evidence of insolvency offered fell short of establishing the basis for an 
order for security for costs and so agreed with the other members of the court in dismissing 
the appeal.‘599 Moreover, in Porzelack KG v Porzelack (UK) Ltd, Sir Nicolas Browne 
dismissed the application for security for costs observing that:  
I have little doubt that the plaintiff organisation would be unable to provide security for costs if I were 
to order it on this application. I also have little doubt that there may be great difficulty in recovering the 
costs against the plaintiff, not by reason of its residence in West Germany, but by reason of its lack of 
funds to meet the order…Weighing all these factors and all the circumstances of the case, subject to 
one point I do not think that it is right to grant security for costs.
600
 
 
However, some scholars consider that the financial circumstance of the claimant and the 
availability of his assets within the tribunal's jurisdiction should be decisive elements in the 
response to security for costs applications.
601 
Nonetheless, a security for costs order needs 
real facts to support it and, at the same time, justify the use of such power. Therefore, Lord 
Slynn of Hadley, in Coppee-Lavalin SA/NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd opined 
that ‗there must be other factors indicating that the justice of the case requires that security 
should be ordered.‘602 
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599
 Bank Mellat v Helliniki Techniki SA [1984] Q.B. 291. 
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471. 
159 
 
Since there are no universal standards governing security for costs applications, a few 
arbitration institutions have issued guidelines on security for costs. These guidelines contain a 
set of norms and criteria that the arbitral tribunal could take into account to help in deciding 
on applications.
603 These criteria may include, for example, a party‘s nationality or residence, 
financial circumstances and good (or bad) faith, while the timing of such an application may 
also be of significance.
604
 Such norms that could be helpful to the arbitral tribunal when it 
considers such applications. 
 
However, security for costs is a controversial subject,
605
 as it is a double-edged sword,
606  
since it may be a tool used to safeguard a party‘ rights, or a means of aborting the arbitration. 
Therefore, there are two views regarding this measure. The first believes that security for 
costs ensures the seriousness of any claim, prevents any evasive behaviour, and finally 
secures the rights of the parties.
607 
Thus, the power to order that a party provides such 
security is recognised by such provisions as Article 17(2)(c) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
2006,
608
 s.38(3) of the English Arbitration Act 1996, s.38 of the Swedish Arbitration Act of 
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1999,
609 
Articles 182 and 183 of the Swiss Private International Law Act 
610
 and s.1041 of the 
German Arbitration Act of 1998. In institutional arbitration the power is also conferred by 
Article 25(1) (a) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules.
611
 
 
On the other hand, many arbitration laws and rules are still reluctant to grant this power to the 
arbitral tribunal. This is because it is feared that measure might cause much delay in the 
arbitration process, increases its cost, and violates the confidentiality 
612
 and neutrality of 
arbitration.
613 
Moreover, if a party has to resort to the court to obtain such a measure, he will 
need to expose a lot of documents and evidence to the court, which further threatens the 
confidentiality of the process. This view sees that this kind of measure as potentially 
hindering the arbitration process and shutting the door of the arbitration before the claimant. 
 
4.1.3 Different Aspects for Security for Costs     
 
The objective of security for costs is to protect the defendant by enabling him to recover his 
costs if he won the case.
614
 It guards against the bad effects that could face the defendant if 
the losing claimant resisted meeting the costs by hiding his assets, or where his assets are 
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located beyond the jurisdiction of tribunal or court.
615
 This measure is a kind of guarantee of 
protection following success in arbitration proceedings.
616
 It may be expedient to consider the 
arguments for and against security for costs before examining how the issue is treated under 
Egyptian, English, and Scottish arbitration laws. 
 
4.1.3.1 Objections and Answers on Security for Costs 
 
Key characteristics of arbitration are the confidentiality of the proceedings and economical 
and speedy processes.
617
 The author submits that ordering the provision of security for a 
party‘s legal costs is a good tool that protects parties from frivolous claims. Nevertheless, 
there are some arguments against the granting of such a measure. Therefore, this part will 
discuss these arguments in some detail.   
 
The defects of security for costs, which could stifle the arbitration process, may be 
summarized as follows:  
- It violates confidentiality of arbitration. 
- It violates party‘s right to access justice.  
- There are rarely clear rules or criteria governing the exercise of such power.  
- It increases the cost of arbitration and thereby causes the loss of investment 
opportunities. 
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4.1.3.1.1 Violation of Confidentiality 
 
One of the most decisive grounds for granting security for costs is the inability of the 
claimant to pay the defendant‘s cost if the latter won the litigation.618 To consider whether or 
not to grant an order, the tribunal may need to assess the claimant‘s financial 
circumstances,
619
 and to do this it probably needs to analyse his financial situation and review 
the annual accounts of his business. These procedures may require this party to disclose 
highly confidential material 
620
 such as bank statements and the percentage of his share of a 
commercial market, to demonstrate whether or not he is insolvent or impecunious.
621 
   
 
Moreover, if a court is invited to enforce or review the arbitral tribunal's decision, this will 
violate the principle of confidentiality, as the documents that have been used to evaluate the 
claimant's financial circumstances will be exposed to the court.
622
  
4.1.3.1.1.1 Answer  
 
There is no doubt that the principle of confidentiality of arbitration proceedings is one of the 
most important characteristics of the arbitration system,
623
 whether or not it has been 
mentioned explicitly in the arbitration agreement, since it is tacitly understood. Parker LJ in 
Dolling-Baker v Merrett held that: 
Although the [Arbitration] proceedings are consensual and may thus be regarded as wholly voluntary, 
their very nature is such that there must, in my judgment, be some implied obligation on both parties 
                                                 
618
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not to disclose or use for any other purpose any documents prepared for and used in the arbitration, or 
disclosed or produced in the course of the arbitration, or transcripts or notes of the evidence in the 
arbitration or the award—and indeed not to disclose in any other way what evidence had been given by 
any witness in the arbitration—save with the consent of the other party, or pursuant to an order or leave 
of the court. That qualification is necessary just as it is in the case of the implied obligation of secrecy 
between banker and customer.
624
   
 
Moreover, most recent arbitration laws and rules prescribe a duty of confidentiality in 
arbitration.
625
 Such laws and rules look to protect any information or documents disclosed to 
the tribunal, and the tribunal is obliged to maintain the confidentiality of such materials. 
 
Yet the possibility of violating confidentiality via a security for costs order is minimal, 
because it is a self-enforcing measure,
626
 which, unlike many interim measures,
627
 does not 
need court assistance to activate it. The plaintiff facing a security for costs order has only one 
option - to comply with the order and furnish the sum demanded - otherwise, the tribunal may 
make an award to dismissing his claim.
628
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Indeed, a security for costs order may help protect the confidentiality of arbitration parties, 
particularly the defendant, as it may mean that he need not disclose documents or other 
materials in defending a frivolous and unmeritorious claim. 
 
4.1.3.1.2 Security for Costs and Access to Justice (Justice Denied)  
 
It might be said that a claimant‘s right to a fair hearing should not depend on any conditions, 
particularly financial ones. A demand that a claimant provides security for costs might be 
said to constitute a kind of human rights violation 
629 
because it entails a deprivation of the 
claimant‘s right to access justice and thus sees justice denied.630 
Is it right that, if the claimant cannot comply with the tribunal‘s order, the claim should be 
dismissed, or indeed that the right to submit the claim again should be forever lost? 
631
 The 
defendant may use this means to abort the arbitration process,
632
 especially if acts in bad faith 
in the knowledge that the claimant is suffering from financial problems, or is a small or new 
company that cannot respond to the tribunal's order.
633
 This approach could well undermine 
the arbitration system as an instrument for dispute resolution, or at least render it a private 
tool for resolving huge commercial disputes between multi-national firms.
634
 Moreover, the 
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tribunal‘s consideration of the strength of a claim prior to any hearing 635 may lead it to reach 
an initial opinion against one party without any real examination of merits, which arguably 
violates its duty to act fairly and impartially towards all parties.
636
 
 
4.1.3.1.2.1 The Answer  
 
An individual's right to access justice is, no doubt, one of the most important principles in 
law, which is indeed recognized by leading international treaties.
637
 Nevertheless, there 
should be some instrument that prevents the misuse of the right of access to justice by 
bringing frivolous or nuisance claims,
638
 which may leave a defendant unfairly out of 
pocket.
639 
This tool is the security for costs order. A security for costs order serves the 
laudable aim of protecting both parties by guaranteeing a fair and just hearing for them. It is 
only fair that a claimant should show his ability and willingness to pay his opponent's costs if 
he loses the claim. There need be no prescribed form for the security. It might be a bond, a 
bank guarantees a payment into escrow account 
640
 or even take the form of a cautionary 
obligation.
641
 
 
Moreover, in certain jurisdictions the inability of a claimant to provide security for costs will 
not be a sufficient ground to dismiss his claim in all cases. Kerr L.J. in Bank Mellat v. 
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Hellinki Techniki S.A opined that, ‗I would also regard it as wrong in principle to make any 
such order on the-ground that the claimant may be unable to pay the other party's costs if the 
award requires him to do so.‘642 The arbitral tribunal should take into account the 
considerations of justice when determining a security request. Sir Nicolas Browne, in 
Porzelack KG v Porzelack (UK) Ltd, remarked that: 
It is always a matter to be taken into account that any plaintiff should not be driven from the judgment 
seat unless the justice of the case makes it imperative. I am always reluctant to allow applications for 
security for costs to be used as a measure to stifle proceedings.
643
 
 
Therefore, the dominant view on this question is that the arbitral tribunal should consider all 
parties‘ circumstances and balance them well. Moreover, the tribunal should base its 
evaluation of the security request on all relevant factors 
644 such as the claimant‘s financial 
position, whether past or present,
645
 the location of his assets, etc. In such cases, it will not be 
a sufficient ground to challenge the tribunal‘s order to say that justice has been denied.646 
Regarding the defendant who acts in bad faith, the tribunal in certain systems has a wide 
discretion whether or not to grant his application. Hence, if the tribunal determines that the 
application for security for costs has merely been made to hinder the arbitration and that, the 
defendant was well aware of the claimant‘s circumstances before signing the arbitration 
agreement; 
647
 the tribunal should reject the request to prevent the defendant from benefiting 
from his ill intentions. Butler J in Jackson v Hamer stated that: 
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It is of essential importance to consider as far as possible whether the plaintiff's shortage of funds has 
been brought about as a consequence of the defendant's conduct of which the plaintiff complains. If so, 
it would be unfair to require the plaintiff to provide security for the defendant's costs.
648
  
 
The tribunal might further oblige the defendant to show good faith by also providing such 
security.
649
  
Thus, the security for costs does not contradict or violate parties‘ right to access justice; on 
the contrary, it ensures a proper and efficient use of this right.   
 
Regarding the potential violation of the arbitrators‘ duty by considering in advance the merits 
of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal, in considering a security request, should rely on its 
evaluation on factors such as claimant‘s insolvency or inability to meet an award of costs.650 
 In such cases, it will not need to examine the merits of the dispute, and need only look 
briefly at the material presented to it by the parties. Therefore, Rix J, in Renel v Gulf 
Petroleum noted that: 
Having looked briefly at the pleadings in the arbitration and at some essential documents which Mr 
Brodie has brought to my attention, I will say nothing further than that I put out of account for the 
purpose of this application any question of the merits in the arbitration and I say nothing whatsoever 
about them.
651
   
Moreover, some arbitration practitioners 
652
 argue that the parties, if they see this issue as a 
potential problem, can appoint another arbitrator to decide on any application for security for 
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costs.
653
Although this will increase the cost of arbitration, this solution avoids the risk that the 
tribunal may be seen to have prejudged the merits of the dispute,
654
 while simultaneously 
allowing the tribunal to concentrate on the substantive issues in the arbitration.  
 
4.1.3.1.3 The Absence of Clear Rules or Criteria Addressing This Measure 
 
Security for costs should be a good tool to safeguard a defendant‘s rights against loss arising 
from a vexatious claim.
655
 Nevertheless, the absence of uniform norms governing the use of 
this measure may lead to its mismanagement whether by the tribunal, the court or even the 
lawyers involved.
656
  
 
This fear explains why many arbitrators hesitate to grant security for costs orders.
657
 They are 
reluctant simply because there are no standards or rules that explain or indicate how 
arbitrators (especially those from a civil law background) should exercise this power.
658
 In 
this regard, Professor Robert Merkin, in his comment on s.38(3) of the English Arbitration 
Act 1996, says that: 
Section 38(3) of the 1996 Act in its final form does not, with the exception of the removal of the 
residence principle, contain any restrictions on the grounds for the making of an order or the criteria 
which the arbitrators might take into account in exercising their discretion.‘659  
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For these reasons, some would argue that security for costs should not be ordered in 
international arbitration. 
 
4.1.3.1.3.1 The Answer 
 
One of the key principles of the modern arbitration process is that the arbitral tribunal often 
has a wide and unfettered discretion to Rule on any application,
660 
whether related to security 
for costs or any other interim measure.
661
 In many of these applications the arbitral tribunal 
relies on its evaluation of conditions of the case, and sometimes takes the initiative to issue 
measures that support the arbitration proceedings. The tribunal in all these cases is obliged to 
act fairly and impartially towards the parties.
662 
 
The tribunal in all cases will be fettered by mandatory arbitration law of the lex fori.
663
 For 
example, a tribunal seated in London would be able to grant security for costs because the 
English judicial system supports such kind of order.
664 
On the other hand, if Egypt was the 
seat of arbitration lex fori, the arbitral tribunal would be reluctant to grant such measures, 
because the Egyptian judicial system does not recognise the arbitral tribunal as having such 
power.
665  
 
                                                 
660
 Wendy Miles and Duncan Speller, 'Security for Costs in International Arbitration – Emerging Consensus or 
Continuing Difference?' (2007) European Arbitration Review 32.  
661
 Margaret Rutherford and John Sims, Arbitration Act 1996: A Practical Guide (FT Law & Tax, London 
1996)137-138. 
662
 See for example, Egyptian Arbitration Law Article 26; English Arbitration Act 1996 s.33; Arbitration 
(Scotland ) Act 2010 Rule 24. 
663
 Noah Rubins, 'In God we Trust, All Others Pay cash: Security for Costs in International Commercial 
Arbitration' (2000) 11(307) Am Rev Int'l Arb. 366. 
664
 Wendy Miles and Duncan Speller, 'Security for Costs in International Arbitration – Emerging Consensus or 
Continuing Difference?' (2007) European Arbitration Review 34. 
665
 See Security for Cost under Egyptian Law. 
171 
 
There may be many considerations accepted in arbitration as criteria for granting a security 
for costs order,
666
 but the following tend to be the key grounds for such an order: 
 The financial circumstances of the claimant (inability to repay), 
 The place of residence and nationality of the claimant, 
 The bona or mala fides of the parties, 
 The enforceability of the arbitration award,  
 The prospects of success of the arbitral claim. 
 
The court in K/S A/S Bani v Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corp was mainly prompted 
by the claimant‘s financial circumstances in making a security for costs order.667 Kerr J in 
Mavani v Ralli Bros Ltd was influenced by the place of residence and nationality of the 
claimant plus the potentials enforceability of a security for costs order, observing that:  
I unhesitatingly accept the evidence that an order for costs would be difficult to enforce against him in 
Pakistan and that there would be considerable difficulty in securing the remission of the proceeds of 
such enforcement.‘
668  
 
Moreover, the tribunal in ICC Case No. 7047 rejected a security for costs application because 
it considered the defendant in bad faith.
669
  
 
Thus, allegations that the making of security for costs orders is subject to no clear criteria 
have no basis in reality. Rather the non-codification of rules on security for costs has made 
this tool more flexible and assisted tribunals in evaluating every case individually. This 
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flexibility could further influence tribunals to look for new considerations, which may help 
develop arbitration practice. 
 
4.1.3.1.4 Security for Costs Increases Arbitration Cost and Causes Financial 
Damage 
 
The last criticism directed at security for cost orders is that they undermine one of the most 
important features of the arbitration system, i.e. its economy.
670
 It is a measure that increases 
the cost of arbitration. Time must be taken to examine applications, to exchange of 
memorandums, and to hear the parties.
671
 Moreover, the parties who will need further 
expensive assistance from lawyers or advisers, whether to support or resist such an 
application. Furthermore, an order could cause the claimant damage because he is obliged to 
set aside for an unspecified time, a fact that weakens his financial capacity to take up new 
investment opportunities.
672
  
 
4.1.3.1.4.1 The Answer 
 
A security for costs order guarantees the seriousness of the arbitration claim, preventing any 
frivolous or malicious claim,
673
 which means that only worthy claims which truly deserve to 
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be arbitrated will proceed. Hence, in one way, the device of a security for costs ordered may 
be considered as a means of avoiding unnecessary expenditure.         
In most cases security for costs applications depend on fairly straightforward facts, which 
rarely need a lot of time to be evaluated, and do not involve witness testimony or legal 
pleadings, e.g. whether the claimant is insolvent,
674
 whether he resides outside the tribunal or 
court's jurisdiction, and whether his assets are located in a country that is not a party to the 
New York Convention.
675
 The tribunal just has to evaluate the necessity of an order in light 
of these factors, which task rarely involves a lot of work or time. 
 
Moreover, much tribunal time can be lost in deliberating over the question whether it has the 
power to grant security for costs or not.
676
 Therefore, if there was a clear provision addressing 
this issue, time might actually be saved. The problem is not in security for costs as a measure 
but in the absence of clear rules governing to the measure.
677
      
  
Regarding the loss of investment opportunities, this is an argument which can be directed at 
involvement in to the whole arbitration process or any litigation process. Since involvement 
in any claim tends to cost money, the risk of losing investment opportunities is an inherent 
feature of any adjudicative process. Hence, the security for costs measure does not itself 
cause this loss, involvement in the process does. Indeed the ability to order security for costs 
may be regarded as one of the most important pillars of international field,
678
 because the 
                                                 
674
 K/S A/S Bani v Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corp [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 445. 
675
 Azov Shipping Co v Baltic Shipping Co [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep 159, Mavani v Ralli Bros Ltd [1973] 1 All E.R. 
555. 
676
 Noah Rubins, 'In God we Trust, All Others Pay cash: Security for Costs in International Commercial 
Arbitration' (2000) 11(307) Am Rev Int'l Arb. 378. 
677
 Weixia Gu, ‗Security for Costs in International Commercial Arbitration' (2005) 22 (3) J.Int'l Arb. 202. 
678
 Ibid.  
173 
 
inherent risk of cross border transactions demands some means of ensuring the seriousness of 
any arbitration claim.
679 
   
 
4.1.4 Conclusion  
 
 
After a careful consideration of all aspects of orders for security for costs, the previous 
discussion shows that their advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. Such orders ensure 
the seriousness of arbitration claims by protecting the parties and the arbitral tribunal from 
being involved in frivolous or malicious claims.
680 
 
The advantages of orders for security for costs no doubt lie behind the recent change in 
addressing this topic in many arbitration laws. For example, before 1990, the Swiss doctrine 
showed the highest level of hostility towards such orders, as it violates the neutrality principle 
as it favours defendant over the claimant.
681
 However, this situation changed dramatically 
between 2003 and 2009, as many arbitration cases recognized the tribunal‘s power to grant 
security for costs.
682
 The same sort of process can be seen in Singapore. Before 1994, such 
orders could only be granted by the court, but after the 2009 Arbitration Amendment Act 
such an order became lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in 
international arbitrations, and lay within the tribunal‘s competence in domestic arbitrations.683  
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Moreover, the report of UNCITRAL Working Group II stated that ‗The Working Group 
agreed that security for costs was encompassed by the words ―preserving assets out of which 
a subsequent award may be satisfied.‖684 
 
It appears that in spite of the fact that orders for security for costs serve a worthwhile aim – 
especially considering that the arbitral tribunal will always consider all relevant 
circumstances before granting such a measure – there still seems to be some concern about 
the misuse of this tool, especially arising from the defendant‘s ill faith. Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that it is a vital tool in arbitrations. Perhaps in order to reconcile the two views the 
author of this thesis submits that the tribunal‘s power to grant an order for security for costs 
should be opt in power. This means that there must be a very clear provision – whether in the 
arbitration agreement or in arbitration law or rules – that addresses the tribunal‘s power to do 
so. Otherwise, the arbitral tribunal has no such power. Or this power could be listed in 
arbitration laws as a default power and the parties, if wish, can exclude it.  If adopted, this 
proposal could defeat any problem that could face security for costs in the future.  
 
These concerns may explain arbitrators‘ hesitation to grant this measure,685 and explain why 
some scholars classify this measure as exceptional – one that should only be taken in unusual 
circumstances.
686
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4.1.5 Egyptian Arbitration Law and Security for Costs 
     
Article 17 of the old version of the UNCITRAL Model Law 1985 reads: 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any 
party to take such interim measure of protection, as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in 
respect of the subject matter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide 
appropriate security in connection with such measure.
687
 
 
Article 24 of Egyptian Arbitration Law stipulates that: 
Both parties to the arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral panel the power to order, upon 
request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject 
matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the 
measure ordered.  
 
The approach of the Egyptian Law and the UNCITRAL Model Law differs in that the Model 
Law confers the power if the parties do not exclude it, while Egyptian law merely allows the 
parties to confer the power by agreement.  
 
However, it is obvious that Article 17 of the Model Law has given the arbitral tribunal a 
fettered power in taking interim measures.
688
 The restriction mentioned in Article 17 is that 
any interim measures that may be taken in the arbitration process must relate to the subject 
matter of the dispute.  
                                                 
687
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Since the cost of arbitration relates to procedural matters 
689
 and is determined separately 
from the substantive matters in the arbitration award, it is, therefore, a volatile subject 
690
 the 
assessment of which depends on many changing factors,
691
 such as the length of the 
arbitration process, that are not related to the substance of the dispute. This makes the cost 
subject to re-estimation and review, whether upwards or downwards, during the arbitration 
process.
692
 
 
Hence, security for costs as a procedural measure is not covered by Article 17 of the old 
version of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
693
 and the tribunal under that version is not entitled 
to order such a measure. Since the Egyptian Arbitration Law is based on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 1985,
694 
the arbitral tribunal under the current Egyptian law is not entitled to 
grant security for costs. Yet while the tribunal has no power to grant a security for costs order 
under the Egyptian Arbitration Law, could the Egyptian courts grant such an order in arbitral 
proceedings? 
4.1.5.1 Egyptian Court and Security for Costs 
 
Article 45 of the Egyptian Civil Procedure Law No. 13 of 1968 gives the court of urgent 
matters a wide power to take any provisional or interim measures which are urgently 
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required.
695
  The Article only allows the court to act if two conditions are satisfied: the case 
should be urgent, and the measure required should be provisional and should not affect the 
substantive matters of the dispute.
696
 Does security for costs meet these conditions so as to 
justify court involvement in arbitration proceedings?   
First, the idea of security for costs originated in the common law system,
697
 while the 
Egyptian legal system belongs to the civilian tradition. Therefore, there is no particular Rule 
or provision in either the Civil Procedures Law or Egyptian Arbitration Law addressing 
security for costs. Secondly, the Egyptian Arbitration Law has adopted the principle of party 
autonomy, so parties can agree to empower the arbitral tribunal to take any measure, 
including ordering security for costs.  In such case, the court will prima facie assist to enforce 
such an order as a matter of the law of the contract.
698  
 
However, in the absence of such a clear provision in the arbitration agreement, the claimant 
has the right to resort to the court only under Article 45 of the Civil Procedures Law. As 
mentioned above, Article 45 indicates that provisional measures will be ordered where 
urgency is established, without such urgency the court has no power to act.
699
 Since the 
assessment of the urgency of the case is within the exclusive discretion of the court, it would 
be entirely up to the court of urgent matters to decide whether to grant security for costs or 
not.
700 
It may thus be that the court decides that the application has not satisfied the 
conditions of Article 45, and dismisses the defendant‘s request. It seems more probable that a 
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request will be rejected than accepted because Article 45 requires an immediate risk to the 
parties‘ rights, while a security for costs application is based on a potential risk.  Moreover, 
since Egyptian courts lack experience in handling security for costs orders, and given the 
uncertainty of the considerations which might be used to justify such an order, the Egyptian 
courts would be especially reluctant to grant such measures. 
 
4.1.5.2 Conclusion  
 
Given the absence of provisions addressing security for costs orders in Egyptian law, despite 
the growing importance of such measures in the field of arbitration,
701 
the following 
proposals might be made. 
 
4.1.5.2.1 Regarding Egyptian Arbitration Law 
 
It might be reasonable if Egyptian Arbitration Law adopted the possibility that orders for 
security for costs could be made, particularly in relation to securing the costs of the 
arbitration, in order to ensure that arbitration proceedings actually start. Otherwise, Egyptian 
laws do not provide an effective means of securing such costs. Arbitrators who were left 
unpaid would have to bring a normal lawsuit, which takes a very long time.
702
 This powerful 
disincentive diminishes the attraction of Egypt as an arbitral seat. 
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Due to the increasing use of security for costs, the Egyptian Arbitration Law should introduce 
a clear provision addressing this measure to clarify: 
- The tribunal‘s power to order security for costs in the absence of agreement between 
the parties; 
- The grounds for granting such orders, in order to prevent any misuse of this tool. In 
this regard, s.38(3) of the English Arbitration Act 1996, or Article 17 of the 2006 
version of the UNCITRAL Model Law could provide a model such a provision.  
 
Allowing tribunals to order security for costs would make Egyptian arbitration law modern 
and consistent with recent trends in arbitration laws such as the UNCITRAL Model Law 
2006. This in turn should help and make Egypt a leading centre for international arbitration, 
especially in the Middle East. 
4.1.5.2.2 Regarding Egyptian Civil Procedure Law 
 
Civil procedures law suffers from many shortcomings in supporting both domestic and 
international arbitration level. In the shadow of the rising international use of security for 
costs, this law should adopt a set of rules for securing smooth court intervention in the 
arbitration process to assist the arbitral tribunal to achieve its aim. In particular, these 
proposed rules should include a clear provision addressing the court‘s power to issue a 
security for costs order. Regardless of whether provisions relating to security for costs orders 
are introduced, the law should feature clear rules allowing non-parties involved in the 
arbitration process (e.g. arbitrators) to recover their fees without unnecessary delay. This 
proposal facilitates the arbitration process, since it avoids the normal procedures which cause 
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enormous delay in civil litigation,
703
 while inspiring confidence in third parties that they will 
obtain payment quickly. 
4.1.6 Security for Costs under Scottish and English Arbitration Laws 
 
The British legal systems have paid more attention to security for costs orders than any other 
systems,
704
 the discussion of this measure in case law going back many years.
705
 Therefore, 
many leading cases, which have helped establish and develop the security for costs system, 
are English.
706
 Section 38(3) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 and Rule64 of the 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 also empower tribunals to order security for costs. The 
language used in these provisions is nearly the same identical save that Rule64 speaks of 
security for expenses rather than costs.   
  
The granting of a security for costs order under both Acts is within the exclusive power of the 
arbitral tribunal.
707
 Nevertheless, the court under s.70(6)(7) of the English Act can order the 
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appellant to provide security for the costs of an application to challenge or appeal against the 
arbitration award.
708  
 
However, the rules addressing the tribunal's power to make security for costs orders have set 
some restrictions on limit this power.
709
 Section 38(3) of English Arbitration Act 1996 
stipulates that: 
(3) The tribunal may order a claimant to provide security for the costs of the arbitration. This power 
shall not be exercised on the ground that the claimant is-  
(a) An individual ordinarily resident outside the United Kingdom, or 
(b) A corporation or association incorporated or formed under the law of a country outside the United 
Kingdom, or whose central management and control is exercised outside the United Kingdom. 
 
And Rule 64 of the Scottish Arbitration Act 2010 stipulates that: 
(1)  The tribunal may—  
(a) Order a party making a claim to provide security for the recoverable arbitration expenses or any part 
of them, and  
(b) If that order is not complied with, make an award dismissing any claim made by that party.  
(2)  But such an order may not be made only on the ground that the party 
(a) Is an individual who ordinarily resides outwith the United Kingdom, or  
(b) Is a body which is—  
(i) Incorporated or formed under the law of a country outwith the United Kingdom, or  
(ii) Managed or controlled from outwith the United Kingdom.   
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To some extent, these restrictions echo the prior common law. Thus Lord Slynn of Hadley, in 
Coppee-Lavalin SA/NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals, opined that: 
It is plainly not sufficient to justify an order that one or both of the parties is not ordinarily resident in 
the jurisdiction. There must be other factors indicating that the justice of the case requires that security 
should be ordered.‘710  
Nevertheless, Longmore J in Azov Shipping Co v Baltic Shipping Co (No 2), considered that 
‗there is no formal fetter on my discretion in relation to security for costs beyond paragraphs 
(a) (b) of Section 38(3).
711
 However, the arbitral tribunal or the court could rely on granting 
security for costs order on real factors that indicate that the justice of the case is at stake.
712
 
For example, the location of a party's assets can still be a crucial element when security for 
costs is requested, simply because it bears on the possibility of the enforcement of an award 
of costs, particularly in the defendant's favour.
713
 In addition, the claimant‘s financial 
circumstances must be a vital element in considering whether to make an order.
714  
 
 
When the tribunal issues a security for costs order, the claimant is expected to comply with it. 
If the claimant does not comply with this order, s.41(6) of the English Act allows the arbitral 
tribunal may make an award dismissing his claim, and in that case he will not be able to 
appeal this decision till providing the required security. However, the tribunal in the 
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exercising of this power should be careful to adhere to its duty under s. 33 to treat the parties 
fairly and impartially.
  
 
4.1.7 Conclusion 
 
The issue of security for costs has been addressed very carefully by the English legal system, 
which makes it the cornerstone in understanding this measure. In addition, English case law 
has played a substantial role in the development of arbitration practice.
715
  
 
Hence, the Egyptian lawmaker could benefit by using s.38(3) of the English Arbitration Act 
1996 as a model for a new provision regulating security for costs. The extensive English case 
law on s.38(3) would then be a useful resource for Egyptian practitioners in understanding 
the legal nature of this measure. Egyptian Arbitration law would also be brought in line with 
contemporary international practice in this area, this measure now being seen as highly 
desirable in arbitration.
716
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Chapter 5  
 
5 Provisional Payment Measure 
5.1 Preamble 
 
In the world of construction, many contractors arrange their financial obligations towards 
workers, suppliers and sub-contractors based on the monies that they earn from the employer 
or project owner. These payments secure the cash flow,
717 
which in turn ensures the 
contractors‘ capability to continue to fulfil their contractual and financial obligations.718 
Therefore, any imbalance in the dates of these payments might cause significant damage to 
their work and reputation. Nonetheless, it is natural in any dispute between two parties that 
mutual obligations are suspended until a competent tribunal adjudicates on the merits of such 
disputes.  
 
To avoid any harm that may happen during arbitration, a party may request from the arbitral 
tribunal some sort of financial relief, such as a provisional payment order,
719
 this money 
being placed in his own account or an account controlled or supervised by the tribunal.
720
 
 
There is, however, no limit to the forms of relief that may be given to prevent the kind of 
financial loss.
721 
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A provisional payment measure is an order directing a party to pay a sum of money into an 
escrow account controlled by the arbitral tribunal 
722
 to prevent irreparable harm to one of the 
arbitration parties.
723
 However, only a few arbitration laws and rules mention such measures 
explicitly, e.g. s.39 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 
724
 and Article 25(1)(c) of the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules 1998. Yet many arbitration rules and laws recognize this measure 
implicitly, it being recognised that it falls within the authority of the arbitral tribunal to take 
such measures. Thus, Article 183(1) of the Private International Law Act in Switzerland 
725  
stipulates ‗the arbitral tribunal may, on motion of one party, order provisional or conservatory 
measures.‘ In the same vein, Article 17(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 and Article 
26(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules state that ―the arbitral tribunal may, at the request 
of a party, grant interim measures‖ to allow the arbitral tribunal to take any measure.726 Also, 
Article 28(1) of the ICC Arbitration Rules stipulates the arbitral tribunal may, at the request 
of a party, order any interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate‘, and ICC case 
No. 7544 emphasised that this allowed the arbitral tribunal to order a party to set up an 
interim payment.
727   
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It is worth mentioning that a provisional or interim payment measure may seem a comparable 
with an Astreint, which is a sum of money to be paid if the principal order of the court is not 
complied with.
728
 This tool has been created by French Judicial system as a means of making 
a party comply with the court‘s decisions without need to resort to enforcement 
procedures.
729 
It is obvious that this is a judicial penalty in the form of a payment to be made 
in respect of each day of delay in fulfilling the court or tribunal's orders.
730
 Thus, Article 
1467 of the French Code of Civil Procedure 2012 stipulates that ―... If a party is in possession 
of an item of evidence, the arbitral tribunal may enjoin that party to produce it, determine the 
manner in which it is to be produced and, if necessary, attach penalties to such injunction.‖731   
It is obvious that interim payments and astreintes are very different.  While both measures 
deal with monetary issues, a provisional payment measure offers a party financial relief, 
while an astreinte is a financial penalty against a non-cooperating party.
732
 As the issue of the 
astreinte falls within the realm of enforcement, which lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
will not be considered further.  
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5.2 Some aspects of Provisional Payment Measures  
 
In the French Law, a provisional payment measure is called a référé-provision,
733
 and the 
interim relief judge, juge des référé, is empowered to grant this measure for either the whole 
or part of the amount in dispute 
734
 as long as the request has fulfilled the conditions set by 
the law.
735
 These conditions are the existence of an urgent case and the application being 
submitted to the court before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
736
 Articles 809(2) and 
873(2) of the French Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) stipulate that:  
The president may always…in cases where the existence of the obligation is not seriously challenged, 
he may award an interim payment to the creditor or order the mandatory performance of the obligation 
even where it is an obligation to do a particular thing.
   
 
However, some scholars argue a provisional payment order, whether made by a tribunal or 
court, should not be able to cover the whole sum in dispute subjects, but should only include 
undisputed sums,
 
otherwise it risks undermining the final award.
737
 Therefore, the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal refused to grant an order covering the whole of the goods which were the 
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subject of dispute, because such an order could affect the outcome of the case.
738
 Similarly, 
the tribunal in ICC case No.9984 noted that ―the amount was, in fact, seriously contested‖ so 
shrank from granting the measure requested as it was ―too closely linked with the solution of 
whole dispute.‖739 In addition, granting such a measure, even in relation to undisputed sums, 
might require examining the merits of the dispute, which is the exclusive right of the arbitral 
tribunal. Therefore, the provisional payment measure might sometimes conflict with the 
purpose of arbitration.
740
 
Accordingly, some scholars 
741
 argue that a provisional payment order is not really a 
provisional measure, because it requires the tribunal to examine the merits of the dispute to 
determine whether it will grant the application.
742
 This process is totally opposed to the 
notion of provisional measures – a system based on the idea that the arbitral tribunal should 
not examine the merits of the dispute in the absence of any party. These scholars view a 
provisional payment measure as a provisional remedy that may be granted by a partial award. 
It is an opinion that certainly has some logic and it may be the reason why some scholars do 
not count this measure among the types of provisional measures.
743
 
                                                 
738
 Behring International, Inc v Iranian Air Force, 8 Iran-US CTR 44, cited in Lew, D. M. Julian, Loukas A. 
Mistelis, Stefan Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law international, 2003) 
605. 
739
 ICC Partial Award 9984 of 1999 cited in Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 219, footnote 255.  
740
 Heba Badr Al-Sadiq, 'The Interim Protection in Arbitration; Comparative Study' (Ph.D Ain Shams 
University(Egypt) 2009) 57. 
741
 Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 
2005) 218. 
742
 Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 729. 
743
 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4
th
 edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell, London 2004) para 7-23. 
189 
 
A provisional payment order may thus affect the dispute, especially if the final award finds 
against the party who benefited from this measure during the arbitration process. The winning 
party may be in a difficult position, particularly if the losing party has become insolvent, in 
which case the prospects of the winner recovering his money will hugely diminished, 
transforming the provisional payment order from a protective measure to a means of 
undermining the arbitral award. In an attempt to avoid negative consequences of such 
measures, the European Court of Justice in Van Uden Maritime BV Africa Line v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line has adopted a new principle allowing the court to 
insist  
on the provision of a guarantee as a pre-condition for granting a provisional payment order. 
The European Court observed that:  
Interim payment of a contractual consideration does not constitute a provisional measure within the 
meaning of Article 24 of the Convention unless, first, repayment to the defendant of the sum awarded 
is guaranteed if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as regards the substance of his claim, and, second, the 
measure sought relates only to specific assets of the defendant located or to be located within the 
confines of the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which application is made.
744
 
 
Article 24 of the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters stipulated: 
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Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such provisional, including protective, 
measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the courts of 
another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.
745
 
The approach used by the European Court of Justice seems more practical since while it does 
not prevent the court from taking such measures, it nonetheless secures the effectiveness of 
the final judgment, and protects a winning party from any loss that may happen due to this 
measure. Even though the ECJ‘s decision only addressed the powers of national courts, it has 
created a very important approach that could easily be applied in arbitration. This approach is 
totally consistent with Article 17(E)(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006, which stipulates 
that the ‗arbitral tribunal may require the party requesting an interim measure to provide 
appropriate security in connection with the measure.‘746   
The success of the system of provisional measures relies on the arbitrators' experience in 
conducting the arbitration process.
747 
Therefore, if arbitrators succeed in ordering an interim 
payment without affecting the subject matter of the dispute and without violating the duty of 
acting fairly and impartially, the interim payment will be a kind of interim measure rather 
than a provisional remedy. However, if the tribunal feels obliged to examine the merits of the 
dispute in order to reach a decision such an application, its order could be considered a partial 
award because it was partly adjudicated on the dispute. Such an order may be regarded as a 
type of remedy, as under s.48(4) of the English Arbitration Act 1996.
748
  
In conclusion, while a provisional payment order is a very important measure that supports an 
arbitration party and secures his need for cash flow during arbitration; nonetheless the 
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tribunal should always be very careful about prejudicing the merits of the dispute by granting 
such an order.
749
 
5.3 Provisional Payment Measures under the Egyptian Arbitration Law of 1994 
5.3.1 Arbitral Tribunal Provisional Payment Order 
 
Article 24 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law says nothing about the arbitral tribunal‘s power to 
take provisional payment measures in the arbitration process and does not contain any 
classifications of such measures.
750
 The tribunal under Article 24 has no competence to take 
any measures unless the parties so agree. Once the jurisdiction is established by that 
agreement, the tribunal can grant any measures deemed necessary in the dispute including an 
interim payment order for any amount. In this vein, the free language of Article 24 is similar 
to Article 809 of the French Code of Civil Procedure that allows the judge (juge des référés) 
to grant interim measures where the parties have so agreed, without any explanation or 
limitation of such power.
751
  
Therefore, the current phrasing of Article 24 could lead to many unfortunate consequences, 
since it could be understood as giving the tribunal a wide power to take any measures without 
any limitations. Thus, the tribunal might grant a provisional payment order covering the 
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whole amount of the dispute, which may in turn affect the outcome of the dispute.
752
 
Moreover, the imprecise expression of Article 24 might lead a lack of uniformity in 
arbitration practice in Egypt, as arbitrators vary in their experience and knowledge, which 
could leads to many different interpretations of their power under this Article. 
Therefore, due to its importance and complexity, the subject of provisional payment orders 
demands special attention in Egyptian law, and might need to be addressed in more detail by 
a separate provision, as in s.39 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. Such a provision should 
empower the tribunal to make such orders (subject to the contrary agreement of the parties), 
make provision for the applicant to be asked to offer appropriate guarantees as a condition for 
granting an order, and describe the form this measure should take. It could further determine 
that the sum ordered to be paid cannot exceed, e.g. 30% or 50%, of the whole sum in dispute. 
This should clarify the matter saving much debate between tribunals and parties, and helping 
to achieve more uniformity in arbitration practice in this area.        
5.3.2 The Provisional Payment Measure (Provisional Expenses) before the 
Egyptian Court 
 
 
Article 45 of the Egyptian Civil Procedure Law 13 of 1968 authorizes the President of the 
Court of Appeal (responsible for arbitration matters) in the capacity of the urgent judge to 
take any urgent measures in arbitration disputes. Consequently, the court can grant a 
provisional payment order if the request has fulfilled the conditions for such a claim. The 
jurisdiction of the urgent judge to grant provisional expenses or an allowance order (as it is 
known under Egyptian Law) stands if three conditions have been met.
753
 The case must be 
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urgent, the required measure must be provisional and the claim should not be seriously 
disputable.
754
 These conditions are nearly the same in Article 809 (référé-provision) of the 
French Code of Civil Procedure.   
Such a request may be submitted to the Egyptian court in two ways.
755
 The first one is the 
traditional method of lodging the application with the court registry accompanied by the 
evidence supporting the request.
756
 The second is by submitting a subsidiary request to the 
executive judge when challenging the enforcement of a garnishment resolution.
757
 The stage 
of the arbitration process will determine how a party will choose to submit his request. In this 
vein, a court decision on an urgent claim in Egyptian law has only temporary authority, 
which means that the court could change its judgement if the circumstances upon which the 
request was been based have changed, or when it considers the substantive claim.
758
    
Article 288 of the Egyptian Civil Procedure Law 13 of 1968 states that ―the expedited 
execution system is compulsory without any guarantee to all urgent judgements, whatever the 
court that issued them…‖759 This means that the court‘s decision on a provisional payment 
request would be executed promptly, even if the party against whom the order was issued has 
challenged it in court.  
In conclusion, Article 24 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law does not prevent the arbitral 
tribunal from ordering a provisional payment upon a party‘s request, and does not limit its 
power to do so. Similarly, the Egyptian Civil Procedure Law has granted the court, in the 
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capacity of an urgent judge, power to take such measures as long as the case is urgent and it 
has not considered the subject matter of the dispute. 
5.4 Provisional Payment Orders under the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 
5.4.1 Orders Issued by the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 addresses the subject provisional payments in Rule 53, 
which stipulates, ―The tribunal may make a provisional award granting any relief on a 
provisional basis which it has the power to grant permanently.‖ Consequently, the tribunal 
under the Scottish Act is empowered to order a provisional payment to protect the applicant 
financially during the arbitration.
760
 Rule 53 is a default provision,
761
 which means that the 
tribunal has this power unless the parties have agreed otherwise.
762 
By contrast s.39(4) of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 makes it clear that the tribunal has no power make a provisional 
award unless the parties agree that it should.  
Unlike s.39, Rule 53 does not contain any examples explaining what provisional measures 
the tribunal can take, or outlining the extent of the tribunal's power regarding these measures. 
The Policy Memorandum does not indicate why this is so. Does the lawmaker want to leave 
the door open for the tribunal to take any provisional measure, or is it assumed that this 
power is naturally understood to be limited? In this regard, some scholars 
763
 argue that the 
provisional measures that the tribunal is entitled to take are naturally limited by remedies the 
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parties have agreed that the tribunal should have. Hence, there is no need to give any 
examples in this rule. 
  
Yet it is submitted that the Scottish lawmaker, by leaving these measures undefined, wants to 
leave the door open, especially since Rule 53 could easily followed s.39 in giving examples. 
However, the tribunal should take special care in exercising such power so as not to prejudice 
the subject matter of the dispute.
764
  
A further problem is that Rule 71(3) prohibits any challenge of a provisional award.
765
 This 
Rule confers a kind of immunity on such an award, albeit that the award is only binding until 
superseded by a final or partial award.
766
 Moreover, the prohibition of appealing against a 
provisional award might protect an award which is arrived unfairly in breach of the duty 
under Rule 24(1)(b) to treat the parties fairly, in that a party may have no right to appeal 
against an award issued at a hearing at which he was not present.
767
   
The final question here is whether the lawmaker used the term ―award‖ to stress the intention 
that a provisional award was a true award and could be enforced as such.
768
 Indeed, there is 
no indication in the Act or the Policy Memorandum suggesting otherwise, which means that a 
provisional award under the Act is intended to be recognized and enforced as an award. 
Presumably, it should be so regarded if its enforcement is sought under s.12 of the Arbitration 
(Scotland) Act 2010, but there is no guarantee that this award will be regarded as an award 
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under New York Convention if it required to be enforced elsewhere.
769
 The Queensland 
Supreme Court refused to enforce a provisional award in Resort Condominiums International 
Inc. v. Ray Bolwell noting that: 
[T]he ―arbitral award‘‘ in the Convention does not include an interlocutory order made by an arbitrator 
but only an award which finally determines the rights of the parties; i.e. one in which the arbitrator has 
already ‗‗considered‘‘ those matters and reflected his views in an award. There is no... reference to an 
interim award in the Act or the Convention. 
770
  
 
In this vein, Article 17(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 does not stipulate a particular 
form for the tribunal‘s decision in this respect. Article 17(H)(1) merely states that, ―An 
interim measure issued by an arbitral tribunal shall be recognized as binding and, unless 
otherwise provided by the arbitral tribunal, enforced upon application to the competent 
court…‖.771 That means the UNCITRAL Model Law has left the door open for every state to 
insert its own enforcement rules. 
5.4.2 Provisional Payments ordered by the Scottish Courts 
 
 
The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 grants arbitration parties conditional access to the 
national courts, the Sheriff Court or the Court of Session,
772
 to support arbitration seated in 
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Scotland.
773
 In this context Rule 46(1)(g) stipulates that the ―court has the same power in 
arbitrations as it has in civil proceedings to grant any other interim or permanent order.‖  It is 
obvious that Rule 46(1)(g) uses wide language 
774
 probably to cover any unforeseen measures 
that have not been specifically covered elsewhere in Rule 46. Might this embrace an order for 
provisional payment? 
Accordingly, a party can resort to the court to request a provisional payment order under Rule 
46(1)(g) of Arbitration Act. However if the application is made once the arbitration has 
begun, the case must be considered urgent or the tribunal must consent to the application.
775
 
There are no restrictions under Rule 46 regarding the amount of the payment order. Hence the 
court has a wide discretionary power and may order the payment of the whole sum in 
dispute.
776
 In dealing with s.44 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, Clarke L.J observed in 
Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Limited held ‗I cannot see that there is anything in the 
subsection or the Act which deprives the court of the power to make an order which it thinks 
is necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets.‘777 Since Rule 46 is the 
counterpart of s.44, the Cetelem‘s decision is persuasive in a Scottish context.  
However, Rule 46 of the Act does not address whether the court could request any guarantees 
from a party before acceding to his requests.
778
 Yet there is nothing in Rule 46 that prevents 
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the court from seeking caution to secure the effectiveness of the final award, or to protect a 
winning party‘s right to reimbursement.779   
In conclusion, the arbitral tribunal under Rule 53 and the court under Rule 46 can grant an 
interim payment order upon a party‘s request. 
 
5.5 Provisional Payment Orders under the English Arbitration Act 1996 
5.5.1 Provisional Payment Ordered by the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
Section 39 of the English Arbitration Act gives the arbitral tribunal the power to order 
provisional payment if the arbitration parties have agreed to confer such power on it.
780
 
Unless the parties so agree, the arbitral tribunal has no such power.
781
 Section 39 clearly 
addresses grey areas previously surrounding provisional payment orders. Firstly, it has 
recognised the tribunal‘s power to grant provisional measures – when previously it was 
incompetent to take such measures –782 as long as arbitration parties have so agreed. 
Secondly, it gives several examples of provisional measures that may be taken in arbitration 
disputes to show the tribunal‘s limits in this regard, the clearest indication of the limits of its 
power being the parties‘ agreement.783  
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Thirdly, s.39 has accentuated the temporary nature of the measure pending the making of the 
final award 
784
 by providing that ―any such order shall be subject to the tribunal's final 
adjudication.‖785 Fourthly, even though the heading of s. 39 is titled ―Provisional Award‖, the 
DAC Report 
786
 and the rest of s.39 make it clear that provisional measures would be treated 
as orders not awards.
787
 In this regard, it is unclear whether such provisional orders subject to 
appeal or challenge.
788
 Since only awards are open to challenge, if such measures are truly 
orders, they cannot be challenged. Nothing in ss.67, 68, 69 or 70(2) (the provisions dealing 
with challenges) relate to such orders. Therefore, some scholars argue that any appeal in such 
cases should be submitted to the tribunal itself.
789
 This suggestion seems more practical as the 
party will go directly to the tribunal that issued the order to review it, which means the 
tribunal will have another chance to review its order with more care.
790
 This will also save 
time. Moreover, this proposal seems more consistent with the tribunal‘s duty under s.33(1)(a) 
to give ―each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his 
opponent‖.  
 
In conclusion, the arbitral tribunal under the English Arbitration Act can order a provisional 
payment upon a party‘s request. Moreover, the limit of the amount of the order under s.39 
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will rely on the agreement of the parties, and the tribunal is obliged not to exceed it. Hence, 
the tribunal is free to grant any amount in its order – even the whole amount in dispute – as 
long as it is empowered to do so.    
5.5.2 Provisional Payment Ordered by the English Court 
 
Section 44 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 gives the court wide powers to take 
provisional measures including ordering the interim payments. Section 44(1) gives the court 
the same power to make orders in the matters that listed in s.44 (2) as it has in legal 
proceedings. 
Section 44 does not contain any direct mention of power to order provisional payment. Yet s. 
44(3) provides that: ―If the case is one of urgency, the court may, on the application of a party 
or proposed party to the arbitral proceedings, make such orders as it thinks necessary for the 
purpose of preserving evidence or assets.‖ That means that a party can apply for a provisional 
payment order on the basis of urgency, and the court can grant such measure as long as it 
thinks it is necessary. Moreover, a party could rely on Rule 25(1)(k) of the CPR, which 
stipulates:  
The court may grant the following interim remedies-… an order (referred to as an order for interim 
payment) under Rule25.6 for payment by a defendant on account of any damages, debt or other sum 
(except costs) which the court may hold the defendant liable to pay.  
The English Arbitration Act 1996 has allowed arbitration parties to resort to the court, but has 
made this facility exceptional, available in very limited cases.
791
 Hence, if the court is 
satisfied that the application has met its conditions of jurisdiction, it will grant the provisional 
payment order; otherwise it will not do so.  
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Yet the final determination on a provisional payment order may be for the arbitral tribunal, as 
the court may allow it to decide whether the order should cease to have effect.
792
 Section 
44(6) of the Act stipulates that: 
If the court so orders, an order made by it under this section shall cease to have effect in whole or in 
part on the order of the tribunal or of any such arbitral or other institution or person having power to act 
in relation to the subject matter of the order. 
 
It is submitted that this is one of the most interesting provision of the Act 1996. It solved the 
problem of the overlap of powers between the arbitral tribunal and the court in respect of 
provisional measures in a smooth way. This section is clearly premised on the idea that court 
intervention in arbitration is exceptional, and the main power should remain in the tribunal. 
Thus, wherever possible, the final adjudication of any issues should be by the arbitral 
tribunal.
793
  
 
In conclusion, the subject of the Provisional Payment Order has been more carefully 
addressed in the English Arbitration Act, which has clearly illustrated the basis of such power 
and has clearly designated it as an opt in power. It has given many examples of such 
measures, and has finally described the tribunal‘s decision as an order to forestall debates in 
this regard. Furthermore, s.44 has made clear that the arbitral tribunal has the final word in 
any procedures related to the subject matter of the dispute.  
5.6 Conclusion 
 
After a careful consideration of provisional payment orders under Egyptian, Scottish, and 
English arbitration law, it can be concluded that: 
                                                 
792
 DAC Report Feb 1996, para 216.  
793
 DAC Report Feb 1996, para 216 
212 
 
5.6.1 Egyptian Law 
 There is no particular provision under this law addressing this measure, which means 
that there are no rules or examples illustrating the tribunal‘s power in respect of the 
amount of such order.  
 There is no indication of the legal nature of the tribunal's order. Should it be 
classified and enforced as an order or as an award? 
 It is not clear under this law whether the tribunal can look over the court's order 
(reviewing or set it aside), does tribunal provisional payment orders subject to 
challenge? And if so, does the challenge would be before the tribunal or before the 
court?  
In this regard, Article 52 (1) of EAL stipulates that ‗Arbitral awards rendered in accordance 
with the provisions of this Law may not be challenged by any of the means of recourse 
provided for in the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures.‘794   
There is no answer for these questions under the law. For such reasons, Egyptian Arbitration 
Law needs to adopt a new provision that clarifies such issues. In this vein, s.39 of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 would be a good model for such a provision because it has covers most 
of the above points. 
5.6.2 The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 
 
Although the text of Rule 53 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 is better than the 
Egyptian law, it still leaves a few Arbitration doubts regarding provisional payment orders: 
 There are no examples in Rule 53 illustrating the tribunal‘s power in this regard, 
which may cause some confusion about the meaning and limits of such power. 
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 Rule 71(3) prevents the challenge of provisional awards – an immunization of a 
temporary action that could lead to a breach of the tribunal‘s duties under Rule 24 of 
the Act, especially because Rule 71 is mandatory, and cannot be excluded. 
 Even though Scotland has recognised a provisional payment order as an award, there 
are some doubts about whether such a foreign provisional award ‗order‘ would be 
enforced in Scotland as an award. In other words, What if the tribunal used 
expression ‗order‘ rather than 'award'? What are the criteria that will make these 
decisions subject to enforcement? Do these criteria rely on the description applied to 
such decisions or do they rely on the subject of the decision regardless of the legal 
description?
795
  
Therefore, it seems from the foregoing points that Scottish lawmakers may need to reconsider 
Rule 53 to clarify any grey areas that may cause problems for the future of arbitration in 
Scotland. 
5.6.3 The English Arbitration Act 
 
The only criticism that could be directed to the English Arbitration Act is that the title of s. 39 
that uses the term ―Award‖ but actually means ‗order‘. Hence, it would be better if this point 
were clarified to prevent any misunderstanding, especially for arbitration practitioners from 
non-common law backgrounds. 
 
 
                                                 
795
 The question here is whether such an 'award' would be enforced outside Scotland? The answer of such 
question will vary since it depends on the understanding of every state to New York Convention, and the 
meaning of the Arbitral Award under Article (I) of this convention. See earlier para 1.1.4 Order or Award in 
Chapter 1. 
214 
 
Chapter 6  
6.1 Anti-Suit Injunctions  
6.1.1 Preamble  
 
Do anti-suit injunctions properly fall to be regarded as interim measures? This author 
suggests that they do. Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model law 2006 lists many interim 
measures that the arbitral tribunal can take in arbitration disputes. An anti-suit injunction is 
one of the measures that has been investigated very carefully by the Working Groups.
796
 The 
UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration) in its Forty-first session stated that: 
The Working Group heard diverging views on the question of whether paragraph (2) of Article 17 
could be interpreted as encompassing the power of an arbitral tribunal to order an anti-suit injunction 
(A/CN.9/547, paras. 75-83).After discussion, the Working Group agreed to amend subparagraph (b) of 
paragraph (2) to clarify that anti-suit injunctions were included in the definition of interim measures of 
protection.
797
 
 
Thus after extensive discussions and deliberations, the UNCITRAL Working Group agreed 
that anti-suit injunctions were included in the definition of interim measures of protection.  
 
Such injunctions forbid a party from pursuing litigation outside the arbitration.
798
 Thus, it 
provides an urgent protection to the arbitration process like other interim measures.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
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It seems that the basis of this measure in urgency and its purpose of protecting the arbitration 
process
799
 were the key elements in its adoption by the Model Law. 
 
Recently, Article 17(2)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 has recognized the power of 
the arbitral tribunal itself to grant an anti-suit injunction and thus prevent action which could 
cause harm or prejudice to the arbitral process.
800
 Article 26(2)(b) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 2010 is to the same effect. Consequently, many courts in civil law 
jurisdictions have showed their willingness to enforce anti-suit injunctions.
801
 The French 
Cour de Cassation in In Zone Brands International Inc v In Beverage International opined 
that ‗An anti-suit injunction the object of which, outside the scope of conventions or 
Community law, was only, as in the present case, to sanction the breach of a pre-existing 
contractual obligation, was not contrary to French international public policy.‘802 
 
Notwithstanding the recognition of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 that the anti-suit 
injunction is an interim measure, debates about whether it is an interim measure persist, in 
particular after the later decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Allianz SpA v. 
West Tankers Inc.
803
  However, this chapter aims to examine the anti-suit injunction in some 
detail, in light of the ECJ‘s decisions, to reach a conclusion on whether this relief is an 
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interim measure. Yet, before doing so, an examination of the historical background of the 
measure could be of benefit.    
 
6.1.2 Anti-Suit Injunction Historical Background 
 
Arbitration system derives from the parties‘ agreement; therefore, any breach of the 
agreement to arbitrate would tend to undermine the whole arbitration regime. Consequently, 
any litigation on the substance of the dispute is impliedly forbidden or suspended until the 
final award is made. To secure the effectiveness of arbitration at least one legal system found 
it necessary to devise a tool that compels the parties to carry out their undertakings to 
arbitrate.
804
  In Bushby v Munday 
805
 an English court has applied for the first time a new tool 
(known later as the Anti-Suit injunction) to preclude one party from litigating in the courts of 
another country (Scotland).
806
 Sir John Leach stated that: 
This court has full authority to act upon them [the parties] personally with respect to the subject of the 
suit as the ends of justice require, and, with that view, to order them to take, or to omit to take, any 
steps and proceedings in any other court of justice, whether in this country or in a foreign 
country…This authority is ordinarily found fully adequate to the purposes of justice.
807  
The use of the anti-suit injunction by the English courts increased gradually; particularly after 
the fusion of the English Courts of Law and Equity by the Jurisdiction Acts of 1873 and 
1875.
808
 The English courts‘ power to grant anti-suit injunctions was clearly recognised in 
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Cohen v. Rothfield.
809
 The Court of Appeal considered that oppressive and vexatious 
litigation before a foreign authority was a suitable ground to grant an injunction to stop the 
proceedings,
810
 although Scrutton L.J. emphasized that ―this power should be exercised with 
great caution to avoid even the appearance of undue interference with another court.‖811  
Scrutton L.J. clarified the basis for issuing such an injunction in Ellerman Lines Ltd v Read
812
 
where he observed that: 
The English courts ...of course they do not grant an injunction restraining the foreign court from acting; 
they have no possible power to grant such an injunction, but they can grant an injunction to restrain the 
British subject, who is fraudulently breaking his contract, and who is a party to an action before them, 
from making applications to a foreign court for the purpose of obtaining the fruits of a fraudulent 
breach of contract.  
Over time, the usage of anti-suit injunction extended from England to Scotland, Northern 
Ireland,
813
 and then many places around the world, particularly to common law systems.
814
 
For example, Lee Seiu Kin J.C., in the Singapore High Court in WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v 
Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka noted that: 
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Once this court is satisfied that there is an arbitration agreement, it has a duty to uphold that agreement 
and prevent any breach of it. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the anti-suit injunction should be 
continued until further order.
815
 
The English legal system developed the fundamental principles underpinning and the criteria 
for granting anti-suit injunctions through a great deal of case law and statutory provisions.
816
 
Section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, as a main source of the courts‘ power, gives the 
court a general power to grant an injunction in all cases in which it appeared just and 
convenient to do so.
817
 Moreover, the case law has played a significant role in the 
development of this remedy. One of the most important cases is Societe Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak;
 818
 where Lord Goff established the basic principles 
that govern the granting of anti-suit injunctions, saying: 
The law relating to injunctions restraining a party from commencing or pursuing legal proceedings in a 
foreign jurisdiction has a long history, stretching back at least as far as the early nineteenth century. 
From an early stage certain basic principles emerged which are now beyond dispute. 
1-The jurisdiction is to be exercised when the ―ends of justice‖ required it. 
2-the court‘s order is not directed the foreign court but it is against one of the parties.  
3-An injunction may only be issued restraining a party who is amendable to the jurisdiction of 
the court, against whom an injunction would be an effective remedy. 
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4-Since such an order indirectly affects the foreign court, the jurisdiction is one which has to 
be exercised with caution.
 
 
 
The English courts have continued to develop the governing principles of anti-suit injunctions 
cases such as Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA 
819
 Starlight Shipping 
Co and another v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd,
820
 and AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower 
Plant LLC v Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC.
821
  
 
6.1.3 Definition of Anti-Suit Injunction  
 
 
An anti-suit injunction is an order restraining a party from commencing or pursuing 
proceedings before a foreign court.
822
 Some scholars define it as an order of the court 
requiring the defendant not to commence or to cease to pursue; or not to advance particular 
claims within, or take steps to terminate or suspend, court or arbitration proceedings in a 
foreign country.
823 
In the arbitration arena, the anti-suit injunctions are defined as an order 
operating in personam which are aimed at preventing or restraining proceedings in courts in 
breach of an arbitration agreement.
824
 
 
 
It is obvious that all these definitions have a common characteristic which is that the anti-suit 
injunction is an order to stop or suspend any proceedings before foreign courts in breach of 
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the parties‘ agreement. This remedy aims to reinforce the effectiveness of arbitration 
agreement,
825
 by preventing a party from resorting to courts in breach of arbitral tribunal's 
jurisdiction to consider the dispute. Whatever the definition of such measure, its aim remains 
very important to protect arbitration process.
826
 Yet the remedy has triggered a lot of debates 
between scholars, and engendered conflict between judgements. 
 
6.1.4 Anti-Suit Injunction on Balance 
 
 
The anti-suit injunction is one of the most controversial measures whether in the international 
commercial arbitration 
827
 or domestic law,
828
 because it impinges on many sensitive issues, 
such as Public International Law and state sovereignty,
829
 human rights, and the right of 
access to the court.
830
 
 
There are many arguments that support the granting of the anti-suit injunction, and consider it 
a panacea for stopping any attempt to break an arbitration agreement.
831
  On the other hand, 
some believe that the granting of such injunction considers a kind of infringement to the 
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foreign court‘s jurisdiction to investigate the case before it. The author of this thesis submits 
that an anti-suit injunction is a good tool to protect arbitration process. However the way that 
this remedy is employed may need to be reconsidered in order  to make it more acceptable in 
arbitration practice.  
 
However, the current chapter will examine both views in detail to highlight the pros and cons 
of this remedy in order to come to a conclusion. Attention will be giving to the judgement of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Allianz SpA v West Tankers,
832
 that especially as the 
ECJ's Advocate General (the A.G.) has discussed the key arguments regarding this remedy. 
 
6.1.4.1 Allianz SpA v West Tankers Case 
 
In August 2000 the Front Comor, a vessel owned by West Tankers and chartered by Erg 
Petroli SpA ('Erg'), collided in Syracuse (Italy) with a jetty owned by Erg and caused 
damage. The charterparty was governed by English law and contained a clause providing for 
arbitration in London. Erg claimed compensation from its insurers Allianz and Generali up to 
the limit of its insurance cover and commenced arbitration proceedings in London against 
West Tankers for the excess. West Tankers denied liability for the damage caused by the 
collision. Having paid Erg compensation under the insurance policies for the loss it had 
suffered, Allianz and Generali brought proceedings on the 30
th
 July 2003 against West 
Tankers before the Tribunale di Siracusa (Italy) in order to recover the sums they had paid to 
Erg. The action was based on their statutory right of subrogation to Erg's claims, in 
accordance with Article 1916 of the Italian Civil Code. West Tankers raised an objection of 
lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the existence of the arbitration agreement. 
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In parallel, West Tankers brought proceedings, on the 10
th
 September 2004, before the 
English High Court, seeking a declaration that the dispute was to be settled by arbitration 
pursuant to the arbitration agreement. West Tankers also sought an injunction restraining 
Allianz and Generali from pursuing any proceedings other than arbitration and requiring them 
to discontinue the proceedings commenced before the Tribunale di Siracusa ('the anti-suit 
injunction'). 
The court granted the anti-suit injunction, a judgment confirmed by the Court of Appeal. 
However, Allianz and Generali appealed to the House of Lords, arguing that the grant of such 
an injunction was contrary to Brussels Regulation No 44/2001.
833
 The House of Lords noted 
that the ECJ in the cases of Gasser 
834
 and Turner 
835
 had decided that an injunction 
restraining a party from commencing, or continuing proceedings in a court of a Member State 
of the European Union was not compatible with the system established by Brussels 
Regulation No 44/2001. That is because the regulation provides a complete set of uniform 
rules on the allocation of jurisdiction between the courts of the Member States of the 
European Union, which must trust each other to apply those rules correctly. However, the 
House of Lords continued that that principle could not be extended to arbitration, which is 
completely excluded from the scope of the Regulation by virtue of Article 1(2) (d). 
Nonetheless, their Lordships decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following 
question to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:  
‗Whether it is incompatible with Brussels Regulation No 44/2001 for a court of a Member 
State (European Union) to make an order to restrain a person from commencing or continuing 
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proceedings before the courts of another Member State (European Union) on the ground that 
such proceedings would be contrary to an arbitration agreement, even though Article 1(2)(d) 
of the Regulation excludes arbitration from the scope thereof.‘ 
Before considering the ECJ‘s answer to that question, it looks more closely at two cases 
mentioned above - Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl  
836
 and Turner v Grovit.
837 
In Gasser the ECJ held that: 
The court second seised must stay proceedings of its own motion until the jurisdiction of the court first 
seised has been established and, where it is so established, must decline jurisdiction in favour of the 
latter… Moreover, the court second seised is never in a better position than the court first seised to 
determine whether the latter has jurisdiction [or no]…It must be borne in mind that the Brussels 
Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to each other's legal 
systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust... which all the courts within the purview of the 
Convention are required to respect.
838
  
The forgoing statement implicitly showed the reservations of the ECJ towards anti-suit 
injunctions, suggesting that the anti-suit injunction contradicts the principle of mutual trust 
between the courts of EU Member States. 
 
The ECJ in Turner v Grovit was even more explicit in saying: 
The Brussels Convention precludes the court of a Contracting State from granting an injunction 
prohibiting a party to proceedings before it from commencing or continuing legal proceedings before a 
court in another Contracting State, even where that party is acting in bad faith in order to frustrate the 
existing proceedings. 
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The Convention is based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to one another's legal systems 
and judicial institutions, and does not permit the jurisdiction of a court to be reviewed by a court in 
another Contracting State except in special circumstances which were not relevant in the present case. 
An injunction prohibiting a claimant from bringing an action in a foreign court constitutes interference 
with the jurisdiction of the foreign court which, as such, is incompatible with the system of the 
Convention. Such interference cannot be justified by the fact that it is intended to prevent an abuse of 
process. The judgment made as to the abusive nature of bringing proceedings before the court of 
another Member State implies an assessment as to the appropriateness of bringing proceedings before a 
court of another State which runs counter to the principle of mutual trust.
839
 
The ECJ had thus clearly shown a tendency to reject anti-suit injunctions. This paved the way 
for the case of Allianz SpA v West Tankers where the ECJ ruled explicitly that;  
It is incompatible with Regulation No 44/2001 for a court of a Member State to make an order to 
restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings before the courts of another Member 
State on the ground that such proceedings would be contrary to an arbitration agreement.
840
 
The court in this case examined the following arguments in favour of granting of anti-suit 
injunctions -      
6.1.4.2 Arbitration matters fall outside the scope of Brussels Regulation No 44/2001.841 
 
English courts have regarded anti-suit injunctions as not incompatible with Brussels 
Regulation No 44/2001 because Article 1(2)(d) thereof excludes arbitration from its scope of 
application. Article 1(2)(d) stipulates: 
1. This Regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or 
tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters. 
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2. The Regulation shall not apply to: 
(d) Arbitration. 
Hence, the granting of an anti-suit injunction does not breach the rules allocating jurisdiction 
between the courts of the EU Member States. Lord Hoffmann opined in the House of Lords 
in West Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA:
842
 
The proceedings now before the House are entirely to protect the contractual right to have the dispute 
determined by arbitration. Accordingly, they fall outside the Regulation and cannot be inconsistent 
with its provisions. The arbitration agreement lies outside the system of allocation of court jurisdictions 
which the Regulation creates. There is no dispute that, under the Regulation. 
 
6.1.4.2.1 ECJ’s Answer 
 
The ECJ took the view that, in order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of 
Regulation No, 44/2001 or not, reference must be made to the subject matter of the dispute 
rather than how the rights in the dispute are determined. Thus if the subject matter of the 
dispute was a claim for damages, it would fall within the scope of the Regulation No 
44/2001, as would such subsidiary matters as the applicability and validity of an arbitration 
agreement. Consequently, the courts of member states have the right to examine the validity 
of an arbitration agreement as a preliminary issue to determine their jurisdiction.
843
 The ECJ 
seems to have adopted an auxiliary norm to expand the scope of the Regulation to embrace 
arbitration disputes. It held: 
Even though proceedings do not come within the scope of Brussels Regulation No 44/2001, they may 
nevertheless have consequences which undermine its effectiveness, namely preventing the attainment 
of the objectives of unification of the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters 
and the free movement of decisions in those matters. This is so, inter alia, where such proceedings 
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prevent a court of another Member State from exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it by Brussels 
Regulation No 44/2001. 
Hence, according to this justification, Regulation No 44/2001 applies to arbitration disputes. 
 
6.1.4.3 The anti-suit injunction and the personam effect  
 
 
Some scholars argue that the anti-suit injunction only targets in personam 
844
 a party who has 
started proceedings before a foreign court in breach of an arbitration agreement. Therefore, 
this remedy does not infringe the jurisdiction of the foreign court in any way. The 
Chancellor‘s Court in Bushby v Munday 845 in granting the remedy opined that ‗this court has 
not, nor can pretend to have, any authority whatsoever‘ over a foreign court. More recently, 
the Privy Council in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak observed that 
that „the court's approach is to be cautious in granting an injunction because it may interfere 
with a foreign process, although the injunction is directed against the particular party and not 
the foreign court.‘846 Nonetheless, it affirmed the right of an English court to grant such an 
injunction. 
6.1.4.3.1 ECJ’s Answer 
 
The ECJ rejected this argument, taking the view that an anti-suit injunction, by its very 
nature, is a kind of interference with the jurisdiction of foreign courts. In relation to the courts 
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of Member States, this is contrary to the general principle of the Brussels Convention 
847
 that 
the court first seised itself determines whether it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute before 
it.
848
 In addition, the ECJ added that there is no court of one Member State in a better position 
to determine whether the court of another Member State has jurisdiction to consider any 
dispute. The in personam argument is sheer sophistry; since barring a party from resort to a 
foreign court effectively determines whether the court will hear the case.
849
 The English court 
themselves recognize that anti-suit injunctions affects in some way the jurisdiction of the 
foreign court.
850
 The court in Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel remarked that ―the English forum 
should have a sufficient interest in, or connection with, the matter in question to justify the 
indirect interference with the foreign court which an anti-suit injunction entails.‖851 One 
scholar has argued that ‗by their nature and purposes, anti-suit injunctions are disruptive of 
the coexistence of, and cooperation between judicial and arbitral institutions around the 
globe.‘852    
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6.1.4.4 Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Principle of Comity  
 
Some English scholars insist that the notion of comity justifies such injunctions.
853
 The 
Regulation‘s purpose is to facilitate cooperation between the EU Member States, which 
purpose was disregarded by the ECJ in the West Tankers case.
854
 Longmore L.J. elucidated 
this approach in OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corporation 
855
 in stating that: 
It goes without saying that any court should pay respect to another (foreign) court but, if the parties 
have actually agreed that a foreign court is to have sole jurisdiction over any dispute, the true role of 
comity is to ensure that the parties' agreement is respected. Whatever country it is to the courts of 
which the parties have agreed to submit their disputes is the country to which comity is due.
 
 
6.1.4.4.1 Answer 
The principle of comity in the international relationships should not be enforced by a 
unilateral order from a foreign court, even if the aim behind this order is protecting party 
autonomy in the shape of an arbitration agreement. In this regard, Sir Peter Gross has said 
that ―English courts are not unaware of, or insensitive to, the potential for offence when 
granting anti-suit injunctions relating to the pursuit of proceedings in convention [Brussels] 
or regulation jurisdictions.‖ 856 
Therefore, the principle of comity first requires mutual respect between different courts.
857
 
Such a question should be addressed by a bilateral treaty which outlines the basis and 
conditions for such judicial cooperation. Only under such a treaty will an anti-suit injunction 
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be acceptable to enforce by a foreign court.
858
 The Court of Appeal said in A Ltd v B Bank 
that: 
Comity is observed in recognition of the mutuality of the obligations that states undertake towards each 
other. It is in the interests of comity that the courts of one state will abstain from sitting in judgement 
upon the internal affairs of another.
859 
 
Thus, the issue of an anti-suit injunction without the existence of such treaty can be 
considered as an infringement of the judicial sovereignty of the foreign court, which is 
difficult to reconcile with the principle of territorial sovereignty in Public International 
Law.
860
 Taney C.J. opined in Hilton v Guyot 
861
 that '[comity] is the voluntary act of the 
nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy or prejudicial to 
its interests‘. Wheaton J added: 
No sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to execute within his dominions a judgment 
rendered by the tribunals of another state.; and, if execution be sought by suit upon the judgment or 
otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is brought, or from which execution is sought, is, on principle, 
at liberty to examine into the merits of such judgment, and to give effect to it or not, as may be found 
just and equitable.
862
 
The absence of such a treaty between England and Germany may be the reason behind the 
refusal of a German court to notify the claimants of the anti-suit injunction that was issued by 
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the English court in Phillip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd v Bamberger case.
863
 The 
German court held that: 
Such injunctions constitute a violation of the judicial sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
because German courts themselves decide exclusively, on the basis of the law of procedure applicable 
to them and binding international treaties, whether they have jurisdiction to decide a case or whether 
they have to respect the jurisdiction of another German or foreign court (including arbitral tribunals). 
Foreign courts cannot give instructions, whether and to what extent a German court or may act in a 
given case.
864
        
To avoid such situations Rix L.J. in Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Co Ltd advised that 
‗considerations of comity should have in any event caused the English Court to pause long 
and hard before granting an injunction in such a case.‘865 
 
6.1.4.5 An Anti-Suit Injunction is Consistent with Modern and International Law  
 
Supporters of anti-suit injunctions argue that modern international law recognises that courts 
may exercise jurisdiction over the acts of foreigners in foreign states, as long as there is a 
sufficiently close connection which justifies this interference.
866
 This view states that, as long 
as there is a strong connection between the originating court and the pursuit of litigation 
abroad the issue of an anti-suit injunction would be justified.
867
 In addition, the notion of the 
infringement of the rules of Public International Law by anti-suit injunctions has been 
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abandoned by many international bodies.
868
 The French Cour de Cassation in In Zone Brands 
International Inc v In Beverage International overrode this principle and held that: 
An anti-suit injunction granted by an American court was enforceable in France where the American 
and French parties' agreement had given jurisdiction to the American court. Such an injunction was not 
contrary to French international public order when it was outside the scope of conventions or 
Community law and its object was only to sanction the breach of a pre-existing contractual 
obligation.
869
 
6.1.4.5.1 The Answer 
 
There is no doubt that the public international law recognises the principle of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over certain foreign acts. Yet this is not an absolute right, and is in fact 
circumscribed by the rules of international law themselves. Indeed, this principle is relied on 
many international rules, such as the principle of Reciprocity, 
870
 or the existence of bilateral 
treaties providing for the basis of such cooperation between sovereign states. Moreover, for a 
Rule of customary international law to be binding, it must receive the consent of most 
members of the international community, which has not happened with anti-suit 
injunctions.
871
   
6.1.4.6 Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Right to a Fair Trial (Denial of Justice) 
 
Thomas Raphael argues that an anti-suit injunction does not infringe the right to access to the 
court mentioned in Article 6 (Right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Human 
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Rights (ECHR).
872
 Rather it prevents a party from choosing a specific court (the state of the 
court of the proceedings restrained), while allowing the party to be heard in the courts of the 
state in which a court granted the injunction.
873
 The Commercial Court in O T Africa Line Ltd 
v Hijazy 
874
 upheld this opinion and observed that “Article 6 of the Human Rights 
Convention did not provide that a person was to have an unfettered choice of tribunal in 
which to pursue or defend his civil rights.‖ Moreover, the right of access to the court in 
Article 6 is open to contractual waiver by the parties. When they agree upon an exclusive 
forum clause an arbitration clause, they waive the right of access to certain courts.
875
 Thus, 
there is no infringement of the right of access to the court.
876
 The European Court of Human 
Rights in Deweer v Belgium 
877
 held that  
In the Contracting States' domestic legal systems, a waiver of this kind is frequently encountered both 
in civil matters, notably in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts…The waiver, which has 
undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not 
in principle offend against the Convention. 
6.1.4.6.1 The Answer 
 
Article 6 of the ECHR grants an individual the right to access to the courts without 
restriction. Thus, a person can resort to any court to protect his right, and restriction of that 
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right may be regarded as a violation of international public policy.
878
 A.G. Kokott argued in 
the Allianz case that anti-suit injunctions contravene Article 6,
 
while the ECJ in the same case 
noted that ‗The litigant could be deprived of a form of judicial protection to which it is 
entitled…the litigant could be barred from access to the court.‘879 Moreover, why should the 
court issuing the injunction, the court second seised, consider the dispute rather than the court 
first seised? What gives it preference? Bowen L.J remarked in Peruvian Guano Co. v. 
Bockwoldt that, 
It seems to me that we have no sort of right, moral or legal, to take away from a plaintiff any real 
chance he may have of an advantage. If there is a fair possibility that he may have an advantage by 
prosecuting a suit in two countries why should this Court interfere and deprive him of it? 
880
 
Professor, Julian D.M. Lew says ‗the main role of the national court is protecting the interests 
of the litigants, and it should never turn its back on its own nationals, because its main 
interest is to look after them.‘881  
Hence, on this view, anti-suit injunctions violate fundamental rights protected in international 
law, and any restriction on the right of access to the court under Article 6 could constitute a 
denial of justice.
882
 So as not to empty the arbitration clause of impact, while preserving a 
party‘s right of from access to the court, these rights should be balanced by indicating that a 
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party can resort to the courts only where there are allegations related to the existence or 
validity of the arbitration agreement.  
 
6.1.4.7 Anti-suit Injunctions and the Principle of Mutual Trust 
 
The EC Justice in Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl held that: 
The Commission states that the Brussels Convention is based on mutual trust and on the equivalence of 
the courts of the Contracting States and establishes a binding system of jurisdiction which all the courts 
within the purview of the Convention are required to observe…It is that mutual trust which has enabled 
a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview of the 
Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the right to apply 
their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified 
mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. It is also common ground that the 
Convention thereby seeks to ensure legal certainty by allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient 
certainty which court will have jurisdiction.
883
 
The ECJ has assured that the right of the courts of Members States to examine their own 
jurisdiction without any interference from any other state will be upheld,
884
 and has affirmed 
that anti-suit injunctions violate one of Brussels Convention principles, the principle of 
‗mutual trust‘ between Members States. How in this union can a second seised court think 
itself superior to the extent of telling a first seised court what its job is? 
885
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Some argue that the anti-suit injunction is made against the party found be breaching its 
contract to arbitrate, not against the other court.
886
 However, there is no doubt that the anti-
suit injunction at least indirectly interferes with the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
887
 Lord 
Brandon in South Carolina Insurance Co v Assurantie Maatschappij 'de Zeven Provincien' 
NV accepted this view noting that; 
The third basic principle is that among the forms of injunction which the High Court has power to grant 
is an injunction granted to one party to an action to restrain the other party to it from beginning, or if he 
has begun from continuing, proceedings against the former in a foreign court. Such jurisdiction is, 
however, to be exercised with caution because it involves indirect interference with the process of the 
foreign court concerned.
888
  
Moreover, an anti-suit injunction makes the enjoining court appear that it knows better and 
that the foreign court cannot be trusted or is not qualified to consider the dispute.
889
 Thus, 
anti-suit injunctions run counter to the principle of the mutual trust at the heart of the Brussels 
Convention and violate the jurisdiction of the foreign court. 
6.1.4.8 Anti-Suit Injunction and New York Convention  
 
Article II (3) of the New York Convention stipulates that: 
The court of a Contracting state, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties 
have made an agreement within the meaning of this Article, at the request of one of the parties, refer 
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the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed. 
Supporters of anti-suit injunctions regard Article II of the Convention as reinforcing their 
position, as it allows a court to grant an injunction to prevent any breach of the arbitration 
agreement by the parties.
890
 Moreover, the granting of an anti-suit injunction may help the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, as any such award would surely be enforced in the 
jurisdiction of the enjoining court. Given that this court has already recognized the arbitration 
process, it will not later refuse what it has already recognized. Thus, the granting of this 
remedy will make this court more ready to enforce the award. If the second seised court 
refused to grant an anti-suit injunction, it is likely to refuse to enforce the arbitration award 
since a court judgment on the issue may well exist at the same time.
891
 Therefore, the 
granting of anti-suit injunctions is consistent with the purposes of the New York Convention. 
In this regard, some jurists 
892
 believe that there is one case where an anti-suit injunction 
should always be granted to uphold the arbitration agreement – where the parties specify that 
the subject matter and validity of arbitration agreement will be governed by the law of the 
seat of arbitration. In this case, an anti-suit injunction will have minimal impact on foreign 
sovereignty.
893
  
6.1.4.8.1 The Answer 
 
The wording of Article II (3) of the New York Convention says nothing regarding provisional 
measures. It just deals with the arbitration agreement and the enforceability of the arbitration 
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award. Article II obliges contracting states to stay court proceedings in favour of arbitration, 
and asks them to refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
894
 The provision does not empower a 
specific court to examine validity or scope of the arbitration agreement.
895
 Therefore, it may 
be inferred that the court first seised deserves to be allowed to consider arguments related to 
the validity of the arbitration agreement, before deciding whether to refer the parties to an 
arbitral tribunal.
896
 Should a conflict of jurisdiction arise between EU courts, Articles 27 and 
28 of Regulation No. 44/2001 will solve this issue and ensure that there is coordination 
between these courts.
897
  
As for the assumption an anti-suit injunction facilitates the enforcement of the arbitral award, 
this seems like a case where unlawful means are used to achieve a lawful end. Article V of 
New York Convention has determined explicitly the grounds on which enforcement of the 
arbitral award may be refused, and failure to grant an anti-suit injunction is not one of them. 
Any refusal of enforcement on grounds other than those mentioned in Article V would be a 
breach of the Convention. Therefore, some scholars think that anti-suit injunctions are 
inconsistent with the spirit of the New York Convention and with the obligations of States 
under this convention.
898
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6.1.4.9 Other Aspects of Anti-Suit Injunctions 
6.1.4.9.1 Economic Interests 
 
Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords West Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta 
SpA obnserved that:  
Professor Schlosser rightly comments that if other Member States wish to attract arbitration business, 
they might do well to offer similar remedies…Finally, it should be noted that the European Community 
is engaged not only with regulating commerce between Member States but also in competing with the 
rest of the world. If the Member States of the European Community are unable to offer a seat of 
arbitration capable of making orders restraining parties from acting in breach of the arbitration 
agreement, there is no shortage of other states which will. For example, New York, Bermuda and 
Singapore are also leading centres of arbitration and each of them exercises the jurisdiction which is 
challenged in this appeal. There seems to me to be no doctrinal necessity or practical advantage which 
requires the European Community handicap itself by denying its courts the right to exercise the same 
jurisdiction.
899
 
Lord Hoffmann is thus suggesting that a major benefit of anti-suit injunctions is the fostering 
of the economic interests of London and perhaps the EU in general. He believes that the 
availability of anti-suit injunctions is a significant element in persuading parties to arbitrate in 
London, and without the availability of this remedy London would lose its position as a 
leading centre in the settlement of arbitration disputes. Therefore, the protection of arbitration 
agreements is not the main reason for granting anti-suit injunctions. Rather it is a subsidiary 
issue used as excuse to override the sovereignty of foreign courts. 
If that is so, should the economic interests of London be allowed to prevail over the 
sovereignty of foreign courts? The Advocate General‘s answer to this is that ―aims of a 
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purely economic nature cannot justify infringements of Community law.‖ 900 The ECJ has 
taken the view that the protection of the sovereignty of the courts of member states prevails 
over the agreement of the parties. Any violation of this principle is not acceptable no matter 
what the pretext. The ECJ has rejected the principle of the end justifies the means,
901
 decided 
that the sovereignty of the courts of member states should be respected by outlawing anti-suit 
injunctions whatever their aim. 
 
6.1.4.9.2 Anti-anti-suit injunction (Clash of Jurisdictions)   
 
The granting of an anti-suit injunction could lead to a tragic situation, where two courts grant 
injunctions to prevent each party from bringing anti- suit proceedings in a foreign court.902 In 
such case, there will be a clash between what could be called the anti-anti-suit injunctions, 
since each court suppose that it has jurisdiction to grant the injunction, leading to a conflict of 
injunctions. The KBC v Pertamina
903
 case embodies the previous hypothesis and reflects the 
complex situation, which could arise due to the granting of such inunctions.
904
 On the 28
th
 
November 1994, Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. (KBC), Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak 
Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina), the Indonesian state oil company, and PT. (Persero) 
Perusahaan Listruik Negara (PLN), a state owned electrical utility, agreed to jointly develop 
the 400 MW Karaha Bodas Geothermal Project in West Java, Indonesia. KBC and Pertamina 
concluded a Joint Operations Contract (JOC), which provided that Pertamina would manage 
the geothermal operations and KBC would be responsible for financing the Project and 
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building, owning, and operating the generating facilities. KBC, Pertamina and PLN further 
entered into an Energy Sales Contract (ESC) under which PLN was to purchase from 
Pertamina the electricity generated by KBC's facilities for specified prices. Both the JOC and 
the ESC contained a clause for arbitration of disputes in Switzerland according to the 
UNCITRAL Rules. 
On the 20
th
 September 1997 and the 10
th
 January 1998, the Government of Indonesia issued 
Presidential Decrees indefinitely postponing the Project. Pertamina and PLN became thus 
unable to purchase the energy to be generated by KBC's facilities. KBC commenced 
arbitration for breach of the contracts. On the 18
th
 December 2000, the Tribunal rendered a 
Final Award in favor of KBC, directing Pertamina and PLN to pay KBC a total of US$ 261 
million. KBC sought enforcement of the award in the United States. At the same time, 
Pertamina obtained an award from the Indonesian courts annulling the KBC arbitration 
award. Moreover, Pertamina has obtained an anti-suit injunction preventing KBC from 
commencing the enforcement process before U.S. courts.  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued an order to enforce the 
arbitration award. Moreover, it issued an anti-suit injunction requiring Pertamina to withdraw 
its Indonesian claim and to cease any proceedings before the Indonesians (an anti-anti-suit 
injunction). Unfortunately, Pertamina did not comply with U.S. court injunction, continued 
its claim and obtained another injunction preventing KBC from seeking to enforce the arbitral 
award.  
In this case, the U.S. courts have issued more than seven injunctions against Pertamina,
905
 
while Indonesian courts have issued many contrasting injunctions and judgements against the 
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orders of the U.S. courts. Finally, the U.S Court of Appeal in 2004 annulled the U.S. 
injunctions, while emphasising that District courts have inherent authority to issue an Anti-
suit injunction.
906 
 
Did the granting of an anti-suit-injunction in KBC v Pertamina impact positively or 
negatively on the arbitration process? It seems clear that the effects were very negative, and 
caused many clashes between national courts and harm to the arbitration process,
907
 as well 
as leading to many contradictory orders and judgements.  
It should be emphasised that the question of whether anti-suit injunctions should continue to 
be available is not merely academic. Apart from the fact that certain jurisdictions outwith the 
EU continue to grant them, although the ECJ has banned the granting of anti-suit injunction 
within the EU,
908
 the English Courts continue to grant this measure to restrain legal 
proceedings outwith the EU.
909
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6.1.5 Anti-Suit Injunctions under Egyptian Law.  
 
The Egyptian legal system, in common with other Civil Law systems, does not recognize the 
anti-suit injunction remedy. Therefore, the Egyptian laws that have links to arbitration 
proceedings, such as the Egyptian Arbitration Law 27 of 1994 or the Civil Procedures Law 
13 of 1968 contain no provisions pertaining to this measure. The Egyptian courts do not grant 
anti-suit injunctions. However, could an Egyptian court enforce an anti-suit injunction issued 
by a foreign court or by an arbitral tribunal seated outside or inside Egypt? The answers to 
these questions need to be examined in light of the situation under both the Arbitration Law 
and the Civil Procedure Law. 
 
6.1.5.1 Anti-Suit Injunction under Egyptian Arbitration Law    
 
Egyptian Arbitration Law does not include any provision addressing anti-suit injunctions. 
This may be because this measure in unknown outside Common Law countries, or because 
Egypt adopted the old version of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which (unlike the 2006 
version) did not encompass this measure. The nearest the law comes to an anti-suit injunction 
is Article 13(1), which provides. 
The court before which an action is brought concerning a disputed matter which is the subject of an 
arbitration agreement shall hold this action inadmissible provided that the respondent raises this 
objection before submitting any demand or defence on the substance of the dispute.   
This provision aims to protect an arbitration clause from any attempt to breach it by resorting 
to the court. Additionally, this Article deprives the court of any discretionary power to 
consider the dispute,
910
 by obliging it court to Rule that it is not competent to do so.
911
 It is 
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worth mentioning that the court cannot raise the question of an arbitration clause of its own 
motion, since it raises no issue of public policy.
912
 Therefore, if a party fails to raise the 
arbitration clause before any discussion of the merits of the case, his silence amounts to a 
waiver of his right to invoke the clause.
913
 Article 13(1) is to some extent doing the same job 
as an anti-suit injunction, since it protects the arbitration process from any infringement by 
giving the parties the right to plead the existence of arbitration clause before the court, which 
must stay the judicial proceedings until the arbitral tribunal settles the dispute.
914
 This Article 
is the only provision under Arbitration Law that protects the arbitration process, since the 
Egyptian legal system does not recognize the court‘s power to direct a party not to raise 
proceedings before a foreign court (the anti-suit injunction). 
Hence, a party to an arbitration clause (regardless of the place of arbitration) who wants to 
stop proceedings before the Egyptian courts relating to any dispute that the parties have 
agreed should be resolved by arbitration, can simply present the arbitration agreement to the 
court and request it to cease the action. In this regard, even though it may be alleged that the 
arbitration clause is invalid or null, Egyptian Arbitration Law has adopted the principle of 
competence-competence; which means that the court will refer these allegations to the 
tribunal to consider them under Article 22, which stipulates; 
1. The arbitral panel is competent to Rule on the objections related to its lack of jurisdiction, including 
objections claiming the non-existence of an arbitration agreement, its extinction, nullity of said 
agreement, or that it does not cover the subject matter in dispute. 
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2. … 
3. The arbitral panel may Rule on the pleas referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article either as a 
preliminary question before ruling on the merits or adjoin them to the merits in order to be ruled upon 
together. If the arbitral panel rules to dismiss a plea, such motion may not be raised except through the 
institution of a recourse for the annulment of the arbitral award disposing of the whole dispute pursuant 
to Article 53 of this Law. 
Hence, the Egyptian court has no jurisdiction to consider any dispute regarding the validity of 
the arbitration agreement, but must refer any such matter to the tribunal should a party raise it 
before the court. Article 13 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law is a suitable basis for dealing 
with any infringement of an arbitration clause, and thus has a similar effect to an anti-suit 
injunction. 
 
However, the question remains whether an arbitral tribunal could grant an anti-suit 
injunction. Theoretically, Article 24 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law imposes no restrictions 
on the arbitral tribunal‘s power to grant any measures deemed necessary in the dispute,915 so 
that an arbitral tribunal can grant an anti-suit injunction under this provision. Yet would the 
Egyptian courts enforce this injunction?  
 
6.1.5.2 Anti-Suit Injunctions under Egyptian Civil Procedure Law 
 
 
Article 1 of the Civil Procedure Law stipulates that ‗The Egyptian Civil Procedure Rules 
shall apply to all pending litigations within Egyptian territory after the date of this law‘, while 
Article 32 in the same law states that the ‗Egyptian courts are competent to adjudicate in all 
litigations within the Republic‘. Thus, an anti-suit injunction whether issued in or outside 
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Egypt, falls foul of these provisions, which give the Egyptian court‘s jurisdiction to consider 
all litigation within Egypt.
916
 Nor it is inappropriate to invoke the Egyptian rules regarding 
the enforcement of foreign judgments to enforce an anti-suit injunction,
917
 because Article 
298 of these rules requires that the foreign judgments must be res judicata, and adjudicate on 
the substantive matters of the dispute.
 
Moreover, it is unlikely an anti-suit injunction issued 
by an arbitral tribunal could be enforced under the umbrella of New York Convention, since 
it is not really an award but an order.
918
  
Of course, it would still be possible to achieve the anti-suit injunction's aim by invoking the 
arbitration clause to dispute the jurisdiction of the court to consider the substantive claim.
919
    
Inability to enforce such injunctions in Egypt does not strip the arbitral tribunal of power to 
grant such injunctions as long as they are sought to be enforced outside Egypt. 
 
6.1.5.3 Conclusion 
 
It is obvious that Article 298 stands as a legal barrier to the enforcement of foreign orders in 
Egypt, whether such orders are related to anti-suit injunctions or not. Therefore, Article 298 
should be modified by the addition of an exception which allows the enforcement of foreign 
arbitration orders, especially those orders which have been issued to deal with urgent 
circumstances,
920
 regardless of the finality or the subject matter of these orders. Without such 
modification, anti-suit injunctions will remain unrecognized under Egyptian law.  
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6.1.6 Anti-Suit Injunctions under Scottish Law  
 
 
Anti-suit injunctions are not mentioned in the Arbitration Scotland Act 2010. Injunctions 
under the Scottish legal system are known as interdicts.
921
 Interdict is a remedy granted by 
the Court of Session or Sheriff Court to restrain either a wrong in course of being done or an 
apprehended violation of a party‘s rights.922 Interdict is not an exclusive tool of the arbitration 
process, but is rather a general remedy, which could be used against all manner of wrongs, 
e.g. trespass,
923
 the protection of intellectual property rights,
924
 in landlord and tenant 
disputes,
925
 in industrial disputes and in many other types of litigation.
926
 Thus, the Scots 
courts can grant interdict to restrain any actual or threatened violation of an applicant‘s legal 
rights that takes place in Scotland.
927
 Hence, any attempt by a party to breach his undertaking 
to arbitrate by raising litigation would give the other party the right to request the court to 
issue an interim interdict to prevent his opponent from taking or continuing such 
procedures.
928 
Nevertheless, there is no actual case where the Scottish courts have issued an 
interdict to prevent a person from pursuing litigation outside Scotland.
929
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6.1.6.1 The situation after West Tankers 
 
Of course, the ECJ‘s judgement in Allianz SpA v West Tankers has limited the powers of 
courts within the EU to grant anti-suit injunctions (interdict in Scotland).
930
 As Scotland is 
part of the EU, its courts are affected. In light of the West Tankers judgment, the Scottish 
courts cannot grant an interdict restraining a party from bringing proceedings in the courts of 
any EU Member State,
 931
 although this prohibition does not extend outside the EU.
932
  
The Scottish courts might still issue a declarator that there is an arbitration agreement and 
that the parties are obliged to resolve their disputes by arbitration.
933
 However, obtaining a 
declarator is not an easy process, as it needs the court to determine first that there was a valid 
contract, which process might touch upon the substantive matters of the dispute,
934
 thus 
disinclining the court to refuse to grant such declarator.
935
 Moreover, any declarator would be 
ineffective within the EU, since and the court first seised will not be bound by it.
936
  
 
According to the West Tankers judgment, the EU courts may not grant an anti-suit injunction 
to restrain proceedings before the courts of a member state, and of course the Scottish courts 
will not be bound to enforce such injunction if it has been issued.  
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6.1.6.2 The power of arbitral tribunals to issue anti-suit interdicts under Scottish Law 
6.1.6.2.1 Where there is no agreement to make such remedy available 
 
The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 addresses the arbitral tribunal‘s power to conduct the 
arbitral proceedings in Rules 28-40 of the Act. These rules do not mention anti-suit interdicts, 
which suggest that the tribunal has no power under the Act to grant such a measure. The only 
Rule that might be construed so as to empower the tribunal to do so is Rule 49(b), which 
provides that ‗the tribunal‘s award may— (b) order a party to do or refrain from doing 
something (including ordering the performance of a contractual obligation)‘. However, any 
suggestion that Rule 49(b)‘s ambit could be extended to cover the issuing of anti-suit 
interdicts seems misguided for the following reasons: 
1. Rule 49 regulates the tribunal's power to make final awards, a view confirmed by the 
fact that Rule 49 is located under part 6 of the Act, entitled ‗Awards‘. Moreover, 
Rule49 is clearly based on s.48 of the 1996 Act,
937
 which regulates the arbitral 
tribunal‘s powers regarding the final award.938 The Policy Memorandum Paragraph 
170 emphasizes that the remedies mentioned in this Rule have a permanent nature and 
may only be granted in the final award. 
2. Rule 49 regulates the tribunal‘s power to adjudicate upon the substantive issue of the 
dispute, while by contrast anti-suit interdicts have a provisional nature.   
Therefore, unless there is an agreement between the parties to confer on the arbitral tribunal 
the power to issue an interdict, the arbitral tribunal has no power to do so.  
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6.1.6.2.2 The parties agree on this remedy 
 
 
Section 1(b) of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 recognizes the principle of party 
autonomy, so that the parties can confer any power on the arbitral tribunal. Nonetheless, in 
the light of the West Tankers judgment, an anti-suit interdict issued by a tribunal would be 
unenforceable within the EU Member states.
939
 Outside the EU enforcement would depend 
on whether the interpretation of the term ‗Award‘ in the New York Convention extends to 
this type of remedy. 
 
6.1.6.3 Conclusion 
 
 
The Scottish courts and in certain circumstances arbitral tribunals operating under the 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 have the power to issue anti-suit interdicts. However such 
orders would be ineffective within the EU, as a result of the ECJ‘s judgment in West Tankers.  
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6.1.7 Anti-suit Injunctions under English Law  
 
The anti-suit injunction is a creature of English law
940
 being used for the first time in Bushby 
v Munday
941
 in the beginning of the 19th century. The English courts' jurisdiction to grant an 
anti-suit injunction is founded on s.37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, which reads: ‗The 
High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction … in all cases in 
which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so. The ECJ's judgment in West 
Tankers has of course limited the power to grant anti-suit injunctions within the EU.
942
 Yet 
the English courts still grant such injunctions to restrain legal proceedings outside EU 
Members states,
943
 on the grounds that the decision in West Tankers does not prohibit the 
granting of the anti-suit injunction but only limits its scope. Cooke J in Shashoua and others 
v Sharma 
944
 commented that: 
There was nothing in Front Comor [Allianz SpA v West Tankers]which impacted upon the law as 
developed in the UK in relation to anti suit injunctions which prevented parties from pursuing 
proceedings in the courts of a country which was not a member state of the European Community‘  
   
However, some argue that the grounds of the West Tankers' judgment might serve to ban the 
application of this measure outside the EU Member state as well. The arguments are as 
follows.   
1. Advocate General Kokott in his opinion in West Tankers suggested that anti-suit 
injunctions infringes upon the sovereignty of foreign courts as regards their 
                                                 
940
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jurisdiction to examine the validity of arbitration agreement.
945
 This principle should 
not be exclusive to EU courts; it is a common principle that should prevail between all 
national courts. Hence, the granting of a unilateral anti-suit injunction by the English 
courts considers a violation of a foreign court‘s jurisdiction, whether within or outside 
the EU. Why should there be a difference between the notion of sovereignty of EU 
and non-EU courts?    
2. Moreover, the granting of anti-suit injunctions contravenes the New York convention, 
under which every court is entitled to examine its own jurisdiction under the doctrine 
of Kompetenz-Kompetenz).
946
  
 
Thus the reasons which have obliged English courts to refrain from granting anti-suit 
injunctions also operate at the international level, which means that the English courts should 
stop issuing anti-suit injunctions altogether.  
 
6.1.7.1 Arbitral Tribunal’s Power to Grant an Anti-Suit Injunction 
 
 
The Arbitral tribunal‘s powers to conduct arbitration proceedings under the English Act are 
organized by ss.38, 39 and 48.  
 
6.1.7.1.1 Tribunal’s Power under Section 48 
 
Most commentators agree that s.48 of the 1996 Act addresses the arbitral tribunal‘s power 
regarding substantive final awards,
947
 since it stipulates ‗1) The parties are free to agree on 
the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal as regards remedies…5) The tribunal has the 
                                                 
945
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same powers as the court- (a) to order a party to do or refrain from doing anything.‘ It has 
been seen that after the West Tankers decision, English courts have no power to grant anti-
suit injunctions within the EU. This means that the arbitral tribunal, even if the parties agree 
to do so,
948
 would be similarly restricted, since its powers are expressly linked to those of the 
court by s.48(5).
949
  
Moreover, the location of this section under the title of ‗awards‘, and the provisional nature 
of anti-suit injunctions, are inconsistent with the final awards that intended by s.48.
950
  
 
6.1.7.1.2 The Tribunal’s Power under Section 38  
 
 
Section 38(1) stipulates ‗The parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the 
arbitral tribunal for the purposes of and in relation to the proceedings.‘ It is obvious that s.38 
entitles the parties to confer on the tribunal the power to grant any remedy which will assist 
the conduct of the arbitration, including anti-suit injunctions.
951
 However, how is this affected 
by the ECJ‘s judgment in West Tankers? There is no doubt that the judgment affected the 
tribunal‘s power to grant an anti-suit injunction. This decision narrowed the spatial scope of 
such injunctions, since EU Member states will not enforce them due to their incompatibility 
with Brussels Regulation No. 44/2001. Nevertheless, such injunctions may still have forced 
outside the EU, particularly in common law counties that recognize the anti-suit injunction.   
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Professor Debattista draws attention to one of the main difficulties that may be encountered 
by an English court should a party refuse to comply with an injunction issued by the tribunal. 
Would an English court use its power under s.42(1) to enforce a peremptory order made by 
the tribunal? 
952
 The arbitral tribunal under s.41(5) has power to make a peremptory order 
demanding that a party comply with an order it has made within such time as it may 
prescribe, while s. 42(1) empowers the court to make an order requiring a party to comply 
with such a peremptory order that has been issued by the tribunal. It is suggested that, in the 
light of the West Tankers decision, an English court would not be able to make such order, at 
least in so far as it restricted access to the courts of any member state.
953
 Thus an anti-suit 
injunction issued by an arbitral tribunal seated in England will not be supported by the 
English courts despite the terms of s.42(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996.   
Nonetheless, the arbitral tribunal may be able to circumvent this difficulty by using the 
powers listed in s. 41(7), which states that if a party fails to comply with a peremptory order 
the tribunal may:  
 (c) Proceed to an award on the basis of such materials as have been properly provided to it 
 
Professor Debattista argues that if a party ignores an anti-suit injunction issued by the 
tribunal, it should seek to make an award as soon as possible, since the important thing is not 
who is first seised as much as who is first to judgment.
954
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6.1.7.1.3 The Tribunal’s Power under Section 39  
 
 
Section 39 is an opt-in provision, which means that the parties must agree to confer the power 
on the tribunal to make provisional awards; otherwise, the arbitral tribunal has no such 
power.
955
 Hence, the application of s.39 needs clear agreement between the parties, although 
no particular form of words appears to be required. Yet the section does not speak of issuing 
injunctions.  Secondly, the examples listed in s.39 regulate only to financial issues. By 
contrast an anti-suit injunction is an order directed at protecting the effectiveness of 
arbitration clause. Finally, s.39(3) stipulates that ‗any such order shall be subject to the 
tribunal's final adjudication and the tribunal's final award…‘. Since an anti-suit injunction is 
not subject to being reviewed by the final award, it would appear to fall outside this section.  
 
To sum up, the English system has been affected by the West Tankers decision. This change 
needs the intervention of legislators to amendment the Act so that it is compatible with the 
new situation. For example, s. 42(1) should be amended so as to make clear that anti-suit 
injunctions are excluded from its scope, thus preventing any misunderstanding that its current 
general phrases may cause among arbitration users in England. 
 
6.1.8 Conclusion 
 
 
Anti-suit injunctions are not the safest way to protect arbitration clauses, and the problems 
they create may be very complicated, as in KBC V Pertamina. There is no doubt that the 
protection of arbitration clause is a noble aim, but achieving this goal must not be 
compromise state sovereignty or collide with the jurisdiction of foreign courts. The principle 
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of the end justifies the means has no place in international relations, and invoking the 
principle of comity is insufficient to justify such unilateral action.
956
 However, one writer 
says; 
The unilateral attempt of the EU to regulate the practice of an anti-suit injunction through its own 
regional instruments is likely to fail because the problem of an anti-suit injunction is not a regional one, 
but a global one, requiring a global solution.
957
 
 
And another scholar puts it even more strongly, ‗I think it is fair to say that anyone interested 
in arbitration is not in favour of those injunctions.‘958 Yet the absence of clear provision in 
the New York Convention addressing anti-suit injunctions leads to a lack of the uniform rules 
governing practice in this area.  
Yet anti-suit injunctions could be reconciled with the public international law and avoid 
interference with state sovereignty, if they were recognized by an international treaty or at 
least by bilateral conventions.
959
 In this regard, the New York Convention is one of the most 
widely accepted international conventions. Accordingly, launching an international dialogue 
to modify the Convention by adding a new provision to recognise the use and enforcement of 
anti-suit injunctions would be a good start in finding an international solution to the problems 
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that currently surround this remedy.
960
 Such proposals will protect the arbitration agreement 
and facilitate the issue and enforcement of such injunctions.
961
 Until this happens, Egyptian 
law should continue to refuse to recognise this remedy. 
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Chapter 7 
 
7.1 The Conditions for Granting Provisional Measures 
 
Since the nature of interim measures involves many restrictions that could affect the subject 
matter of a dispute and limit a party‘s right to deal with his property or assets, it is necessary 
to set some conditions and prerequisites to prevent their misuse.
962
 Several Arbitration Laws 
and Rules address the conditions for granting interim measures.
963
 Most rules just recognise 
generally the arbitral tribunal's power to grant interim measures without setting any 
conditions for such measures to be granted.
964
 Some arbitration rules give examples of what 
might be considered interim measures and sometimes give the tribunal the power to set its 
own conditions.
965
   
 
On the other hand, certain arbitration laws set conditions inspired by territoriality. For 
example, the English Arbitration Act 1996 s.43(3) stipulates that ‗The court procedures may 
only be used if- (a)the witness is in the United Kingdom, and (b)the arbitral proceedings are 
being conducted in England and Wales or, as the case may be, Northern Ireland.‘ Moreover, 
Kerr L.J. observed in Bank Mellat v. Helliniki Techniki S.A that; 
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The grant or refusal of an order for security in international arbitrations must depend upon all the 
circumstances of each case. However, particular regard would, I think, be given to the degree of 
connection that the parties or the arbitration have with this country and its legal system.
966 
Hence, the conditions for granting interim measures may differ between arbitration laws and 
arbitration rules. 
 
However, the most significant legal regime in the arbitration arena is the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 2006. Article 17(A) of the Model Law lays down conditions for granting interim 
measures, which conditions are echoed in many arbitration laws and rules.  
(1) The party requesting an interim measure under Article 17(2) (a), (b) and (c) shall satisfy the arbitral 
tribunal that:  
(a) Harm not adequately reparable by an award of damages is likely to result if the measure is not 
ordered, and such harm substantially outweighs the harm that is likely to result to the party against 
whom the measure is directed if the measure is granted; and 
(b) There is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the claim. 
The determination on this possibility shall not affect the discretion of the arbitral tribunal in making 
any subsequent determination. 
(2) With regard to a request for an interim measure under Article 17(2) (d), the requirements in 
paragraphs (1) (a) and (b) of this Article shall apply only to the extent the arbitral tribunal considers 
appropriate. 
 
Additionally, Article 17(E)(1) stipulates that ‗the arbitral tribunal may require the party 
requesting an interim measure to provide appropriate security in connection with the 
measure.‘  
The UNCITRAL Model Law has come close to creating a kind of international understanding 
on conditions for granting the interim measures. This can be seen in several rules and laws, 
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particularly those adopted after the promulgation of the new version of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law in 2006.
967
 The conditions for granting the interim measures generally do not 
deviate far from what has been mentioned in the UNCITRAL Model Law. Of course, in 
arbitration practice conditions may be applied which differ from case to case because each 
case is dependent on its own facts, and the ultimate objective is to achieve so far as possible 
justice between the parties.
968
 Thus, for example, the impact of the measure on the subject 
matter of the dispute
 969
 may persuade the tribunal to request the provision of security in 
advance to cover the potential damage that could happen due to the granting of such 
measures.
970
 Furthermore, most arbitration rules that recognise the tribunal‘s power to grant 
these measures do not provide a lot of detail about these measures. Such rules give the 
tribunal wide discretion to invent its own conditions and to determine the sort of evidence, 
which will satisfy it that the requested measure is urgently needed.
971
  
 
Accordingly, the conditions for granting interim measures whether under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law or arising from arbitration practice could be said to fall into three categories, each 
of which features a number of sub-categories: 
1. Conditions relating to the circumstances of case 
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a) The urgency of the case972 
b) Irreparable harm  
c) Non-effect of the requested measures on substantive matters   
2. Conditions related to the arbitral tribunal  
a) The jurisdiction of the tribunal to grant an interim measure973  
b) Reasonable chance of success on the merits974 
3. Conditions related to the applicant 
a) Providing security975  
b) Making a request  
c) Good faith  
7.1.1 Case Conditions  
7.1.1.1 Urgency  
 
Interim measures are closely linked to the notion of the urgency, necessitating the 
intervention of the tribunal or court to avoid irreparable harm,
976
 e.g. if critical evidence was 
about to be lost forever or there was a risk that it would be destroyed or otherwise tampered 
with, such as to make it of no probative value.
977
 These examples illustrate the need for 
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taking expeditious action to protect the parties‘ rights.978 Thus, Cooke J in Hiscox 
Underwriting Ltd v Dickson Manchester & Co Ltd noted that: 
The evidence shows that the risks written under the binding authority agreement by DM are 
approaching renewal on a daily basis and that in order to offer renewal to its insureds, whether directly 
or via placing brokers, access to the records maintained by DM relating to the insurances bound under 
the binding authority agreement is a matter of critical importance. It is also a matter of urgency. If 
Hiscox is not able to offer renewal to its insureds it stands to lose an annual book of business which is 
worth approximately £6.5 million at a rate of about £500,000 net premium income per month, or 
approximately £25,000 per day.
979
 
 
Hence, necessity and urgency are the most essential conditions to grant most the interim 
measures.
980
 The arbitral tribunal in Perenco Ecuador Limited v. Republic of Ecuador stated 
that ‗[The tribunal] will not judge that circumstances require the grant of provisional 
measures unless it judges such measures to be necessary and urgent.‘981 
 
Considerations of urgency drove a number of arbitration bodies create provisions regulating 
the appointment of an emergency arbitrator, who will consider applications for interim 
measures before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. For example, Article 29 of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 2012 stipulates ‗A party that needs urgent interim or conservatory measures 
that cannot await the constitution of an arbitral tribunal (―Emergency Measures‖) may make 
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an application for such measures pursuant to the Emergency Arbitrator Rules in Appendix 
V.‘982   
 
It is obvious that whether the circumstances of the case are urgent or not must be a matter for 
the arbitral tribunal‘s judgment. Therefore most arbitration laws and rules use words such as 
‗if [the Tribunal] considers that the circumstances so require‘ to indicate such discretion.983 
The situation has parallels in litigation. In Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Ali,
984
 
Warren J granted a freezing order over real property in the United Kingdom, since he 
considered that there was a real risk of dissipation of the debtor‘s assets. He remarked at para 
67 that; 
I have a concern about the disposal of property to the sister of Stoner Road. There was nondisclosure 
initially of the Payments and I am satisfied that there is a propensity to take financial duties with 
considerable latitude. This is not perhaps the strongest case one has ever seen for dissipation, but 
nonetheless there is a real risk, in my view, of dissipation.  
7.1.1.2 Irreparable Harm  
 
Coulson J in Travelers Insurance Company Ltd v Countrywide Surveyors Ltd, gave some 
examples of what he considered to be irreparable harm ‗critical evidence was about to be lost 
forever or there was a risk that it would be destroyed or otherwise tampered with, such as to 
make it of no probative value.‘985 Thus, the granting of the interim measures in such cases 
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become essential to protect a party‘ rights, whether in terms of preserving evidence or 
assets.
986
  
 
Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 speaks of ‗harm not adequately reparable by 
an award of damages.‘ This provision therefore envisages two kinds of harm, one which can 
be compensated by an award of damages, and one which cannot. Only in the latter case 
should the grant of an interim measure be contemplated.
987
 In the analogous context of 
litigation, Cooke J observed in Lauritzen Cool AB v Lady Navigation Inc: 
In assessing the inadequacy of damages so as to justify an injunction, the Court can take into account 
not only the unquantifiability of damages to be suffered and, the difficulty of assessment, but the 
irrecoverability of damages at law because of a liquidated damages or exception clause or because loss 
is suffered not by the applicant himself but by others or in some intangible way. The purpose of an 
interlocutory injunction is protection not just against loss which would sound in damages but against 
violation of any right where damages would not be adequate compensation. Loss of goodwill, loss of 
reputation and, in the context of a reefer pool, loss of competitiveness or marketability are all matters 
which can be taken into account.
988
 
 
Accordingly, an arbitral tribunal shall not grant an interim measure if any possible harm 
resulting would have an insignificant impact on a party's rights,
989
 and if it could be simply 
compensated by the final award.
990
 Sir Nicolas Browne, in Porzelack KG v Porzelack (UK) 
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Ltd, dismissed an application for security for costs because there was no evidence of potential 
harm.
991
   
7.1.1.3 The Non-effect of the requested measures on the substantive matters 
 
Some interim measures might affect the subject matter of the dispute, such as an interim 
payment.
992
 Such a measure sees the applicant requesting the arbitral tribunal to grant him 
'provisionally' some cash in order to secure his financial obligations and avoid loss or damage 
to his business. It is obvious that this measure touches on the subject of the dispute, and thus 
may impact not only on substantive matters but also on the final award. Therefore, many 
arbitral tribunals are reluctant to grant such measures.
993
 For example, the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal dismissed an application to order a transfer of the goods in dispute to the warehouse 
of the applicant, because such a measure could have affected the arbitration final award.
994
 In 
the same context, an arbitral tribunal in an ICC case refused to grant an interim payment, 
since the question of whether payment was due was ‗seriously contested‘, so that granting the 
measure was ‗too closely linked with the solution of whole dispute.‘995 
 
On the other hand, an arbitral tribunal in deciding whether to grant such a measure may need 
to examine briefly documents and evidence relating to the dispute, without actually 
considering the merits of the dispute, which should only be done at a full hearing in the 
                                                 
991
 Porzelack KG v Porzelack (UK) Ltd, [1987] 1 All E.R. 1074. 
992
 See Chapter 5. 
993
 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Behring International, Inc v Iranian Air Force, 8 Iran-US CTR 44, cited in Lew, 
D. M. Julian, Loukas A. Mistelis, Stefan Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 
Law international, 2003) 605. 
994
 Ibid. 
995
 ICC Partial Award 9984 of 1999 cited in Ali Yesilirmak, Provisional Measures in International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 219 footnote 255.  
255 
 
presence of the parties. In the analogous context of litigation, Rix J said in Renel v Gulf 
Petroleum: 
Having looked briefly at the pleadings in the arbitration and at some essential documents..., I will say 
nothing further than that I put out of account for the purpose of this application any question of the 
merits in the arbitration and I say nothing whatsoever about them.
996
   
 
Since measures such as interim payments may affect the subject of the dispute, some scholars 
consider that such measure should only be granted in relation to undisputed sums, to avoid 
prejudicing the subject matter of the dispute.
997
 In this context, the DAC Report stated that 
‗enormous care has to be taken to avoid turning what can be a useful judicial tool into an 
instrument of injustice.‘998 Generally, an arbitral tribunal should balance between the harm, 
which might result from granting such measures on the one hand and from rejecting the 
application on the other.
999
  
7.1.2 Conditions of the Arbitral Tribunal  
 
7.1.2.1 The Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to take Interim Measures 
 
An arbitral tribunal‘s jurisdiction to grant interim measures will differ from one case to 
another, and depends on many different elements in the arbitration process. For example, the 
applicable procedural law may makes the tribunal‘s power to grant an interim measure a 
default power, so that a tribunal has jurisdiction to grant an interim measure without needing 
                                                 
996
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the parties‘ consent.1000 On the other hand, some arbitration laws make the power to grant 
certain measures dependent on the agreement of the parties. Thus unless the parties have 
positively agreed to confer such power, the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction to take grant 
such measures.
1001
 Accordingly, a party should first check whether the arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction to grant the interim measures sought before considering applying for such 
measures.
1002
 If the tribunal lacks such jurisdiction, the parties may be able to resort to a court 
to obtain such measures, without this step being considered a waiver of the arbitration 
agreement.
1003
 
 
7.1.2.2 Reasonable Chance of Success on the Merits 
 
 
Some arbitration rules and laws require that the applicant should have a good chance of 
succeeding on the merits before the tribunal may grant him an interim measure.
1004
 In other 
words, the arbitral tribunal should believe that the applicant‘s chance of winning the dispute 
is better than his opponent‘s. In order for the arbitral tribunal make an ‗overall 
assessment‘1005 of this case, it needs to consider the merits of dispute to reach such 
                                                 
1000
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conclusion.
1006
 This runs the risk of prejudicing the independence of the tribunal,
1007
 because 
it must reach a preliminary opinion on the merits before conducting any hearing or examining 
any evidence.
1008
 For this reason, many tribunals overlook this condition, so as to avoid any 
challenge to their independence, and instead rely on the urgency of the case as the primary 
criterion determining whether to grant such a measure.
1009
 
 
7.1.3 Conditions of the Applicant 
7.1.3.1 Providing Security  
 
Article 17E(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates ‗The arbitral tribunal may require 
the party requesting an interim measure to provide appropriate security in connection with the 
measure.‘ 1010 The notion of security in Article 17 is different from the notion of security for 
costs.
1011
 Security in Article 17 contemplates covering the expenses arising from the measure 
and any damage that results from the measure.
1012
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The arbitral tribunal may request the applicant to provide security if it believes that there is a 
serious risk that the granting of the measure will cause damage to the other party.
1013
 The 
relevant laws and rules tend not to prescribe a specific form for such security, so a party can 
generally provide any form of security as long as the tribunal regards it as effective.
1014
 The 
amount of any security obviously is dependent on the tribunal‘s estimation of the sum that 
could be required to compensate the party for the loss which may arise from the measure.
1015
 
The security should not exaggerate or exceed the value of the subject matter of the dispute; 
otherwise the measure will be a bar to an arbitration claim. 
 
An arbitral tribunal which believes that security should be provided will usually refrain from 
granting the measures sought until security is provided.
1016
 However, the arbitral tribunal 
should not obstruct the grant of appropriate interim measures by requesting an extreme 
security from the applicant. The fear that this might occur might explain the refusal of the 
UNCITRAL Working Group to include this condition in Article 17A. The relevant report 
states that a ‗general view emerged that the granting of security should not be a condition 
precedent to the granting of an interim measure.‘1017    
                                                 
1013
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7.1.3.2 Party request  
 
Article 17(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates ‗Unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant interim measures.‘ In order 
for the arbitral tribunal to grant an interim measure, it needs to know that there is a risk of 
damage unless the measure is granted. The only way for the tribunal to discover such facts is 
through a party‘s application, which will indicate the circumstances that could affect his 
rights and why an interim measure is necessary to avoid such harm. Therefore, the granting 
of a measure tends to be dependent on a party requesting it. A party's application should 
highlight the circumstances that justify the granting of the interim measure, and present the 
evidence that supports the application. Otherwise, the tribunal or court should dismiss his 
request.
1018
      
 
7.1.3.3 Good faith (bona fide)1019  
 
The interim measures system is a tool to protect the rights of the parties during the arbitration 
proceedings. The arbitral tribunal should be careful that the tool is not exploited by a party 
acting in bad faith as a tactic to hinder or delay the arbitration process. Herbert E. Meister 
sought thus to define the meaning of 'bad faith' in Senso Di Donna's Trade Mark case and 
held that; 
Bad faith is the opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving, but not limited to actual or 
constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or any other sinister motive. 
Conceptually, bad faith can be understood as a ―dishonest intention‖…The words ―bad faith‖ are not 
                                                 
1018
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apt for definition. They have to be applied to the relevant facts of each case. The test is the combined 
test and the standard must be that of acceptable commercial behaviour observed by reasonable and 
experienced persons in the particular commercial area being examined.
1020 
 
Hence, any application for the interim measures should be made in good faith,
1021
 and any 
application reliant on dishonest intention should be considered in bad faith and dismissed.
1022
 
For example, an application for security might be intended to frustrate a valid claim where 
the defendant knew that the claimant would not be able to comply with the tribunal order, and 
would thus have to abandon the claim. In such case, the arbitral tribunal should dismiss the 
application on the basis that it is made in bad faith. In one ICC case the arbitral tribunal did 
indeed dismiss an application for security for costs on the ground that the applicant should 
have been aware of his contracting partner‘s financial difficulties.1023  
 
Some measures may be seen as designed to counter a party acting in bad faith. Thus an anti-
suit injunction, restrains a party from commencing or pursuing proceedings before a foreign 
court in breach of the arbitration agreement.
1024
  
 
The arbitral tribunal when conducting the arbitration process should avoid any unnecessary 
delay or expense,
1025
 and thus reject any suspicious application from a party who is just using 
the application in bad faith as a tactic to delay the process.
1026
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7.1.4 Conclusion 
 
The conditions applicable to interim measures differ from one case to another depending such 
elements as the seat of the arbitration, the type of the measure sought and or the law 
applicable to the merits of the dispute. 
 
7.1.5 The Conditions for granting Interim Measures under Egyptian Arbitration Law 
 
7.1.5.1 The Arbitral Tribunal’s Conditions 
 
 
There is no doubt that the arbitral tribunal can be given discretion to set whatever conditions 
it wishes regarding the grant of interim measures where the relevant arbitration law has 
adopted the principle of party autonomy as regards the conduct of the arbitral proceedings.
1027
 
Article 24 of the Egyptian Arbitration Act does not contain explicit conditions for the 
granting of interim measures.
1028
 It provides: 
Both parties to the arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral panel the power to order, upon 
request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject 
matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the 
measure ordered. 
 
Nevertheless, this Article indirectly indicates to what could be considered conditions for such 
measures. It requires that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to grant such measures on a 
                                                                                                                                                        
1026
 Jeff Waincymer, Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2012) 
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Arbitration (Dar El-Nahda El-Arabia, Cairo 1997) 25. 
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party‘s request, taking into account the urgency of the situation and the need to provide 
security. 
7.1.5.1.1 The Arbitral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction 
 
Article 24 makes the arbitral tribunal's power to grant interim measures an opt-in power, 
which means that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant such measures unless the parties 
agree to do so.
1029
 Article 12 further requires that any such agreement to be in writing. Article 
24 does not determine an exact time for such agreement to be reached. Therefore, the parties 
can agree on such matter at any time before or during the proceedings. If they failed to reach 
such agreement a party who has exhausted all arbitral recourse may seek an interim measure 
from the Court of Appeal under Article 14. 
 
7.1.5.1.2 Necessity for the Interim Measures  
 
Article 24 requires that the interim measures should be necessary in respect of the subject 
matter of the dispute. That means that interim measures should only be granted to protect a 
part right from real dangers that threaten his rights that relate to the dispute.
1030
 It is the job of 
the arbitral tribunal to determine whether such necessity exists, and what sort of measure is 
suitable, briefly examining relevant documents and evidence of the case in order to make that 
judgment. The estimation of the urgency of the case and the necessity for the interim measure 
should rely, in the first place, on the nature of the subject matter of the dispute, rather on the 
party's description of his case. For example, if a party requests a sale of goods order in a 
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dispute that relates to a construction project or a freezing order in a dispute that relates to the 
sale of goods, such an application must be rejected because the requested measures do not 
relate to the subject matter of the dispute as required by Article 24. 
7.1.5.1.3 Party request 
 
Article 24 makes a tribunal‘s power to grant an interim measure contingent on the request of 
a party. Thus, the arbitral tribunal cannot grant an interim measure of its own motion. Article 
24 does not indicate a specific time or an exact form for such application. Nevertheless, any 
such application should show the grounds for the request, the evidence that supports it, proof 
that there is a risk to the applicant‘s rights, and must finally specify the interim measure 
required.
1031
 
 
7.1.5.1.4 The linking between the required Measures and the Subject of the Dispute 
 
Article 24 stipulates that; 
Both parties to the arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral panel the power to order, upon 
request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject 
matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the 
measure ordered‘  
The phrase ―in respect of the subject matter of the dispute‖ has a particular significance, as it 
indicates that any required interim measures should be linked to the subject matter of the 
dispute. By virtue of this provision, any measure has no direct link to the subject of the 
dispute unlikely be granted. Hence, this provision excludes security for costs; as such a 
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measure is not related to the substance of the dispute.
1032
 Although this provision has been 
excluded from the UNCITRAL Model Law, it still exists under the Egyptian Arbitration 
Law.    
7.1.5.1.5 Providing Security 
 
 
Article 24 gives the arbitral tribunal the right to request the applicant to provide security to 
cover any damage, which could happen due to the granting of the interim measure. Provision 
of security is an optional condition, so the arbitral tribunal can make the granting of the 
application conditional on the providing of such security, or it could ignore such condition 
entirely if it saw no need for security. There is no provision under the Egyptian Arbitration 
Law regulating the provision of security. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal is free to apply the 
applicable substantive law on this subject, or it can follow the Articles that regulate the 
provision of security under Egyptian Civil Law - Articles 772-801. These Articles regulate 
everything related to the security, such as the conditions applicable to security,
1033
 the types 
security,
1034
 and how to provide it.   
 
7.1.5.2 Conclusion 
 
There are no specific conditions under Egyptian Arbitration law that should be satisfied 
before granting interim measures. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal seems to have a wide 
discretion to set conditions.  In this context, before any interim measures are granted it will 
often be required that a party has requested them and they are shown to be necessary. The 
                                                 
1032
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phrase ―in respect of the subject matter of the dispute‖ in Article 24 detracts from the 
tribunal‘s power to grant any measures deemed necessary in arbitration dispute, as it excludes 
some important measures such as security for costs. Therefore, reform of Article 24 seems 
necessary to give the tribunal full power to protect the parties‘ rights from beginning to end. 
In this regard, Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 would seem to offer a good 
blueprint for reform.   
 
7.1.5.3 The Conditions under Egyptian Civil Procedure Law 
7.1.5.3.1 Urgency 
 
 
Article 45 of the Civil Procedure Law 13 of 1968 requires two conditions to be in place 
before the granting of interim measures - urgency and not prejudice the substantive claim. If 
these conditions are not met, the court has no inherent jurisdiction to grant interim measures, 
as the conditions are rooted in public policy.
1035
 While the court may Rule on such matters of 
its own initiative, any party can raise the issue before the court at any time.
1036
   
 
The definition of urgency under Egyptian Law has been considered the introduction of this 
chapter,
1037
 ‗the existence of risk or damage threatens parties' rights and needs in urgent 
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actions, which are not available in the normal proceedings.‘1038According to this definition, 
there are no limits on the concept of urgency under this law, as long as urgent action is 
required to stop or avoid any harm not adequately reparable by the substantive judgement.
1039
  
If such conditions have been fulfilled, the court of urgent matters can grant whatever interim 
measures are necessary to protect a party‘s rights whether against a party or non-party.1040  
 
7.1.5.3.2 Non-prejudice of substantive matters   
 
 
Article 45 requires that the requested measures should not impact upon the substantive 
matters of the dispute.
1041
 The court should not consider the merits of the dispute, as this is 
the exclusive right of the arbitral tribunal.
1042
 Hence, the judge‘s role in this case is just to 
scan the case file quickly, without seriously examining the merits of the dispute. Therefore, 
the court may not cite in its decision any grounds relating to the subject matter of the 
dispute.
1043
 The judge is prevented by Article 45 from considering any matter that has any 
connection or could affect the subject matter of the dispute. Therefore, if the Court feels 
unable to Rule on the matter without examining the subject matter of the dispute, it must 
reject the request for interim measures because it has no jurisdiction to decide this matter, 
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which is the exclusive right of the tribunal.
1044
 For example, the court may not consider an 
application for an attachment order if this application needs the court first to decide who 
owns the property, where this is the matter the tribunal has been asked to determine.
1045
  
 
7.1.5.4 Conclusion 
 
The arbitral tribunal under Egyptian Arbitration Law can grant any interim measure in 
arbitration dispute as long as it is empowered to do so by parties' agreement, and can attach 
any conditions to its order.
1046
 On the other hand, in an emergency a party can resort to the 
court, whether before, after, or during the arbitration process, to request interim measures to 
protect his rights.
1047
 
 
7.1.6 The Conditions for granting Interim Measures under Scottish and English 
Arbitration Acts 
 
7.1.6.1 Arbitral tribunal conditions for granting the interim measures 
 
There are no clear provisions under the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 or the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 that indicate the conditions for granting of interim measures in 
arbitration disputes. Nevertheless, such conditions might be deduced from the case law on 
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interim measures.
1048
 For example, Clarke L.J. in Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Limited 
1049
 
emphasised that urgency is one of the conditions for granting interim measures. Moreover, a 
few conditions are mentioned under s.39 of the English Act and Rule 53 of the Scottish Act - 
party agreement, the provisional basis of such measures, urgency, irreparable harm,
1050
  party 
request and arbitral tribunal consent. 
 
7.1.6.1.1 Agreement of the parties 
 
Section 39(4) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 stipulates ‗Unless the parties agree to 
confer such power on the tribunal, the tribunal has no such power.‘ Thus, the arbitral 
tribunal‘s power to grant interim measures relies on the parties' agreement to confer such 
power on it.
1051
 By virtue of s.5(1) such agreement should be in writing to clarify the ambit of 
the arbitral tribunal‘s power to grant such measures,1052 but there is no need to agree on every 
detail as s.39 gives some guidance as to the type of measures contemplated.
1053
  
 
7.1.6.1.2 Provisional Basis 
 
Albeit Rule 53 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 addresses provisional awards, it is the 
equivalent of s.39 of the English Act,
1054
 so it will be appropriate to examine the conditions 
                                                 
1048
 Kastner v Jason [2004], EWHC 592 (Ch), Permasteelisa Japan UK v Bouygesstroi, [2007] All E.R. (D) 97 
(Nov), LauritzenCool AB v Lady Navigation Inc, [2004] EWHC 2607 (Comm). 
1049
 Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Limited [2005] EWCA Civ 618. 
1050
 This will be discussed under the court conditions for granting interim measures.  
1051
 Kastner v Jason [2004], EWHC 592 (Ch). 
1052
 Kastner v Jason [2004], EWHC 592 (Ch), 
1053
 David ST. John Sutton, Judith Gill, Russell on Arbitration (22
nd
 edn, Sweet&Maxwell, 2003) para 5-106.   
1054
 Fraser Davidson, Davidson Fraser, Arbitration (2
nd
 edn W. Green, Edinburgh 2012) para 17.02. 
269 
 
under which such an award can be made. Rule 53 took the opposite view to s.39 in 
recognising the arbitral tribunal‘s power to make a provisional award, without making this 
power dependent on the parties‘ agreement.1055 However, because a provisional award is just 
that, any relief awarded under the Rule must be provisional and thus subject to being 
superseded by the final award. If under the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 any relief is not 
awarded on a provisional basis, it is not truly provisional relief, but rather a partial award 
under Rule 54 of the Act.   
 
7.1.6.2 Court conditions for granting interim measures 
 
Rule 46 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 and s.44 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 
regulate the court‘s power in relation to the arbitration proceedings and require three 
conditions to enable a court to grant an interim measure: 
1. Agreement of the parties 
2. Commencement of the arbitration process 
3. Urgency 
 
7.1.6.2.1 Agreement of the parties 1056 
 
The court‘s power under s.44 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 is a default power, which 
means that the parties may agree to remove or reduce the court‘s power to take interim 
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measures.
1057
 In the absence of such agreement, the court is fully empowered to grant interim 
measures.   
7.1.6.2.2 Commencement of the arbitration process and arbitral tribunal consent  
 
Rule 46 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 distinguishes between two cases - where the 
application has been submitted before the arbitration has begun, and where the application 
has been submitted after this stage. In the latter case, the applicant must have the consent of 
the tribunal or the other party; otherwise, the application will be dismissed.
1058
 That being 
said, if the case is urgent the consent of the arbitral tribunal becomes unnecessary, as urgency 
is considered to be a sufficient ground for court intervention.
1059
  In the former case, the court 
can take any measures deemed necessary to preserve the party‘s rights1060 whether ex parte or 
inter parties,
1061
 as its power in this case becomes unfettered 
 
7.1.6.2.3 Urgency 
 
Under both Acts, the existence of urgency gives the court jurisdiction to grant interim 
measures to protect a party‘s rights.1062 It is for the court to determine whether the case is 
urgent or not, based on the circumstances of the case and any evidence submitted on the 
matter.
 1063
 If the court is satisfied that the case is urgent it will have jurisdiction to grant 
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interim measures,
1064
 otherwise it must dismiss the application.
1065
  If the court decides that 
the case is not urgent, it will have no jurisdiction to grant interim measures, unless the 
applicant has the consent of the tribunal or his opponent to the application.
 1066
 
 
7.1.6.3 Conclusion 
 
The granting of interim measures, whether under Egyptian, Scottish, and English Arbitration 
are subject to almost the same conditions for granting the interim measures in arbitration. 
The arbitral tribunal, if these conditions have been satisfied, can grant any type of interim 
measure to protect the parties‘ rights during the arbitration. If the party has obtained such a 
measure, s/he will be obliged to go to court should it become necessary that measure. The 
enforcement of interim measures under Egyptian, Scottish, and English law will be the 
author‘s next research project.    
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Chapter 8 
 
In this chapter, I will summarise the key findings and the contribution that this research 
makes to knowledge. I will outline the limitations of the research, and make suggestions for 
further research and recommendations to improve the law.  
 
8.1 Summary of the research 
 
 
1. The first part of the study was the introduction, which highlighted the important of the 
study of the interim measures in international commercial arbitration, particularly in 
Egypt. Moreover, it highlighted the reasons for choosing the subject - the major gaps 
under the Egyptian Arbitration Law 27 of 1994, and the Egyptian Civil Procedures 
Law 13 of 1968 relating to the subject of study. In this part, the researcher gave 
examples of the main studies of interim measures, whether on the international level 
or in Egypt. The review of these studies indicated a lack of knowledge of and research 
addressing the topic of interim measures. Most existing studies addressed the subject 
of the interim measures from the perspective of the authority of the arbitral tribunal to 
grant such measures. This research examines the theories that explain the tribunal‘s 
authority and the relationship with the authority of the court. Other studies do not 
explain the types of interim measures in depth, as this study does. Moreover, the 
reasons for choosing a comparative approach were highlighted.  
2. In Chapter 1 the researcher defined interim measures through studying many 
arbitration laws, rules, and case laws. The chosen definition was that mentioned in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 17. Additionally, Chapter 1 illustrated the 
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characteristics of the interim measures as a necessary introduction for understanding 
the legal nature of the various types of interim measure. 
3. In Chapter 2, the researcher examined the first type of interim measure - that which 
regulates the taking and preserving of evidence. This area was examined under 
Egyptian, Scots and English law. This comparative approach allowed the researcher 
to make a number of recommendations regarding improving the system of interim 
measures in Egyptian Law.
1067
  
4. In Chapter 3, the researcher examined interim measures directed towards maintaining 
the status quo. Again, he was able to offer recommendations for improvement, this 
time to both Egyptian and Scottish legislators. 
5. In Chapter 4 the researcher examined the issue of security for costs by studying this 
measure at international level, and then in the three main systems under review.  
6. In Chapter 5 the researcher studied issue of interim payments and how this measure is 
addressed in the legislative regimes under examination. 
7. In Chapter 6 the researcher examined anti-Suit injunctions and whether they should be 
considered as an interim measure or not. The researcher concluded that they should 
not. 
8. In Chapter 7 the researcher scrutinised the conditions for granting interim measures, 
both in a general way and in the legislative regimes under examination.  
8.2 Implications for Practice  
On the basis of the study findings, this part offers some recommendations which could help 
improve the arbitration process in the Middle East in general and under Egyptian law in 
particular. These recommendations are divided into three sections; the first is directed to 
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Egyptian lawmakers and arbitration practitioners; the second to Scottish Lawmakers, and the 
last to English legislators. 
 
8.2.1 Recommendations for Egyptian Lawmakers  
 
This study showed that every law system has strengths and weaknesses. The Egyptian legal 
system has adopted approaches that may lead to many contradictory situations. The Egyptian 
Arbitration Law adopted the principle of party autonomy, but when the Court of Appeal 
recognized this principle, the Court of Session annulled its decision.
1068
 This inconsistent 
situation under Egyptian Arbitration law system affects the efficiency of the interim measures 
system and may hinder the whole arbitration process.  
 
 
Therefore, the study recommends that; 
1. Adopting Article 17 sections 1, 3, and 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006.1069 
Article 17 would fill gaps in the current Egyptian Arbitration Law as follows: 
1) Unlike Egyptian Arbitration Law, Article 17(2) defines interim measures. Thus by 
adopting this provision the ambit of interim measures will be clearer, and such 
definition will help arbitral tribunals and arbitration practitioners understand their 
legal nature.  
2) This study showed that Article 24 of the Arbitration Law regulating interim measures 
is vague, equivocal, and has led to many conflicting judgements. Moreover, it still 
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contains the expression ―in respect of the subject matter of the dispute‖, which 
deprives the arbitral tribunal of the power to grant measures like ordering the 
provision of security for costs. On the other hand, Article 17(2) contains and lists 
variety of interim measures that could be used in arbitration disputes. This a list 
covers all kinds of interim measures, whether related to the arbitration process itself 
e.g., the anti-suit injunction, the parties‘ relationship, e.g. maintaining the status quo, 
or the subject matter of the dispute, e.g. preserving assets or evidence. Hence, the 
adoption of Article 17 would fix all these loopholes, and at the same time gives the 
arbitral tribunal the power to conduct arbitration proceedings effectively.  
3) Article 17A lays down the conditions for granting the interim measures, while Article 
24 of the Egyptian arbitration Law does not.
1070
 Hence, the adoption of Article 17A 
will improve the performance of the tribunal, as by indicating the conditions for 
granting the interim measures, the tribunal should be aiding in assessing the needs for 
interim measures more accurately. Moreover, this provision indicates to parties the 
conditions that should be fulfilled for them to make an application, which in turn will 
help them to base their requests on acceptable grounds.  
4) Article 24 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law has not addressed, in detail, tribunal‘s 
power over the interim measure after it has been granted, and whether it can modify, 
suspend, or terminate a measure, while Articles 17D and F address this issue 
appropriately. Article 17 D and F recognize the tribunal‘s power to modify, suspend, 
or even terminate the interim measure it has granted upon party‘s request or even of 
its own motion.
1071
 Moreover, Article 17F requires a party in whose favour the order 
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is issued to disclose any change in the circumstances on the basis of which the 
measure was requested or granted.
1072
  
Hence, the adoption of Article 17 D and F will fill the gaps in current Egyptian Law, 
and determine in a very clear way the tribunal‘s power in this regard, which would 
otherwise be unclear.   
5) Article 24 of the Egyptian Law has addresses the issue of security for loss in a very 
brief way, while this subject has carefully addressed by Articles 17 E and 17 G of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. Therefore, the adoption of these provisions will make this 
subject is consistent with the rest of the regime.   
 
2. The researcher recommends that the Egyptian legislator should allow courts and 
arbitral tribunals to issue anti-suit injunctions and to enforce such measures. 
Nonetheless, the researcher suggests that there should be treaties between Egypt and 
other countries to regulate the mutual enforcement of such injunctions in order to 
protect the arbitration agreement from violation from by a party, as the New York 
Convention did with arbitral awards. 
3. There should be a clear provision under the Arbitration Law allowing the arbitral 
tribunal to seek court help in obtaining evidence, as this question is currently unclear 
under Article 37.  
4. The Egyptian Arbitration Law preferably should contain provisions to regulate the 
court‘s power in arbitration dispute like section 44 of the English Arbitration Act 
1996 and Rule 46 of the Scottish Act 2010. By adopting this suggestion, court 
assistance would be more effective since it will avoid the procedural difficulties of the 
Civil Procedure Law.  
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5. The current Civil Procedure Law 13 of 1968 is not suitable to deal with international 
commercial arbitration in general and with the interim measures in particular. 
Therefore, two steps should be taken. The first is to create a new provision under the 
Civil Procedure Law to regulate and facilitate the arbitration process, particularly the 
taking and enforcement of interim measures. The second step is following the same 
process with regard to other relevant laws such as the Civil Law and the Evidence 
Law.  
The researcher believes that the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006 could form a useful blueprint 
for amending Egyptian Arbitration Law, particularly as regards the subject of interim 
measures.  
 
8.2.2 Recommendation for Scottish Lawmaker  
 
This study found that Rule 39(2)(d) of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 could impact 
negatively on the efficiency of the interim measures system, since a decision under that 
provision cannot be challenged as a result of Rule 71(3), and this is inconsistent with the aims 
of the system. Therefore, this study recommends that the Scottish lawmaker intervenes to 
rephrase Rule 39(2)(d) to prevent any misuse or misapplication.   
 
8.2.3 Recommendation for English Lawmaker  
 
This study highlighted the subject of Mareva Injunctions under the English Arbitration Act 
1996, discussed many arguments, and finally concluded that the arbitral tribunal should be 
empowered to issue a freezing injunction to preserve the evidence in arbitration. Therefore, 
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the study recommends that the English Lawmaker rephrase s.38 to remove any ambiguity 
about this question. 
 
8.3 Contributions to knowledge 
 
This study aimed to fill a gap in Egyptian legal literature, which lacked a study of the types of 
the interim measures.  
8.3.1 For Egyptian and Middle East Arbitration Laws   
 
 
The contributions related to Egypt may be applicable to the rest of the Arabic states in the 
Middle East, especially as have the same legal background since their arbitration laws derive 
from the UNCITRAL Model Law 1985 and their civil procedure laws from French law.  
1. This study is first research, which addresses the types of the interim measures under 
Egyptian Arbitration Law and Civil Procedures Law. 
2. This is the first study comparing the Egyptian Arbitration Law conducts common law 
jurisdictions such as England. This gives the study some exceptional features 
particularly in relation to the discussion of case law.   
3. This study for the first time examines security for costs measures under Egyptian 
arbitration law compared with many other jurisdictions. Therefore, this study will 
offer arbitration parties in Egypt or across the Middle East, an effective way to protect 
their rights from frivolous or nuisance claims. 
4. This is the first study to examine the anti-suit injunction in Egypt and the Middle East. 
Therefore, the study will offer arbitration practitioners and customers an in-depth 
study of anti-suit injunctions, which helps them to resist any improper use of such 
injunctions. 
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5. This study offers examples of interim measures at an international level, which could 
help lawmakers in Egypt make comparisons and take advantage of the ideas and 
experiences of other legal systems.  
8.3.2 For Arbitration in Scotland 
 
1. To the best of the author‘s knowledge, this is the first study of the Arbitration 
(Scotland) Act 2010 which addresses the subject of interim measures. It is hoped that 
later researchers will be inspired by its results to dig even deeper into the subject. 
8.3.3 For Arbitration in England 
 
1. This study highlighted the use of the Mareva Injunction in arbitration in England. 
After considering a wealth of arguments, it finally concluded that the arbitral tribunal 
should be empowered to issue freezing injunctions to preserve evidence.  
2. This study discussed the justifications which have been advanced to support the 
granting of anti-suit injunctions by the English courts, and concluding that most of the 
reasons used to reject the use of such injunctions within EU Member States apply 
with equal force to the use of such injunctions generally.    
8.4 Limitations of the research 
 
Naturally, any research has its limitations and this study is no different.  
1. One limitation is that the Egyptian case is relatively old because there is no system for 
properly reporting and classifying court judgements, particularly those related to 
arbitration. Therefore, the researcher found it difficult to access the most recent 
Egyptian cases.  
2. Secondly, there are no formal translations of many of the Egyptian laws examined in 
this study. Therefore, the researcher translated these provisions himself, thereafter 
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having the English translations confirmed by a number of peers who have a very good 
knowledge of both Arabic and English. Yet the fact remains that the translations are 
not official.    
8.5 Further research 
 
Further study should perhaps concentrate on obtaining the most recent Egyptian courts 
decisions and tribunals awards, because this could help examine the types of interim 
measures and their effectiveness in arbitration. This might assist Egyptian lawmakers in 
reaching a clear vision of the types of the interim measures that should be adopted, and those 
should be left.    
 
Research could also be done into the enforcement of interim measures, perhaps on a 
comparative basis. Such research could enhance this current study because it would provide a 
complete vision of interim measures under the systems in question from beginning to end. 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The research has had a significant contribution to the researcher‘s personal development. It is 
hoped that this will allow him to contribute effectively to the future improvement of Egyptian 
Law  
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